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The Policy Challenges 
of Increasing Longevity 
Paying the Costs of Living Longer 
Increases in life expectancy are no secret, yet government policy 
does not explicitly deal with their well-known consequences for Social 
Security ﬁnancing. Every day 12,000 baby boomers turn 50. Continu-
ing improvements in life expectancy mean that those people will live 
longer on average than any previous generation. That fortunate devel-
opment, however, poses public policy challenges as to how to pay for 
the living costs of those added years. 
This book focuses on public policy issues concerning Social Secu-
rity, pensions, and older workers that arise because people are living 
longer. The question it addresses is, “What should be the retirement pol-
icy responses to increased longevity?” Not only has increased longevity 
occurred for all major demographic groups, but people are healthier at 
older ages. This book draws on international experience to recommend 
solutions for U.S. policy. 
The premise of the book is that public policy should recognize lon-
gevity policy as a distinct area—as we do now, for example, for cli-
mate change. The reason longevity policy is best treated as a uniﬁed 
policy area is that the challenges arising from increased longevity are 
best dealt with when the interrelationships between work at older ages, 
Social Security, and pensions are recognized. Rather than separately 
treating the issues raised by life expectancy in policies toward older 
workers, and in other unrelated policies concerning Social Security and 
pensions, a uniﬁed approach toward policies concerning Social Secu-
rity, pensions, and work at older ages would facilitate making needed 
changes in each of the areas. Because of interconnections between these 
three areas, policy will be more effective if it considers them together, 
rather than separately. Furthermore, the book argues that policy should 
be developed that is directly related to the effects of increasing life 
expectancy. 
1 
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Social Security is projected to have insufﬁcient funding to pay 
promised beneﬁts on time. The 2010 report of the trustees of Social 
Security projects that Social Security will not have sufﬁ cient resources 
to pay beneﬁts on time starting in 2037, at which point it will be able to 
pay 75 percent of promised beneﬁts. The annual cost of Social Security 
beneﬁts represented 4.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and is projected to 
increase gradually to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2035 and then decline to 
about 5.9 percent of GDP by 2050 and remain at about that level. The 
projected 75-year actuarial deﬁcit for the combined Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASI and DI) Trust Funds 
is 1.92 percent of taxable payroll (Social Security Board of Trustees 
2010). 
When Social Security is reformed to deal with its ﬁ nancing insuf-
ﬁciency, the effects of the changes will depend on whether employ-
ers and workers extend work at older ages and what changes are made 
to pensions provided by employers. Features of Social Security affect 
when people retire, but so do pensions and labor market conditions. 
Living longer affects all three areas, so that policy dealing with greater 
life expectancy should address all three areas at the same time. 
Many of our social policies and employee beneﬁt policies were 
designed for an era when people had shorter lives. With the demo-
graphic changes occurring, it is time to reexamine those policies so that 
they ﬁt the realities of the new demographic era of living longer. 
LIFE-EXPECTANCY INCREASES 
Overall Gains and Distributional Issues 
The policies proposed in this book are speciﬁcally designed to 
address the effects of life-expectancy increases. Thus, as a starting 
point, it is important to understand something about those increases. In 
the past 50 years, the increase in life expectancy at older ages has been 
considerable. Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 14.4 years in 1960 
to 18.5 years in 2006, an increase of four years (Arias et al. 2008). This 
change has considerably increased the cost of providing pensions. 
Turner 2011.indb 3   5/17/2011 9:53:38 AM     
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Yet the full story is more complex than simply one of widespread 
increases in life expectancy. The United States has a diverse population 
in terms of both income and ethnicity. The disparities in life expectancy 
across some groups are large. When groups are broken into detailed 
categories by race, gender, and geographical area, the gap between the 
highest and lowest life expectancies at birth for race-county combina-
tions in the United States is more than 35 years (Murray et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, differences in life expectancy across demographic groups 
have increased in recent decades (Freedman et al. 2004).1 For example, 
disparity in life expectancy between whites and blacks is growing. (See 
Chapter 2.) 
Having important distributional (and thus social and political) con-
sequences, the increase in longevity for older persons has occurred 
mostly among those in the top half of the earnings distribution. A male 
in the top half of the earnings distribution who reached age 60 in 1972 
could expect to live 1.2 years longer than one in the bottom half. By 
2001, the gap for 60-year-olds had grown to 5.8 years (Waldron 2007). 
This large difference has major implications for public policy dealing 
with the effects of longer life expectancy. 
It is also important to note, however, that life expectancy improved 
for both earnings groups. Measuring life expectancy from birth for the 
male cohort born in 1912, researchers found that, among those in the 
bottom half of the earnings distribution, 50 percent were still alive at 
age 77. Those in the top half of the earnings distribution reached age 
79 before their survival rate fell to 50 percent. By comparison, for the 
male cohort born in 1941, the ages at which mortality reached 50 per-
cent improved to 80 and 86, respectively. Thus, this measure of life 
expectancy lengthened by three years for males in the bottom half and 
by seven years for those in the top half. 
The policy debate over the equity effects of raising the early retire-
ment age for Social Security or other changes based on improvements 
in life expectancy is determined to a large extent by the choice of the 
baseline comparison. Often in policy issues relating to equity, the 
choice of the baseline comparison is key.  If the baseline comparison is 
the present, then the differences in life expectancy by income are key. 
If the baseline comparison is the past, then the improvement in life 
expectancy by all groups is important. In that case, the increase in life 
expectancy for all groups can be viewed as justifying raising the early 
Turner 2011.indb 4   5/17/2011 9:53:38 AM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 Turner 
retirement age, which would leave no group worse off compared to the 
past. That is the perspective taken in this book. 
Other Demographic Changes 
As well as changes in life expectancy, changes in retirement age 
and in the age at which people enter the labor force also affect Social 
Security and pension ﬁnancing. In 1940, when Social Security ﬁ rst paid 
retirement beneﬁts and when the earliest age at which those beneﬁts 
could be collected was 65, workers reaching age 65 lived, on average, 
for another 13 years. Many workers began work at age 18, immedi-
ately after high school. These workers could work for as long as 47 
years before reaching the normal retirement age of 65. For a full-career 
worker, a pension plan could anticipate the amount of contributions 
needed to ﬁnance 13 years in retirement and could make these contri-
butions over a 47-year period. The number of years a full-career worker 
spent in retirement was thus between one-fourth and one-third of the 
number of years that worker had spent in the labor force. 
Now most workers claim Social Security retirement beneﬁts at age 
62 rather than at age 65. Many entered the labor force at a later age than 
in the past, often at age 21 or even older, rather than at age 18. This 
leaves about 40 years of work possible before an expected retirement 
at age 62, with a remaining life expectancy of approximately 20 years. 
Thus, a pension plan can anticipate about 40 years of contributions for a 
full-career worker to ﬁnance about 20 years of retirement. The number 
of years spent in retirement is about half of the number of years spent 
in the labor force, up from less than one-third in 1940 (American Acad-
emy of Actuaries 2006). This book considers both changes in retirement 
age (see, in particular, Chapter 4) and changes in life expectancy. 
The Cost of Increased Longevity 
What does increased longevity cost? Projected longevity increases 
are a major cause of the projected funding shortfalls for Social Security. 
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) has estimated the cost savings 
if beneﬁts were indexed for life expectancy, a proposal considered in 
this book. With that change, increases in life expectancy would reduce 
annual beneﬁts received by future retirees. That one change would 
eliminate 43 percent of Social Security’s long-term deﬁcit (CBO 2005). 
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In the long term, increases in longevity are the main aspect of 
demographic change that increases Social Security’s costs. A study by 
the Social Security Administration indicates that if a baseline of 2008 is 
chosen, increases in life expectancy after that date have little effect on 
program costs through changes in the dependency ratio for the ﬁrst 20 
years, but after 2030 they are projected to account for all the changes 
in the dependency ratio (Goss 2010). The dependency ratio is a key 
parameter in determining the costs of providing Social Security ben-
eﬁts. Thus, in the long term, increases in life expectancy are key. 
A related issue to increasing life expectancy is population aging. 
Populations age when people live longer and when fertility decreases, 
which results in there being fewer young people in the population. The 
aging of the baby boom population bulge also contributes to population 
aging. This book focuses speciﬁcally on increased life expectancy in 
terms of its effects and the possible policy responses, and only deals 
with population aging and the population bulge peripherally. 
While the future course of life expectancy is unknown, the Social 
Security Administration, other government agencies, and most demog-
raphers predict that it will continue to increase. One reason to expect 
that life expectancy at older ages will continue increasing is that the 
United States lags behind a number of countries in this regard. In 2005, 
life expectancies at age 65 for women and for men in this country were 
19.0 and 17.0 years. In that year, the ﬁgures in France were 19.8 and 
18.2. In Japan, they were 23.4 and 18.5. Compared to U.S. ﬁ gures, the 
ﬁgures were higher for women in at least 17 countries and were higher 
for men in at least 13 countries (National Center for Health Statistics 
2009a). 
THIS BOOK 
The remainder of the book is organized into four parts, the ﬁrst 
three of which all discuss various policy responses to increased longev-
ity. The ﬁrst of these, Part 1, deals with issues relating to the labor mar-
ket for older workers. It considers changes in the health of older work-
ers and changes in job requirements by employers, two issues affecting 
whether older workers could work longer. It argues that the evidence 
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supports the ability of most people to extend their working lives, mak-
ing feasible a policy that would encourage later retirement. The wide-
spread strikes in France when this was proposed in 2010 indicate that 
this can be an unpopular proposal. 
Part 2 of the book considers how Social Security policy is affected 
by increasing life expectancy. Its ﬁrst chapter examines automatic 
adjustment mechanisms that could be adopted to restore and maintain 
Social Security solvency, including raising the early retirement age. 
Social Security currently adjusts beneﬁts for postponed beneﬁ t receipt 
so that, for a person with average actuarial life expectancy, the present 
expected value of beneﬁts is roughly equal at age 62 or 63, thus provid-
ing neither an incentive nor a disincentive to postpone retirement. For 
people expecting to live longer than the actuarial average, there is an 
incentive to postpone retirement.2 
The question could be asked, “Why raise the Social Security early 
retirement age, given that Social Security provides incentives for some 
workers to postpone retirement already?” Social Security provides 
incentives for workers with longer-than-average life expectancy to 
postpone retirement because the increased beneﬁts they receive are for 
more than the average number of years. However, the actuarial adjust-
ment for postponed receipt of beneﬁts is insufﬁcient to provide such 
incentives to people with shorter-than-average life expectancy. In any 
case, regardless of the incentives, many people are shortsighted and 
take beneﬁts at age 62, the earliest age at which beneﬁts are available, 
even though they would be better off ﬁnancially if they postponed ben-
eﬁ t receipt. 
In discussions about policy reform of Social Security, participants 
often ﬁnd the issue of raising the retirement age confusing. Often, when 
those discussions refer to the Social Security retirement age, they are 
referring to the normal retirement age, which is a technical term for the 
age at which a person can receive what are considered to be full ben-
eﬁts. For people currently aged 62, that age is 66, but changes already 
enacted into law raise it to age 67 for people born in 1960 and later. 
When this book refers to raising the retirement age for Social Security, 
it is referring to the early retirement age, which is 62, but which for 
more than 20 years at the start of Social Security was 65. The reason the 
issue of raising the retirement age can be misleading is that raising the 
normal retirement age would have no effect on the earliest age at which 
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people can receive Social Security beneﬁts, which continues to be 62. It 
is equivalent, instead, to a beneﬁ t cut. 
Retirement income policy is fundamentally about making hard 
choices. This holds true for both individuals and national policymakers. 
An alternative to workers working longer is to increase workers’ sav-
ings and worker and employer contributions to Social Security and pen-
sion funds to pay for retirements that are being lengthened by increas-
ing life expectancy. Whatever changes are made in public policy, that 
option with respect to personal savings remains for individuals: those 
who wish to retire early can plan to do so by raising their savings. That 
said, many individuals ﬁnd retirement planning, with its long time 
frame, difﬁcult to do. 
In the public arena, politicians and the general public face the pos-
sible choice, among others, between raising the Social Security payroll 
tax and raising the Social Security early retirement age, so that beneﬁts 
currently receivable at age 62 would instead be received at age 63. Any 
change in the early retirement age would presumably take effect many 
years in the future, with a phase-in period starting at that point. Given 
the widespread antipathy toward raising Social Security contributions, 
and the improvements in the ability of people to work in their early 
sixties, this book presents the case for raising the early retirement age. 
The section on Social Security also contains a proposal for a new 
beneﬁt, called longevity insurance, that would be payable starting at 
age 82. It focuses on two vulnerable groups: ﬁrst, workers who retire 
at age 62 in poor health, with poor work prospects and little in retire-
ment resources other than Social Security; and second, retirees in their 
eighties who have spent down their non–Social Security assets and rely 
primarily on Social Security beneﬁts. 
Part 3 of the book looks at private pension policy as it is affected 
by increasing life expectancy. It discusses issues for 401(k) plans and 
for deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans. The most common type of pension plan in the 
United States is the 401(k) plan, named after the section of the tax code 
that enabled it. It is a deﬁned contribution plan, where the worker’s ben-
eﬁt is based on the amount accumulated in a pension account. Ways to 
encourage more people to annuitize their 401(k) plan account balances 
are discussed. 
The chapter on deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans proposes a new type of deﬁned 
beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy–indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plan. 
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Deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans are traditional pension plans, where the worker’s
beneﬁt at retirement is typically based on a beneﬁt formula that incor-
porates years of work and some measure of the worker’s salary. A life 
expectancy–indexed deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan would incorporate a feature 
of deﬁned contribution plans that provide annuities. It would “de-risk” 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans of most of the longevity risk that plan sponsors 
bear currently, which could encourage employers to provide deﬁned 
beneﬁ t plans. 
The book’s fourth and ﬁnal part is its conclusion, which consists 
of a chapter on policy recommendations. Yet public policy books 
shouldn’t be read like novels: readers need not wait for the suspense 
to be resolved at the end. While this book ﬁrst presents the evidence 
concerning the ability of many people to extend their working lives and 
the evidence concerning other policy prescriptions, readers who care 
more about the policy prescriptions and less about the development of 
the material supporting them should read the last chapter ﬁ rst. The next 
several pages provide a brief overview of some of the major policy 
recommendations. 
FIVE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the ﬁnal chapter provides a more detailed summary and jus-
tiﬁcation of the policy recommendations I make, this section provides 
an overview of ﬁve of the major recommendations (Table 1.1). Three 
of the recommendations involve Social Security. While changes con-
cerning Social Security that involve retrenchment are not popular, these 
changes are recommended within the context of recognizing that some 
changes are needed to restore solvency. 
1) Index Social Security Beneﬁts for Life Expectancy 
First, I recommend that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life 
expectancy, so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an 
increase in the lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of index-
ation has been adopted by Sweden for its social security program.3 From 
a lifetime perspective, this change is not a beneﬁt cut, but it does result 
in lower annual beneﬁts than otherwise. 
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Table 1.1  Overview of Major Policy Recommendations 
Policy area Policy Goal 
1) Social Security 
2) Social Security 
3) Social Security 
4) 401(k) plans 
5) Deﬁ ned beneﬁt 
plans 
Life-expectancy indexing 
of beneﬁts 
Raise early retirement age 
from 62 to 63 
Longevity insurance beneﬁt 
payable at age 82 
Require that annuities be 
offered when a deﬁned 
beneﬁt plan is not also 
offered 
Life expectancy–indexed 
DB plan 
Help restore solvency 
Raise beneﬁt level to offset 
beneﬁ t cuts 
Provide better targeting of 
beneﬁts; offset beneﬁ t cuts 
Encourage annuitization of 
401(k) plans 
Encourage provision of 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 
SOURCE: Author’s recommendations. 
With this type of indexation, every year, for each new retirement 
cohort, beneﬁts would be slightly adjusted downward to take into 
account the effect of increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of 
beneﬁts. The adjustment would occur for each cohort only once; thus, 
beneﬁts received at retirement would face no further adjustments for 
continued increases in life expectancy during the retirement period. 
According to calculations done by the CBO (2005), this change 
would reduce the present value of the 75-year Social Security deﬁcit 
by 0.5 percent of payroll, a reduction in the present value of the deﬁcit, 
in the CBO’s calculations, of 42 percent. The Congressional Budget 
Ofﬁce estimates that with this change the date of Social Security insol-
vency would be 2059, which is sufﬁciently far into the future that no 
further cost-saving changes would need to be made for at least a decade. 
This type of indexation results in a reduced replacement rate over time, 
an issue addressed by the following proposal. 
2) Raise the Early Retirement Age 
Second, I recommend that, using a long delay and phase-in period, 
the Social Security early retirement age be raised from 62 to 63. This 
change is consistent with policy in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and a number of other countries that have early retirement 
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10 Turner 
ages of 63 or higher (Turner 2007). An early retirement age of 63 is two 
years younger than what the early retirement age for Social Security 
was when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act 
and beneﬁts were ﬁrst paid in 1940. Life expectancy has increased for 
all demographic groups since 1940. 
This change could be accomplished in one of two ways. First, 
it could be done so that persons retiring at age 63 would receive the 
advantage of the actuarial adjustment currently provided for postpon-
ing beneﬁt receipt from age 62 to 63. This approach would raise the 
level of beneﬁts for persons who previously would have retired at age 
62, by providing an additional boost in their beneﬁts if they worked 
the extra year. This approach would not affect Social Security’s long-
run ﬁ nances. Alternatively, the second approach would provide, at age 
63, beneﬁ ts currently receivable at age 62. That approach does not cut 
annual beneﬁts for those who were going to retire at age 62, but it does 
cut lifetime beneﬁts and would result in cost savings. 
3) Add a Longevity Insurance Beneﬁt 
My third recommendation for Social Security is to add a new type 
of beneﬁt called a longevity insurance beneﬁt. Longevity insurance 
would be a type of social insurance providing beneﬁts to qualifying 
persons at an advanced age—initially set at age 82, but automatically 
increased to take into account future increases in life expectancy. 
As retirees age, they face an increased risk of poverty as they spend 
down their non–Social Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt 
would be paid by Social Security starting at age 82 for people who had 
at least 20 years of covered earnings and were receiving Social Security 
beneﬁts below a ﬁxed level. Payment would not require an application 
or a means test; it would occur automatically. It would be a targeted, 
cost-effective way of addressing poverty at advanced old age. Longev-
ity insurance could be included in a reform package to restore Social 
Security solvency that contained beneﬁt cuts, so that it would prevent 
beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at advanced older ages. It 
would not have the problem of low take-up rate, which Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) has, because eligible retirees would automati-
cally receive it. 
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4) Require 401(k) Plans to Offer Annuities, if They Are the Sole Plans 
A fourth recommendation I make is to require that 401(k) plans 
offer annuities when those plans are provided by an employer that does 
not also provide a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum standards of 
generosity. Initially, most 401(k) plans were supplemental plans pro-
vided by employers who also provided deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans. That is no 
longer the case, but they still are regulated to a large extent as if they 
were supplemental plans. This requirement would treat 401(k) plans 
that are the primary plan as pension plans rather than as savings plans, 
as they are currently treated. 
5) Permit Life Expectancy–Indexed Deﬁ ned Beneﬁ t Plans 
Because of the different types of risks that deﬁ ned beneﬁt and deﬁned 
contribution plans impose on participants, a pension system would be 
more diversiﬁed if it provided both deﬁ ned beneﬁt and deﬁ ned contri-
bution plans to most workers. In order to encourage employer provision 
of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans, my ﬁfth recommendation is that pension law 
be amended to permit a new type of deﬁ ned beneﬁt (DB) plan, called a 
life expectancy–indexed DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient 
bearing of life expectancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁned 
beneﬁt plans, which may encourage employers to provide such a plan. 
With a life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the gen-
erosity of the plan would be adjusted to take into account improve-
ments in life expectancy, which would be analogous to annuitizing a 
deﬁned contribution plan account using current life expectancy, or to 
the changes proposed for Social Security. Thus, cohort life expectancy 
risk would be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan 
sponsors because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase 
in life expectancy. This recommendation for deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans is 
equivalent to Recommendation 1 for Social Security. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The premise of the book is that public policy should recognize lon-
gevity policy as a distinct policy area. Policy should be developed that 
is directly related to the effects of increasing life expectancy. Rather 
than separately treating the issues raised by life expectancy concerning 
Social Security, pensions, and work at older ages, a uniﬁ ed approach 
should be developed that recognizes their interrelationship. A uniﬁed 
approach may facilitate the needed changes in each of the areas. Dealing 
with only one area may be more difﬁcult and less effective than dealing 
with all the areas at the same time. Together, the policies recommended 
in this book would encourage work at older ages, move Social Security 
toward solvency, provide better targeting of Social Security beneﬁts, 
increase annuitization of 401(k) accounts, and encourage employers to 
provide deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
Notes 
1. Healthy life expectancy, which combines morbidity and mortality, is an indicator 
of expected years of life lived in full health without disease or disability. 
2. Actuarial life expectancy is based solely on a person’s age, and sometimes gender. 
Some people have family histories where they expect to live substantially longer 
than their actuarial life expectancy. 
3. In this book, I follow the practice of uppercasing “Social Security” when referring 
to the U.S. system, and of lowercasing the term when referring to social security 
systems in other countries or to social security systems generally. 
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Can Older Workers 
Extend Their Work Lives? 
Changes in Health and Job Requirements 
This chapter addresses the question of whether workers would be 
able to work longer without undue hardship. This issue is key in formu-
lating policies to deal with the improvements in longevity. Speciﬁ cally, 
this chapter focuses on working past age 62, the early retirement age 
for Social Security. The question of whether it would be feasible for 
more workers to work longer has two parts. First, have older workers’
capabilities changed over the past several decades in ways that would 
facilitate their continued employment? Second, have job requirements 
changed in ways that would facilitate continued employment for older 
workers? 
While worker capabilities and job requirements can be viewed 
separately, ultimately the matching of job requirements and worker 
capabilities is what matters. Thus, the ultimate questions are “What 
percentage of the older workforce cannot ﬁnd jobs that match their 
capabilities as they age?” and “How has that percentage changed over 
recent decades?” 
In examining changes in worker capabilities and job requirements, 
this chapter looks back over the past 20 to 40 years, depending on avail-
ability of data, and focuses on people in their late ﬁfties and their sixties. 
WHY WORK LONGER? 
In a wealthy country such as the United States, some people ques-
tion why the issue of extending work lives is even discussed. As society 
grows wealthier, people want to spend more of their wealth on leisure, 
including longer periods of retirement. Can’t we as a society afford an 
ever-increasing share of adult life spent in retirement? 
15 
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Paying for retirement is expensive. Longer retirements mean greater 
costs for social programs. It also means workers need greater savings, 
which means reduced consumption while working. Workers individu-
ally and society generally need to face the hard choice of saving more 
to fund longer retirements or taking steps to postpone retirement. While 
saving more is an option to postponing retirement, the reality is that 
many workers are not setting aside sufﬁcient savings to fund longer 
retirement. One study of retirement savings has found that roughly half 
of households have insufﬁcient retirement savings, and the shortfall is 
staggering. The total shortfall in 2010 was $6.6 trillion dollars, a short-
fall roughly equal to the amount of savings in retirement plans (Retire-
ment USA 2010). 
In this era of increasing longevity and insufﬁcient savings, older 
workers able to do so may gain a number of advantages from working 
longer. They have more years to save and fewer years to spend during 
retirement. They have more years to earn beneﬁt credits in traditional 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans and Social Security, and more years to accumulate 
assets in deﬁned contribution plans. Beneﬁts that are paid as annuities 
will start at a later date, and early retirement reductions will be smaller. 
They face less concern about inﬂation eroding the real value of their 
beneﬁts during a lengthy period of retirement. 
In addition to these savings and cost issues favoring longer work 
lives, aspects of the labor market are more favorable to working longer 
than in the past. Many people have jobs that are less physically strenu-
ous than in the past. The move from deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned 
contribution plans reduces pension disincentives to continue to work 
at older ages. Changes in Social Security have raised the incentives to 
continue working past age 62, up to age 70. 
Yet working longer is not advantageous for all older workers. For 
example, older workers with relatively short life expectancy reduce 
their expected lifetime Social Security beneﬁts by postponing receipt 
of beneﬁts. This contrasts with older workers who have relatively long 
life expectancy, who raise their expected lifetime beneﬁts because of 
the increase in annual beneﬁts that comes from postponing retirement, 
and because of the relatively long period over which they will receive 
the increased beneﬁts. 
Statistics show that some men are working longer than did their 
counterparts in the recent past. Starting in the 1990s, the decades-long 
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decline or stagnation of labor force participation of men age 65 and 
older was reversed, and the labor force participation rate for men in 
that age group began to increase (Maestas and Zissimopoulos 2010). In 
1995, 51 percent of males aged 62 were working (Quinn 1999), but by 
2005, that ﬁgure had risen to 60 percent (Burkhauser and Rovba 2009). 
This chapter examines how changes in worker capabilities and job 
requirements over the past few decades affect the ability of older work-
ers to work past the Social Security early retirement age of 62. This 
issue arises because a possible reform of Social Security would raise 
the early retirement age from 62 to 63. This change might be made in 
conjunction with raising the normal retirement age in order to offset the 
reduction in annual beneﬁts that workers would receive when retiring 
at the early retirement age. The normal retirement age, also called the 
full retirement age, is the age set in the Social Security beneﬁ t formula 
where there is no reduction for early retirement. The name can be mis-
leading—it does not refer to when people actually (normally) retire. 
The normal retirement age is currently 66 but is scheduled to increase 
to 66½ for people who will reach age 62 in 2017, and to 67 for people 
who will reach age 62 in 2022. 
HEALTH INDICATORS AFFECTING THE ABILITY TO
WORK AT OLDER AGES 
A survey in the 1980s concluded that persons aged 62–67 had expe-
rienced increased longevity over the previous 20 years but that their 
health had worsened on average. Their health on average had declined 
because advances in medicine were enabling more unhealthy people 
to live to older ages. Disability rates and morbidity rates had increased 
(Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky 1986). While recognizing that 
improvements in medical technology and in healthy behaviors could 
reverse this trend, the study projected that the trend of worsening health 
at older ages would continue, because of improvements in medical care 
that enable unhealthy people to live longer than in the past. After look-
ing at trends in life expectancy, this section assesses the accuracy of 
the predictions of that study and shows that its gloomy assessment was 
incorrect. 
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Life Expectancy 
Improvements in life expectancy, if accompanied by better health, 
allow workers to extend their work life and still enjoy a longer retire-
ment. While life expectancy has improved generally in the United 
States, its rate of improvement has differed across demographic groups. 
Population life expectancy by age
Improvements in life expectancy can be measured different ways. 
Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 14.4 years in 1960 to 18.4 years in 
2000, an increase of four years (Robinson 2007). Let’s make a slightly 
different comparison: a person aged 62 in 1960 had a life expectancy of 
14.6 years, which was the life expectancy of someone aged 67 in 2000. 
Thus, by this measure there has been an improvement of ﬁve years. A
third way to measure changes in life expectancy is to compare the age 
in 2000 at which workers would have the same risk of death as a worker 
aged 62 in 1960. The average person aged 68 in 2000 had the same risk 
of death over the following two years as the average person aged 62 in 
1960, an improvement of six years over four decades (Cutler, Liebman, 
and Smyth 2006). 
Gender and race differences in life expectancy 
Examining differences over the past four decades in life expectancy 
by gender, a man aged 65 had a life expectancy of 12.8 years in 1960, 
compared to 16.8 years in 2003. The comparable ﬁgures for women 
are 15.8 years and 19.8 years (Robinson 2007). Thus, for both men 
and women life expectancy over this period increased by four years, or 
about one year per decade. 
Life expectancy improvements for blacks have lagged behind those 
for whites. Life expectancy at age 65 was similar for black and white 
males in 1950 and 1960 and for many years following. In 1975, black 
and white males at age 65 both had a life expectancy of 13.7 years 
(Table 2.1). However, by 2003, black male life expectancy was 14.9 
years, while that of white males was 16.9 years (CDC 2003b). Thus, life 
expectancy had improved for both groups, but had improved more for 
whites than for blacks, by two full years. While the reasons no doubt are 
complex, differential changes in smoking and in obesity may be factors. 
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Table 2.1  Life Expectancy at Age 65, 1950–2005 (by number of years) 
Year White men White women Black men Black women 
1950 12.8 15.1 12.9 14.9 
1960 12.9 15.9 12.7 15.1 
1975 13.7 18.1 13.7 17.5 
2006 17.1 19.8 15.1 18.6 
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2009b). 
Policy analysts sometimes argue that raising the early retirement 
age in Social Security would hurt blacks more than whites because 
blacks have a shorter life expectancy than whites. Instead of making 
comparisons across racial groups, however, we can make an intergen-
erational comparison between blacks currently and blacks in the early 
1960s. In that case, the early retirement age could be raised by at least 
a year. Doing so would still result in a higher number of years in retire-
ment for blacks and the same percentage of adult life spent in retirement 
in comparison to that experienced by the black cohort retiring in the 
early 1960s. 
If we take a more granular approach, life expectancy by race can 
be further divided into racial differences by geographic location. Doing 
so produces much greater differences in life expectancy than the differ-
ences just discussed (Murray et al. 2006). The gap in life expectancy at 
birth between the 3.4 million high-risk urban black males and the 5.6 
million Asian females was 20.7 years in 2001. The gap in life expec-
tancy at birth between the highest and lowest race-county categories 
(i.e., race average at the county level) was more than 33 years. The life 
expectancy at birth for Native American males in certain counties in 
South Dakota was 58 years, which fell 33 years short of the life expec-
tancy for Asian females in Bergen County, New Jersey, of 91 years. 
For some narrowly deﬁned groups, life expectancy at birth actually 
worsened between 1982 and 2001. For example, life expectancy wors-
ened for low-income females in Appalachia and the Mississippi Valley 
over that period. These disparities, which are enormous by international 
standards, complicate efforts at structuring public policy to deal with 
improvements in life expectancy, and suggest that policy changes need 
to take into account the situation of vulnerable groups. It is not possible 
to raise the early retirement age for Social Security and keep every race-
geographical location group as well off as its comparison group for an 
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earlier period. However, for major demographic groups, it is possible to 
meet that criterion. 
Socioeconomic differences in life expectancy 
Studies have documented differences in mortality by income, edu-
cation, and marital status (Brown 2001). Mirroring differences by race, 
improvements in life expectancy have not occurred at the same pace for 
all socioeconomic groups. In particular, the historical advantage in life 
expectancy of higher education groups compared to lower education 
groups has expanded over the past four decades for men but decreased 
for women. In 1960, the mortality rates for white men aged 65 to 70 
at the top of the education distribution were 10 percent lower than for 
those at the bottom. Mortality rates have decreased for both the upper 
and lower education groups. However, the improvements were much 
more rapid for upper education groups—mortality rates were 70 per-
cent lower for the upper income and education groups in the 1990s 
compared to the lower income and education groups (Diamond and 
Orszag 2004). 
Health 
As we have just discussed, people generally are living longer. How-
ever, those alive at the ages at which increased work might occur may be 
less healthy on average than in the past because medical improvements 
are allowing more unhealthy people to survive to older ages. This effect 
of increased life expectancy on health at older ages was debated dur-
ing the early 1980s when the 1983 Social Security Amendments were 
passed, raising the normal retirement age. At that time it appeared that 
health at older ages was declining (Social Security Administration 1986). 
Many jobs have low physical requirements, so robust health is not 
required to perform them. Thus, the low end of health may be more 
relevant currently than the upper end for determining ability to work 
for most jobs. Since the early 1980s, the percentage of older persons 
reporting that they are in fair or poor health has decreased (Table 2.2). 
Between 1982 and 2005, for the population aged 50–64, all demo-
graphic groups examined showed a decline in the percentage of persons 
reporting themselves in fair or poor health. For example, for blacks that 
percentage declined from 41 to 26 percent (Robinson 2007). 
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Table 2.2  Self-Reported Health Status Rated as Fair or Poor, Aged 50–64, 
by Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 1982–2005, Selected Years (%) 
Non- Non-
Hispanic Hispanic 
Year Women Men blacks Hispanics whites 
1982 24.4 23.2 40.9 29.6 21.7 
1985 21.0 20.4 37.1 25.3 18.6 
1990 18.1 18.0 31.8 24.2 15.9 
1995 20.2 18.5 33.2 28.6 16.7 
2000 16.4 15.4 26.9 23.9 13.6 
2005 16.3 15.8 26.4 25.2 13.9 
Difference, 8.1 7.4 14.5 4.4 7.8 
1982–2005 
SOURCE: Robinson (2007). 
The percentage of both men and women reporting their health as fair 
or poor has also declined. This trend suggests that a growing propor-
tion of the older population would be capable of working. In the mid-
1970s, 29 percent of men aged 62 reported their health as fair or poor. 
Two decades later, in the mid-1990s, that percentage was not reached 
by men reporting their health until they hit their early seventies—an 
improvement of 10 years over a 20-year period (Cutler, Liebman, and 
Smyth 2006). The improvement in self-reported health was more rapid 
than the increase in life expectancy. 
While the prevalence of self-reported fair or poor health declined 
for both men and women, a more complex pattern emerges for other 
demographic groups (Table 2.2). The largest decline over the period 
1982–2005 for people aged 50–64 self-reporting fair or poor health 
occurred for non-Hispanic blacks, causing a move toward convergence 
for blacks and whites. However, Hispanics have seen basically no 
improvement by this measure over the past 20 years. 
Despite these general trends of improvement over the past several 
decades, more-recent evidence is mixed concerning trends in health, 
and therefore the ability to work. Some evidence suggests a reversal 
in the trend of improving health at older ages (Korczyk 2002). A study 
of baby boomers aged 51–56 concludes that their self-reported health 
was worse than that of people the same age 12 years earlier (Soldo et 
al. 2006). Possible explanations for that ﬁnding include that obesity has 
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increased, that baby boomers are more likely than earlier generations 
to complain about health issues, that improvements in diagnosis and in 
pharmaceutical treatments have made people more aware of their health 
problems, or that this trend is the result of increased stress. The percent-
age of the population aged 50–64 reporting their health as excellent or 
very good has increased over the past several decades (Robinson 2007). 
However, the incidence of diabetes among the population aged 55–60 
rose between 1992 and 2002 (Johnson 2004). Other evidence indicates 
that the prevalence of diabetes has declined among non-Hispanic whites 
aged 50–64, while it has increased among non-Hispanic blacks that age 
(Robinson 2007). Thus, the recent evidence is mixed, and cannot be 
simply summarized as a trend of overall improvements. 
Disability 
Disability rates for people in their ﬁfties, sixties, and older have 
declined over the past two decades. National Long-Term Care Survey 
(NLTCS) data indicate that the incidence of chronic disability (lasting at 
least three months) declined for the population aged 65–74 for the years 
from 1984 to 1999 (Spillman 2003). Estimates from several national 
sources show that the proportion of the noninstitutionalized population 
aged 70 and older with severe disabilities has declined since the mid-
1990s (Freedman et al. 2004). Functional limitations among men aged 
60 to 74 have also declined over time (Costa 2002). 
Reasons for the decline in disability incidence include improved 
medical technology and health care, better personal health practices, 
better technical aids helping people with disabilities, reduced exposure 
to infectious diseases, and increased education and living standards 
(Korczyk 2002). One study found that improvements in medical care 
relating to cardiovascular disease led to a signiﬁcant part of the decline 
in disability among adults (Cutler, Liebman, and Smyth 2006). Survey-
ing a number of measures of health status, including disability rates, the 
same study has concluded that people aged 62 in the 1960s and 1970s 
were equivalent to people in their early seventies today, an improve-
ment of about a decade. 
The future is not as clear as the past concerning these issues. Similar 
to the ﬁnding of mixed recent evidence concerning health trends, some 
evidence suggests that the decline in disability rates may have stopped 
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or reversed. Comparing people aged 55–61 in 2004 with people of the 
same age range in 1992, researchers found that the reported incidence 
of work limitations was 19 percent for the 2004 group, versus 18 per-
cent for the earlier group, a difference that is not statistically signiﬁcant 
(Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy 2006). 
A survey of a number of studies of disability at older ages 
(Freedman, Martin, and Schoeni 2002) has concluded that disability 
rates declined at older ages over the decade from the late 1980s to the 
late 1990s. However, disability rates at younger ages have been increas-
ing. Between 1990 and 1996, disabilities among those in their forties 
increased slightly, perhaps because of the increased incidence of obe-
sity (Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman 2004). 
In sum, life expectancy at older ages has increased for all major 
demographic groups. Compared to the 1980s, disability rates have 
declined and self-reported health has improved for persons at older 
ages. These patterns also hold for demographic groups viewed as 
vulnerable because of their higher old-age poverty rates—blacks and 
women. However, over the past 10 or 15 years, mixed evidence sug-
gests that improvements in health and disability rates may have slowed 
or, for some groups, possibly reversed. 
FACTORS AFFECTING HEALTH AT OLDER AGES 
While the advance of medicine inﬂuences the health of people at 
older working ages, behavioral factors also affect older persons’ ability 
to continue working. To better understand the trends in health and abil-
ity to work at older ages, this section examines some of the underlying 
determinants. 
Increased Education 
Higher education levels are associated with better health, presum-
ably in part because better-educated people are better informed about 
healthy lifestyles. They also tend to have higher income, better access to 
medical care, and possibly better diets. The percentage of the older pop-
Turner 2011.indb 24   5/17/2011 9:53:42 AM   
 
  
24 Turner 
ulation with at least four years of high school education has increased 
(Table 2.3). 
Workers with higher levels of education are more likely to continue 
working at older ages. One study found that the increase in college 
graduation rates combined with a decline in high school dropout rates 
accounted for about a third of the increase in workers’ expectations that 
they would work past age 62 (Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy 2006). 
Education level plays an important role in the downward trend in dis-
ability rates over the past 20 years. That trend appears to have occurred 
only among persons who completed high school (Schoeni, Freedman, 
and Wallace 2001). Disability rates have not improved among people 
who have not completed high school, and who are thus more likely to 
have physically demanding jobs. 
Decline in Smoking 
Smoking is a major health risk factor. The percentage of adults who 
smoke has declined since 1960: in that year, more than 50 percent of 
men and 30 percent of women smoked. By comparison, in 2004, 23 
percent of men and 19 percent of women smoked. 
Smoking is closely linked to having a low level of education and 
thus to working in occupations that are physically demanding. In 2004, 
Table 2.3  Percentage of Population with Educational Attainment of 
Four Years of High School or More, Aged 55–64, by Race and 
Ethnicity, 1960–2004, Selected Years (%) 
Year Blacks Hispanics Whites 
1960 10.1 — 28.4 
1970 16.2 22.4 42.7 
1980 30.2 29.0 63.8 
1990 46.4 40.0 73.2 
2000 67.8 47.2 83.6 
2004 76.4 56.5 87.7 
Difference, 66.3 — 59.3 
1960–2004 
NOTE: — = data not available. 
SOURCE: Robinson (2007). 
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adults without a high school degree were three times as likely to smoke 
as persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher (National Center for 
Health Statistics 2006). 
The percentage of the population aged 55–64 currently smoking 
declined over the period 1965–2004 for both blacks and whites. The 
decline was less for blacks than whites, but the rates for the two groups 
converged, as blacks started from a lower level (Table 2.4). 
Increase in Obesity 
Increases over the past few decades in the rate of obesity may have 
a negative effect on the health of the older working-age population. 
Since 1960, the proportion of adults who are overweight but not obese 
has remained steady at about one-third. However, the percentage who 
are obese has roughly doubled since the late 1970s (National Center for 
Health Statistics 2006). Two-thirds of adult Americans are overweight, 
including one-third who are obese. Obesity rates for both blacks and 
whites have increased (Table 2.5). 
Obesity is associated with adult-onset diabetes (CDC 2003a). It is 
also linked to hypertension, high cholesterol, heart disease, and some 
forms of cancer. The earlier the onset of obesity, the more serious its 
health effects may be. However, people who exercise regularly and are 
both fat and ﬁt may suffer fewer consequences of being overweight. 
Researchers hold differing views about the severity of the effects of 
the obesity epidemic on disability, particularly when obesity begins in 
childhood (Olshansky et al. 2005; Preston 2005). 
Table 2.4  Percentage of Population Smoking Cigarettes, Aged 55–64, 
by Race, 1965–2004, Selected Years (%) 
Year Black White 
1965 31.0 36.4 
1974 38.7 33.4 
1983–1985 35.8 29.0 
1990–1991 24.9 23.2 
2000–2001 25.9 21.6 
2002–2004 24.8 20.0 
Difference, 1965–2004 −6.2 −16.4 
SOURCE: Robinson (2007). 
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Table 2.5  Obesity Rates for Males, by Race and Ethnicity, 2000–2008 (%) 
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic Mexican 
Year white black American 
1999–2000 34.3 26.4 29.7 
2007–2008 38.4 38.0 35.8 
SOURCE: Flegal et al. (2010). 
The effect of obesity on increased mortality rates may, however, 
have decreased over the past several decades, perhaps from improve-
ments in pharmaceuticals (Fiebelkorn 2006). Some of the effects of 
obesity—high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and diabetes—can be 
controlled pharmacologically. However, because of the large popula-
tion without health insurance currently—some 50 million Americans— 
the ability to offset the health effects of obesity is not available to many. 
Thus, obesity may have a more limited effect on health for people with 
adequate medical care than for lower-income persons lacking good 
medical care. If health care reform, passed by Congress in 2010, suc-
ceeds in extending health insurance to uncovered populations, this dif-
ference in effect would be reduced. However, while obesity has not led 
to declines overall in life expectancy, the increase in obesity among 
people in their sixties and older in the United States may explain why 
the improvements in longevity at older ages have been less rapid in the 
United States than in other advanced countries. 
ABILITY TO WORK AT OLDER AGES 
This section examines direct measures of the ability of people to 
work in their late ﬁfties and early-to-mid-sixties. The ability to work 
at older ages clearly varies across job types that have differing physi-
cal requirements. However, the desire to work at older ages also varies 
across jobs. For example, in the University of California statewide sys-
tem, the average age for retirement of professors is 66, but the average 
age for retirement of staff, who are in the same pension plan, is 60 (Uni-
versity of California 2010). This difference has important implications 
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for the distributional effects of policies that change the ages at which 
beneﬁts can be received. 
Health Impairments and Work 
In 2003, about 25 percent of early retirees in the age range 62–64 
were unable to work because of health impairments (Leonesio, Vaughan, 
and Wixon 2003). By comparison, in the mid-1980s, 16 percent of new 
Social Security beneﬁciaries reported they were unable to work at all, 
and 17 percent reported they were limited in their ability to work (Social 
Security Administration 1986). 
About as many in the 2003 study that reported they were unable to 
work received early retirement beneﬁts from Social Security as received 
Social Security Disability beneﬁts or Supplemental Security Income 
disability beneﬁts (Leonesio, Vaughan, and Wixon 2003). Some dis-
abled people do not qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance 
beneﬁts because they do not meet the requirement for having worked a 
sufﬁcient number of years. The Social Security early retirement beneﬁts 
appear to serve as an important, unofﬁcial disability beneﬁ ts program 
for some early retirees, which is a point to be considered if the early 
retirement age were to be raised. 
Obesity, Diabetes, and Work 
An Australian study documents an association between obesity at 
older ages and a lower probability of being in the labor force (Austra-
lian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005). Among people aged 55–64, 
the obese were 8 percent less likely to be in the labor force and were 
20 percent less likely to be employed full time than the nonobese. The 
obese also had higher absenteeism rates than the nonobese, suggest-
ing an effect of obesity through health issues on ability to work. A
U.S. study has found that obese persons tend to be absent from work 
due to illness substantially more than nonobese persons (Tucker and 
Friedman 1998). Burton et al. (1998) reported that greater body mass 
index (BMI—a measure of the amount by which one is overweight or 
obese) was associated with a higher probability of short-term disability.1 
Similarly, people with diabetes at older ages are less likely to work 
than people without diabetes. Among adults aged 45–64, 51 percent 
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of those with diabetes were working, compared to 72 percent of those 
without diabetes (National Academy on an Aging Society 2000). 
Because both obesity and diabetes have increased over the past sev-
eral decades, these two factors would lead to a decreased ability to work 
at older ages for some people. However, their effects may have been 
offset by other changes affecting the ability to work, including changes 
in the physical demands of jobs. 
THE DECLINE IN PHYSICALLY DEMANDING JOBS 
The ability to postpone retirement depends not only on older 
workers’ physical capabilities but also on the physical demands of 
jobs. Working longer would be facilitated by a decline in the physical 
demands of jobs. 
Occupations and Industries 
Jobs with a high level of physical demands are decreasing in rela-
tive number, both because of a decline in the relative number of some 
types of jobs and because of technological changes that ease the physi-
cal requirements of some jobs. 
Since the beginning of twentieth century, jobs have shifted from 
agriculture to manufacturing, and then from manufacturing to the ser-
vice sector, with the latter shift generally being from physically demand-
ing to less physically demanding jobs. More recently, jobs have shifted 
to the knowledge economy, where the physical demands are even less. 
Between 1950 and 2000, the share of jobs in the goods producing sec-
tor, which includes manufacturing, mining, and construction, fell from 
41 percent to 20 percent (Johnson 2004). 
Even within manufacturing, jobs have shifted away from ones with 
high physical demands. In 1984, 21 percent of those employed in manu-
facturing industries held a job in a professional, managerial, or techni-
cal occupation. By 2000, nearly 28 percent of workers in manufactur-
ing worked in those occupations. Over the period 1984–2000, growth 
in employment in management, professional, technical, and high-level 
sales occupational categories accounted for about two-thirds of job 
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growth. Those job categories accounted for only about one-third of jobs 
at the beginning of the period (Kirsch et al. 2007). 
Farm workers were among the occupations with the largest job 
declines over the period 1988–2000. Technology gains and new labor-
saving machinery were the main reasons for the decline, along with 
increased farm consolidation leading to greater efﬁciencies. Other 
physically demanding occupations that experienced a decline in the 
number of workers included highway maintenance workers (declined 
7 percent), butchers and meat cutters (declined 15 percent), ﬁ sher-
men (declined 22 percent), and cannery workers (declined 32 percent) 
(Alpert and Auyer 2003). 
Direct Measures of Physical Effort 
Jobs can be examined to obtain direct measures of physical effort. 
While various measures can be used, one measure of physically demand-
ing work is the requirement to lift or carry heavy objects. Between 1950 
and 1996, the percentage of the workforce in jobs that required frequent 
lifting or carrying of objects weighing 25 pounds or more declined from 
20 percent to 8 percent (Steuerle, Spiro, and Johnson 1999). 
Using a different measure, in 1982, researchers found that 11 per-
cent of older workers reported that their jobs involved heavy strength 
requirements and 39 percent reported at least medium strength require-
ments. These measures differed by gender, with 17 percent of men in 
jobs having heavy strength requirements and 47 percent in jobs having 
at least medium strength requirements, compared to 4 percent and 29 
percent for women (Table 2.6). 
Workers whose jobs require physical effort all or most of the time 
tend to have relatively little education. In 2002, 28 percent of workers 
aged 55–60 who did not attend college reported that their jobs required 
physical effort all or most of the time (Johnson 2004). 
Between 1992 and 2002, both men and women workers aged 55–60 
saw slight declines in the percentage who reported jobs that required 
substantial physical effort most of the time. The decline was from 20 to 
19 percent for men and from 21 to 17 percent for women (Table 2.6). 
While these ﬁgures are not directly comparable to the ﬁgures from the 
early 1980s, they suggest that a substantial decline has occurred since 
then. However, when disaggregating by education, the decline between 
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Table 2.6  Physical Requirements of Jobs, by Gender, 1982–2002, Selected 
Years (%) 
Deﬁ nition of 
Year job requirement Women Men 
1982 Medium or greater 29 47 
strength requirement 
1992 Always requires 21 20 
physical effort 
2002 Always requires 17 19 
physical effort 
NOTE: The data for 1982 are not directly comparable to the later data. 
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1986); Johnson (2004). 
1992 and 2002 in percentage of jobs requiring substantial physical 
effort only occurred for older workers with four or more years of col-
lege (Johnson 2004). Thus, the decline did not occur among workers 
with relatively low education. 
Technology 
Technological improvements may lessen the effects of some condi-
tions on ability to work. For example, character recognition software 
with voice synthesizers allow blind persons to listen to electronic docu-
ments being read out loud by a computer, including documents that have 
been scanned into computers. This technology allows blind persons to 
function much more independently in a computerized ofﬁce work envi-
ronment than in the past. More generally, technology has reduced the 
physical demands of some jobs, allowing workers to continue working 
at older ages. 
Stressful Jobs 
Although a considerable amount of evidence indicates that the phys-
ical demands of work have declined for most workers, some evidence 
indicates that the stress level of work may have increased. Workers aged 
55–60 who reported that their jobs involved a lot of stress increased 
from 18 to 21 percent between 1992 and 2002 (Johnson 2004). In a 
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survey, three-quarters of workers indicated that they thought jobs had 
gotten more stressful compared to a generation earlier (NIOSH 1999). 
A possible contributing factor to an increase in job stress is the 
increase in working hours for men. While the average work week var-
ies from year to year, it was 43.0 hours for men in 1969, 1980, and 
1990. Since 1990, it has trended upward, and in 2005 it was 45.9. The 
average work week for women also has varied over time, but without 
a clear trend.2 
Bridge Jobs 
Changes in workers’ ability to continue working and changes in the 
prevalence of physically demanding jobs do not tell the whole story. 
The U.S. labor market is ﬂexible, as are individual workers. Sometimes, 
workers can adjust to declining physical ability as they age by changing 
jobs, changing the way they do jobs, or changing the hours they work. 
Currently, about half of all workers aged 55–65 are in “bridge 
jobs,” meaning jobs that are a transition from a career job to retirement 
(Purcell 2002). Bridge jobs can be an adjustment to aging. Bridge jobs 
sometimes involve different occupations from career jobs. Other types 
of bridge jobs include self-employed, part-time, and temporary jobs, 
which provide ﬂexibility to workers who may be unable to continue 
working full time in their career job because of its physical demands. 
Related to bridge jobs, in that it is also a transition to retirement, is 
phased retirement, which is offered by some employers. With phased 
retirement, the worker is able to reduce the number of hours worked 
at his or her career job. While phased retirement seems like a desirable 
option to allow workers to extend their work lives but not work full 
time, employers rarely offer it as a formal beneﬁts program because it 
faces a number of regulatory hurdles (Hill 2010). 
Pensions to Accommodate Early Retirement 
Besides changing to less physically demanding jobs at older ages, 
another option for occupational groups unable to continue working into 
old age because of the physical demands of their work may be occupa-
tional pension plans that permit early retirement (Turner and Guenther 
2005). For example, police, ﬁreﬁghters, the military, and miners— 
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occupations with physically demanding jobs—all have pension plans 
that permit early retirement. 
Errors in Decision Making 
Some people may retire earlier than they otherwise would because 
of errors in decision making (Hill and Reno 2005). They may overesti-
mate the value of a lump sum beneﬁt from a deﬁned contribution plan 
in terms of its ability to provide a stream of income during retirement. 
They may underestimate the effect of inﬂation eroding the real value 
of ﬁ xed beneﬁts, such as those often provided by deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
They may underestimate their life expectancy and overestimate the 
expected return on their investments (Turner and Witte 2009). As lon-
gevity increases, public policy may need to devise ways to help people 
make better decisions as to when to retire. 
In sum, changes have occurred in many workplaces that allow 
workers to work at older ages. In addition, some workers can change 
workplaces as they age to ﬁnd employment that better suits their needs, 
but some workers retire earlier than would best serve their interests 
because of errors in decision making. 
PHASED RETIREMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO RAISING 
THE RETIREMENT AGE 
Because it is difﬁcult under U.S. pension law for workers to collect 
a pension while phasing out of work in the same job, people may retire 
earlier than they want to, doing so in order to access their pension. Cur-
rently an employer wishing to offer ﬂ exible employment faces numer-
ous barriers arising from the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA) (Penner, Perun, and Steuerle 2007). 
Phased retirement can be complex to arrange for employers offer-
ing deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans (Hill 2010). The Pension Protection Act of 
2006 permits in-service distributions of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan beneﬁ ts for 
employees aged 62 or older, which is a step toward facilitating phased 
retirement at older ages. However, phased retirement starting earlier 
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than age 62 cannot include partial payment of the employee’s deﬁned 
beneﬁt plan beneﬁt. There are also unresolved issues relating to the 
partial payment of subsidized early retirement beneﬁts because the pay-
ment of beneﬁts that are more highly subsidized to younger early retir-
ees may be considered to be age discrimination. Employers would be 
more likely to encourage phased retirement if this regulatory issue was 
clariﬁed. 
The government could take a proactive stance and provide guidance 
to employers, who are wary of experimenting under threat of losing 
their tax deductions for pensions. It could issue guidelines based on 
the progressive and effective experiments with phased retirement in the 
public sector. 
Phased retirement may allow some older workers to continue work-
ing longer than they otherwise would. Some older workers may expe-
rience poor health or develop some degree of physical disability that 
limits their abilities to work full time. Other people may have to provide 
caregiving services to family members. These concerns may be ame-
liorated by employment and pension arrangements that allow workers 
to gradually retire through phasing out of work over a period of time. 
Phased retirement may be helpful to older workers in other contexts 
as well. Some people may need to work in order to supplement their 
retirement beneﬁts. Others may wish to work for nonﬁ nancial reasons. 
For these purposes, most people presumably would prefer not to work 
full time. However, under current employment and pension regulatory 
conditions, full retirement is generally the only viable choice for those 
near retirement age who wish to collect their pension. Such an option 
deprives society of the contributions of these individuals, as it dimin-
ishes their opportunity to work. This dilemma could be resolved by 
arrangements that would allow workers to gradually retire. 
Some people prefer retiring from work gradually rather than 
abruptly. For example, according to the 2001 Retirement Risk Survey, 
sponsored by the Society of Actuaries, two-thirds of preretirees (66 per-
cent) and almost half of retirees (47 percent) said they were or would 
have been very or somewhat interested in being able to gradually cut 
back on the hours they worked at their current job, rather than stopping 
work all at once when they got closer to retirement. Moreover, almost 
2 in 10 retirees (19 percent) described their retirement process as being 
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closest to the following: “gradually reduced the number of hours you 
worked before stopping completely” (Society of Actuaries 2003). 
Some retirees prefer part-time work to full retirement. In a 2003 
survey, 70 percent of workers intended to work in retirement and 28 
percent of retirees had worked at some time during retirement, accord-
ing to the Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, conducted by the Employee 
Beneﬁt Research Institute, Mathew Greenwald and Associates, and the 
American Savings Education Council (EBRI, ASEC, and Greenwald 
2003). 
Phased retirement may beneﬁt society. For society, such an arrange-
ment could offset some of the expected labor force shortage, even as it 
helps contain the costs of pensions. And from a business perspective, 
it is important to retain and use long-service employees to mentor and 
train younger workers. 
Despite their desirable effects, formal phased retirement arrange-
ments are rare, at least in part because there are a number of barriers to 
their implementation, including legal barriers, barriers relating to pen-
sion plan objectives, and others (Chen and Scott 2003; Penner, Perun, 
and Steuerle 2002). Though, in principle, hardly anyone opposes phased 
retirement, it seems workers don’t ﬁnd employers’ offers for phased 
retirement very attractive (Hutchens and Chen 2007). While about 80 
percent of older workers work in establishments where employers say 
that phased retirement is possible, opportunities for phased retirement 
depend in part on the characteristics of older workers, and are frequently 
not offered to all workers in an establishment. 
VULNERABLE WORKERS 
Generally, people are living longer, are healthier at older ages, and 
have lower disability rates at older ages than did their counterparts two 
or more decades ago. The primary criticism, however, to policies that 
encourage working longer is that doing so places an unfair burden on 
certain vulnerable groups. These groups fall into three areas: 1) those 
who have relatively short life expectancies, 2) those who are unable 
to work at older ages because of physical limitations or the physical 
demands of their jobs and lack early retirement pensions, and 3) those 
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who become unemployed at older ages and are unable to ﬁ nd other 
jobs. The research surveyed suggests that workers with low levels of 
education may be a vulnerable group. Raising the eligibility ages for 
Social Security may pose problems for workers forced to take early 
retirement or who are ﬁred or laid off in the few years before the early 
retirement age because of the greater difﬁculty older workers have in 
ﬁnding a job. Several studies have attempted to determine the number 
of people in these vulnerable groups. 
In the early 1980s, 19 percent of early retirees were either totally 
unable to work or had partial limitations and jobs that required heavy 
physical exertion. If the group of vulnerable workers is expanded to 
include workers with partial limitations and medium physical require-
ments of their jobs, plus workers with no physical limitations and heavy 
physical requirements, the ﬁgure would rise to 30 percent of new retir-
ees (Social Security Administration 1986). 
One study found that 20 percent of people taking Social Security 
beneﬁts at age 62 have a health condition that limits the type or amount 
of work they can do (Panis et al. 2002). That study found that approxi-
mately one-half of these early retirees with a health condition did not 
have a private pension. In addition, approximately one-half of the early 
retirees with a health condition but without a private pension worked 
in physically demanding jobs. Approximately 5 percent of all early 
claimants, or about 2.5 percent of workers, are particularly vulnerable 
because they have work limitations, do not have a private pension, and 
work on a physically demanding job. The study did not determine what 
percentage of these workers would be eligible for Social Security dis-
ability beneﬁts. 
Another study found that 17 percent of early retirees receiving Social 
Security beneﬁts have signiﬁcant impediments to work but would not 
qualify for Social Security Disability beneﬁts or Supplemental Security 
Disability beneﬁts (Leonesio, Vaughan, and Wixon 2003). They would 
not qualify for disability beneﬁts because they would not have worked 
the minimum required number of years to be eligible for those beneﬁts. 
They also would not qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
disability beneﬁts because they had assets above the level required by 
the asset test to qualify. 
The self-reported health status of workers whose jobs always 
required physical effort improved between 1992 and 2002. In 2002, 
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28 percent of persons aged 55–60 who did not attend college reported 
that their jobs required physical activity some or most of the time. Of 
those older workers whose jobs required physical effort all the time, 11
percent in 2002 reported themselves to be in poor health, down from 17 
percent in 1992 (Johnson 2004). 
People who take Social Security beneﬁts at age 62 frequently have 
pensions or other resources that would allow them to retire at that age 
without Social Security, or have jobs where they could continue work-
ing. Munnell et al. (2004) ﬁnd that 4 percent of the population aged 62 
are vulnerable, meaning that they have a combination of lack of alter-
native resources and poor health, which makes it difﬁcult to continue 
working. 
Measuring the extent to which raising the retirement age would 
hurt vulnerable groups, an earlier study found that less than 10 percent 
of men who take Social Security beneﬁts at age 62 are both in poor 
health and have no source of pension income other than Social Security. 
For women, the ﬁgure is 20 percent (Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 
1996). These ﬁndings were later conﬁrmed by a study done by the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce (1999), which found that if dependency on 
Social Security retirement beneﬁts at age 62 was deﬁned as resulting 
from being poor and having a health condition that limited the ability to 
work, then about 10 percent of the population that age was dependent 
on those beneﬁts. 
In sum, while studies differ to some extent as to precise results, the 
general conclusion is that a small percentage of the population aged 62, 
ranging from 2.5 percent to 10 percent, would be unable to continue 
working and lack sufﬁcient resources to retire, and thus would be vul-
nerable to hardship resulting from an increase in the early retirement 
age. The studies, however, have not counted as being vulnerable those 
older workers who are laid off before age 62, when they become eli-
gible for Social Security, and are unable to ﬁnd a job and lack a pension. 
Doing so would increase the percentage of older people who are vulnerable. 
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PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 
It may be more difﬁcult to make public policies reﬂ ecting improved 
life expectancy in the United States, with its more racially and ethni-
cally heterogeneous population, than in countries such as Japan, where 
the population is more homogeneous. Policies that encourage later 
work in the United States have a differential effect by race because of 
the racial disparity in life expectancy at older ages. 
However, if instead of a cross-sectional approach, the perspective 
is taken of comparing the ability to work and the physical demands of 
work currently with the situation for counterparts in the past, the pat-
tern is clear. Both blacks and whites are living longer, people of both 
races are self-reporting to be healthier at older ages, at least compared 
to several decades ago, and disability rates at older ages are decreasing. 
In Social Security policy, women are often considered to be a vul-
nerable group because of their higher old-age poverty rates. With respect 
to longevity policy and raising the early retirement age, however, life 
expectancy has improved for women (as well as for men) and the per-
centage of female workers in physically demanding jobs has declined. 
One area of uncertainty for future longevity policy concerns the 
obesity epidemic. The increasing obesity among children is a predic-
tor of increasing obesity among adults. The earlier onset of obesity 
may lead to more serious health consequences of the condition, which 
implies that the health effects of obesity that impinge on the ability to 
work at older ages may be worse in the future than they are currently. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented evidence concerning improvements 
in the ability to work at older ages, and in reductions in the physical 
demands of many jobs. Based on that evidence, it appears clear that if 
older workers were economically motivated to do so and the demand 
for older workers was sufﬁcient, it would be feasible for many older 
workers to work longer. The age at which one takes retirement is one of 
the most important ﬁnancial decisions a worker makes, yet it appears 
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that many workers retire too early, perhaps because of myopia as to the 
consequences of the decision. 
To facilitate a policy favoring postponed retirement, it would be 
desirable to address barriers to employment at older ages. Many older 
workers report age discrimination if they are in the situation of looking 
for a job—for example, if they have been laid off. While this book does 
not address this issue, it recommends that further research be done on 
the issue of age discrimination and policies to deal with it. A further 
topic worth exploring is the issue of educating workers on the beneﬁts 
of postponing retirement. 
Notes 
1. The BMI is calculated by dividing a person’s weight (measured in kilograms) by 
his or her height squared (measured in meters). A BMI of 18.5 to less than 25 is 
classiﬁed as a healthy weight. A BMI of 25 or higher but less than 30 is classiﬁed 
as overweight but not obese. A BMI of 30 or higher is classiﬁed as obese. 
2. The data in this paragraph came from http://laborsta.ilo.org, an International 
Labour Ofﬁce database on labor statistics. 
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Automatic Adjustment 
Mechanisms to Maintain 
Social Security’s Solvency 
The trustees of Social Security project in their 2010 report that 
Social Security will not have sufﬁcient resources to pay beneﬁts on 
time starting in 2037.1 At that point it will be able to pay 75 percent of 
promised beneﬁts (Social Security Board of Trustees 2010). Over the 
long term, increases in life expectancy are a major cause of the pro-
jected insolvency of Social Security. Yet policies proposed to deal with 
the projected insolvency often are not directly tied to increases in life 
expectancy. 
In the past, countries have made ad hoc reforms to maintain the sol-
vency of their social security programs. Ad hoc reforms require elected 
ofﬁcials to enact legislation each time an adjustment to social security 
ﬁnancing is needed. These reforms carry a high degree of political risk 
for participants because their timing and magnitude are unknown in ad-
vance. Their distributional consequences are also unknown in advance, 
and depend on whether beneﬁts are cut, taxes raised, or both. Because 
of the political difﬁculty in legislating cutbacks in social security pro-
grams, ad hoc reforms tend to occur in a crisis, with little advance notice 
to workers and retirees as to the legislated changes (Turner 2007). 
Reforms are much easier to enact when beneﬁts are being raised 
than when they are being cut. In the age of social security retrench-
ment, some countries have adopted automatic adjustment mechanisms 
because of the difﬁculty in enacting unpopular reforms involving ben-
eﬁt cuts. These mechanisms automatically change the social security 
program depending on economic and demographic developments, such 
as increases in life expectancy. For example, these policies decide in 
advance how the social security system will adjust to maintain adequate 
ﬁnancing if life expectancy increases. Automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms address the interrelated problems of social security sustainability, 
the political difﬁculty for politicians of reforms that involve retrench-
41 
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ment, and the political risk to workers and retirees associated with ad 
hoc social security reforms. The automatic adjustments involve beneﬁt 
cuts, increases in tax revenue, or increases in retirement age. 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms can eliminate the need for large 
program changes made in a crisis. They can eliminate the risk of in-
sufﬁcient ﬁnancing. They, however, do not eliminate all risk. Workers 
still face the risk that beneﬁt levels may be reduced, taxes raised, or 
retirement ages moved back. Risk is reduced in that workers know un-
der what circumstances such changes will occur. Political risk may be 
reduced with automatic adjustment mechanisms, but it is generally not 
eliminated, as politicians can always intercede and modify the changes 
that were designed to be automatic (Turner 2010a). 
This chapter surveys high-income countries that have automatic ad-
justment mechanisms that cut beneﬁts or the accrual of beneﬁts or raise 
revenue for social security. It describes automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms that achieve and maintain solvency. It concludes by considering 
how U.S. Social Security could use automatic adjustment mechanisms 
to improve and maintain solvency. 
THE PROBLEM 
The U.S. Social Security program, like most traditional social se-
curity programs, is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis, with a relatively 
small trust fund. The annual inﬂow of contributions roughly equals the 
annual outﬂow of beneﬁts. It historically has maintained a reserve fund 
to smooth out ﬂuctuations in contributions over the business cycle, and 
currently it has built up a larger reserve than normal, but that will be 
drawn down as the baby boom generation retires and receives beneﬁts. 
Changes in the ratio of beneﬁciaries to covered workers (the old-
age dependency ratio) play a key role in social security ﬁ nancing in 
pay-as-you-go systems. The ratio of beneﬁciaries to covered workers 
acts like a “price” for beneﬁts, meaning the amount the average worker 
must pay in social security taxes to raise the average beneﬁt level by 
one dollar (Turner 1984). For example, when there are 10 workers for 
every social security beneﬁciary, a dependency ratio of 0.10, it costs 
each worker $0.10 to provide one dollar of beneﬁts to each beneﬁ ciary. 
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By contrast, when there are two workers for every beneﬁciary, a depen-
dency ratio of 0.50, it costs each worker $0.50 to provide one dollar of 
beneﬁ ts. Thus, as the dependency ratio rises with an aging population, 
the “price” to workers of providing social security beneﬁts to retirees 
on a pay-as-you-go basis also increases. Generally, economics predicts 
that when the price of something increases, the quantity demanded falls. 
This occurs because of the law of downward-sloping demand curves. 
Thus, the increase in the shadow price of social security beneﬁ ts would 
be expected to reduce the level of beneﬁts provided. A related point, 
however, is that demand is affected not only by price but also by in-
come, and with rising income people may wish to have more leisure, 
including spending a greater percentage of their life in retirement. 
The question can be raised as to whether the law of downward-
sloping demand applies to social security beneﬁts, since they are not 
purchased in the marketplace, but are determined through the forces of 
politics and public policy. Ultimately that is an empirical question that 
has received little attention, but the theory that this law does apply to 
social security beneﬁts has received some conﬁrmation (Turner 1984). 
Between 1970 and 2000, the growth rates in Social Security– 
covered workers and beneﬁciaries in the United States were roughly 
equal, implying no change in the dependency ratio. However, between 
2000 and 2030, according to the intermediate projection of the Social 
Security Administration actuaries, the number of beneﬁciaries will 
grow considerably faster than the number of covered workers (Table 
3.1). That change places pressure on Social Security ﬁnancing and thus 
strengthens the case for adopting an automatic adjustment mechanism. 
AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
Recognizing the political risks for politicians and workers of re-
solving social security insolvency through ad hoc reforms, at least 12 
countries have adopted life-expectancy indexing of social security 
beneﬁts or automatic adjustments tied to an indicator of social secu-
rity insolvency. Both types of reforms provide automatic adjustment 
mechanisms for sustaining the solvency of social security systems. 
With life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, taxes, or the early or normal 
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Table 3.1  Projected Percentage Change in Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI)–Covered Workers and Beneﬁciaries, 
Selected Periods, 1970–2030 
Ratio of 
OASI beneﬁciaries 
OASI-covered beneﬁciaries to covered 
Year workers (000s) (000s) workers (%) 
1970  92,788 22,618 24.4 
2000 154,624 38,556 24.9 
2030 (intermediate 184,794 71,547 38.7 
projection) 
Percentage change 
1970–2000 66.6 70.5  2.0 
2000–2030 55.0 85.6 55.4 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Social Security Board of Trustees (2008). 
retirement age, increases in life expectancy automatically lead to pro-
gram parameter changes. However, the adjustment mechanisms used 
for indexing can vary. 
Six issues need to be considered in analyzing automatic adjustment 
mechanisms: 
1) The frequency of the adjustment 
Some automatic adjustments test for the need for change and make 
any necessary changes annually; these adjustments are designed as 
part of the ongoing ﬁnancing to maintain the solvency of a system. For 
example, life-expectancy indexing of initial beneﬁts generally is done 
annually, as in Sweden, but Italy adjusts beneﬁts every three years. 
2) The triggering event 
The choice of triggering event has varied. Some adjustments are 
tied to the social security system’s underlying economics and demo-
graphics, such as changes in life expectancy, the dependency ratio, or 
real wages. Others are tied to a measure of the insolvency of the system, 
and adjustments are made only if the system is judged not to be solvent 
over the long run. 
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3) Whether the trigger is a hard trigger or a soft trigger 
The trigger can be a “soft” trigger, meaning that the government is 
obligated to do something, but may choose among different measures. 
Alternatively, it can be a “hard” trigger, meaning that the adjustment 
is automatic (Penner and Steuerle 2007). In most countries adopting 
automatic adjustment mechanisms, the trigger is a hard trigger if the 
adjustment involves life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts. However, 
triggers tied to a measure of insolvency are sometimes soft triggers, 
with some degree of political involvement in the process. Even in Swe-
den, discussed later, which has a hard trigger with respect to insolvency, 
the government maintains oversight, so the automatic adjustment may 
be overridden. 
4) Whether retirees or workers, or both, are affected 
The intergenerational effects of an adjustment can differ. In some 
countries retirees are considered particularly vulnerable and are exempt 
from beneﬁt reductions, with workers bearing the full cost of the adjust-
ment. In other countries, both retirees and workers are affected by the 
automatic adjustments. 
5) The change that is triggered 
The change that is triggered can be an adjustment in tax rates, cur-
rent or future beneﬁts, retirement ages, or other parameters, such as the 
number of years counted in the beneﬁ t calculation. 
6) The extent of advance notice of a change 
The change can take place immediately, with little or no advance 
notice, or it can take place with a number of years of advance notice. 
Indexing for Life Expectancy: Shifting Risk to Retirees 
Starting in the late 1990s, a number of countries, but not the United 
States, have reformed their social security systems to incorporate life-
expectancy indexing or other automatic adjustments. Life-expectancy 
indexing is the policy of adjusting some parameter of social security, 
such as beneﬁts, taxes, the early retirement age, or the normal retirement 
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age, for changes in life expectancy. While the costs of social security 
beneﬁts presumably are ultimately borne by both workers and retirees, 
life-expectancy indexing determines in advance how the distribution of 
those costs will be borne. 
Indexing Beneﬁts 
Deﬁned contribution pension systems use life-expectancy index-
ing when they annuitize beneﬁts based on current life expectancy. 
This feature of deﬁned contribution systems can be incorporated into 
social security beneﬁt systems by life-expectancy indexing of their 
beneﬁts. Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts automatically reduces 
annual beneﬁts to offset the increase in lifetime beneﬁts that accom-
panies an increase in life expectancy. With life-expectancy indexing of 
beneﬁts, retirees are still protected from their individual (idiosyncratic) 
life-expectancy risk because they receive beneﬁts as long as they live. 
Individual or idiosyncratic life-expectancy risk is the risk that individu-
als will live longer than the average for their cohort. 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts gradually lowers the re-
placement rate—the ratio of earnings in the period before retirement 
to beneﬁts received at retirement. Life-expectancy indexing results in 
reduced annual beneﬁts (but not lifetime beneﬁts) relative to earnings. 
Thus, over time, the generosity of the social security system, measured 
by the replacement rate, is reduced. With increased life expectancy, 
working longer is a desirable policy outcome for many people who are 
able and willing to do so. For anyone who chooses and is able to do so, 
reductions in social security beneﬁts could be offset by working longer. 
Countries have used a couple of methods to index beneﬁts for 
changes in life expectancy. One method adjusts for the percentage in-
crease in life expectancy. For example, if life expectancy at retirement 
age increases by 1 percent, beneﬁts would be reduced by 1 percent. 
Portugal and Japan use this method. 
A more commonly used method adjusts for the percentage increase 
in the present value of beneﬁts caused by the increase in life expectancy. 
For example, if an increase in life expectancy raises the expected pres-
ent value of beneﬁts at retirement by 1 percent, annual beneﬁ ts would 
be reduced by 1 percent. With the interest discounting of future beneﬁts 
(because of the time value of money), an increase in life expectancy 
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of 1 percent raises the expected present value of beneﬁts by less than 1 
percent because the increased beneﬁts are received years in the future. 
For that reason, the second method of indexing results in a smaller re-
duction of beneﬁts for a given increase in life expectancy than the ﬁrst 
method. 
Indexing Retirement Ages 
Alternatively, retirement ages can be indexed. Life-expectancy in-
dexing of the normal retirement age (for full beneﬁts) and the early 
retirement age (eligibility age) has two dimensions: 
1) The level of beneﬁts received at the new retirement age 
2) The increase in early or normal retirement age 
The ﬁrst dimension of retirement-age indexing is the level of ben-
eﬁts received at the new retirement age. The level or amount of beneﬁts 
can be the same as that payable at the former age. For example, if the 
age were raised from 62 to 63, the beneﬁts formerly receivable at 62 
would be receivable at 63. With this approach, indexing the earliest 
retirement age in Social Security would reduce beneﬁt costs because 
workers would receive the same level of annual beneﬁts, but for fewer 
years. The replacement rate would be unaffected by that adjustment, 
but would generally be raised if the worker worked an additional year. 
Alternatively, the level of beneﬁts can be raised for those retiring 
at age 62 to reﬂect the adjustment for postponed retirement. The ben-
eﬁts receivable at 63 would be the same as the beneﬁts receivable at 63 
under the former eligibility age. Thus, there would be no effect on the 
beneﬁts of people retiring at ages 63 or higher. This method of indexing 
the earliest retirement age would have little effect on beneﬁt costs in the 
United States because the increased beneﬁts with postponed retirement 
offset the effect of the reduced number of years that beneﬁts would be 
received. 
The second dimension of indexing retirement ages is the increase 
of either the eligibility age or the normal retirement age, or both. For 
example, either age could increase one year for every year’s increase 
in life expectancy, or it could increase at a rate that would maintain a 
constant ratio of retirement years to working years. Alternatively, the 
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increase could be set to maintain a constant ratio of beneﬁciaries to 
workers (dependency ratio) (Gebhardtsbauer 1998). 
The different ways in which the eligibility age or the normal re-
tirement age can be indexed to life expectancy have different effects 
on social security ﬁnancing. With indexing to maintain a constant life 
expectancy at the retirement age, the costs of the social security system 
will decline over time because the ratio of beneﬁciaries to workers will 
tend to decline (Gebhardtsbauer 1998). 
With life-expectancy indexing to maintain a constant ratio of re-
tirement years to working years, because the length of the retirement 
period increases over time, the expected present value of beneﬁts rises 
with increases in life expectancy. However, keeping the ratio of the 
retirement period to the working period constant and setting the beneﬁt 
level so that the beneﬁts at the new age equal those receivable at the 
old age insulates the social security system from adverse ﬁ nancial ef-
fects due to increasing life expectancy. If maintaining a constant ratio of 
work years to retirement years also maintains a constant ratio of work-
ers to retirees, there would be no change in the old-age dependency 
ratio, and the system’s solvency would be unaffected by changes in life 
expectancy. However, life-expectancy indexing done this way is not 
sufﬁcient to maintain a constant payroll tax rate when the retirement of 
an exceptionally large age cohort looms, such as the baby boom genera-
tion, since such a shift has a major impact on the old-age dependency 
ratio, and thus on the cost of providing beneﬁts. 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH AUTOMATIC 
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS 
This section surveys the experience of high-income countries that 
have automatic adjustment mechanisms to maintain social security 
solvency. It investigates how these mechanisms work. The details of 
the international experience are provided because they yield valuable 
insights as to how such policies might be implemented and how they 
would work in the United States. 
The countries that have these mechanisms can be divided into four 
groups. First, traditional pay-as-you-go systems that have instituted 
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life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts are considered. Second, countries 
that use life-expectancy indexing of the earliest age at which social 
security beneﬁts can be received are reviewed. Third, countries are 
considered that automatically adjust other parameters of their social 
security systems, such as the number of years for full beneﬁts. And 
fourth, countries with automatic adjustment mechanisms that are tied to 
solvency are considered. 
1) Life-Expectancy Indexing in Traditional Pay-as-You-Go 
Social Security Programs 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts can be incorporated within the 
framework of a traditional pay-as-you-go social security system, such 
as the U.S. system. Finland, Norway, and Portugal have done so. 
Finland. In 2003, Finland passed a law to incorporate increases 
in life expectancy into the calculation of social security beneﬁ ts. The 
law took effect in 2010. As in other countries adopting life-expectancy 
indexing, the life-expectancy adjustment uses unisex mortality tables, 
thus ignoring gender (or other) differences in life expectancy. 
Because of year-to-year ﬂuctuations in mortality rates, countries 
using life-expectancy indexing generally average mortality rates over 
several years, which smoothes out the yearly ﬂuctuations. Finland uses 
mortality tables based on past mortality data averaged over a ﬁve-year 
period to adjust initial pension beneﬁts at age 62. Thus, in the ﬁ rst year, 
the average life expectancy at age 62 for the years 2004–2008 was com-
pared to the average for the years 2003–2007. 
The life-expectancy adjustment for an individual’s beneﬁ ts depends 
on the person’s year of birth. A person’s beneﬁts at retirement are ad-
justed for unisex life expectancy at age 62 for that birth cohort, without 
regard to the person’s age at retirement. Thus, two persons retiring at 
ages 62 and 63 but born in the same year would have the same percent-
age reduction in their annual beneﬁts. Of course, the person retiring at 
age 63 would receive a larger beneﬁt because of the beneﬁ t adjustment 
for postponement of retirement. 
Life-expectancy indexing in Finland is done so that increases in life 
expectancy do not raise the expected present value of lifetime social se-
curity beneﬁts. The indexing is based on the amount that an increase in 
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life expectancy would increase the expected present value of beneﬁts. 
A 2 percent discount rate is used to calculate the annuity value. Dis-
ability pensions are also adjusted this way (Alho, Lassila, and Valkonen 
2006; Lindell 2003). By 2040, after 30 years of life-expectancy index-
ing, the level of beneﬁts is expected to be reduced to 89 percent of the 
level without indexing, or a reduction of less than 0.4 percent per year 
(Whitehouse 2007a). 
Portugal. In 2006, Portugal passed legislation that indexes its 
social security beneﬁts for improvements in life expectancy. The legis-
lation took effect in 2008. The reduction of beneﬁts is based directly on 
the percentage change in life expectancy, rather than on the percentage 
change in the expected value of pension beneﬁts arising because of the 
improvement in life-expectancy (Whitehouse 2007b). 
2) Indexing the Eligibility Age for Improvements in Life Expectancy 
Rather than indexing beneﬁts, the eligibility age to receive beneﬁts 
can be indexed for improvements in life expectancy. 
United Kingdom. A British pension commission proposed life-
expectancy indexing of the earliest age at which workers are eligible 
to receive social security beneﬁts (Pensions Commission 2005). The 
commission was chaired by Adair Turner, now Lord Turner, and was 
informally known as the Turner Commission. The early retirement age 
in 2009 was 65 for men and 60 for women, but starting in 2010 it was 
scheduled to rise to 65 for women by 2020. The British proposal would 
index the eligibility age so that the ratio of working years to retirement 
years would be constant. It would announce any increase in the eligi-
bility age 15 years in advance. Thus, for the current age of 65 for men, 
no one aged 50 or older would be affected. Based on the projection of 
life expectancy improvements, such indexing would result in an early 
retirement age of 68 in 2050. The Pensions Commission argues that 
this type of indexing would be fair across generations because every 
generation would spend roughly the same proportion of adult life in 
retirement. 
With this proposal, the eligibility age would not increase one-to-
one with increases in life expectancy. Rather, if the ratio of retirement 
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years to working years is one to two, then for every three years’ increase 
in life expectancy, the eligibility age would increase by two years to 
maintain the ratio of one retirement year for every two working years. 
The British Parliament modiﬁ ed the Turner Commission proposal. 
The law Parliament enacted raises the eligibility age in three steps. The 
eligibility age ﬁrst increases between April 2024 and April 2026 from 
65 to 66, followed by a phase-in from April 2034 to 2036 of the in-
crease from 66 to 67, and a phase-in from April 2044 to 2046 of the 
increase from 67 to 68 (Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2007). This reform is 
not indexing because the increases are not linked to actual increases in 
life expectancy. However, it could be called quasi indexing because the 
increases are linked to projected increases in life expectancy. 
Denmark. As of 2010, Denmark was the only country to enact leg-
islation to index the social security beneﬁt eligibility age to increases 
in life expectancy. This change takes effect with a long delay. Denmark 
provides two old-age social security beneﬁts. First, the early retirement 
pension beneﬁt requires the recipient to have worked a certain number 
of years in Denmark. Denmark will raise the eligibility age for that 
beneﬁt by six months each year from 2019 to 2022, so that the early 
retirement eligibility age increases from 60 to 62. 
The second old-age beneﬁt program is a universal old-age pension 
that is available based on a person’s years of residence in Denmark. It 
has no work history requirement. The eligibility age for this universal 
old-age pension will rise by six months each year from 2024 to 2027, 
so that the universal pension eligibility age increases from 65 to 67. 
From then, increases in the eligibility age for both beneﬁt programs 
will be tied to increases in life expectancy. The life expectancy review 
is supposed to be done every ﬁve years (the ﬁrst review is scheduled for 
2015), and the change in retirement age will take effect after a notice 
period of 15 years. The Danish parliament must approve every increase 
in the retirement age. By 2045, the eligibility age is expected to reach 
68.3 years (Whitehouse 2007b). The goal is for the early retirement age 
to be raised so that life expectancy from that age, measured at age 60, 
will be 19.5 years. Thus, the Danish reform does not split the increased 
life expectancy between the working years and retirement years but 
fully raises the eligibility age for increases in life expectancy. 
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3) Indexing Years of Contributions Required for a Full Beneﬁt 
Other parameters of the social security beneﬁt calculation can be 
indexed, such as the years of contributions required for a full beneﬁt. 
France. In 2008, French workers needed 40 years of contributions 
to receive full social security beneﬁts. Starting in 2009, that number has 
increased by one calendar quarter per year and will continue to do so 
until it reaches 41 years in 2012. This change will reduce social security 
beneﬁts by about 2.5 percent for people working 40 years. Thereafter, 
through 2020, the contribution period for full beneﬁts will increase as 
needed to keep the ratio of the contribution period to the average retire-
ment period equal to its ratio in 2003, which was approximately two to 
one.2 The ratio is measured as the number of years required for a full 
pension for work starting at age 20, divided by the expected duration 
of retirement. 
This adjustment mechanism effectively results in a reduction in 
beneﬁts that is tied to increases in life expectancy. The French govern-
ment retains the right to forgo these adjustments if weak labor market 
conditions do not make it feasible for workers to work the extra years. 
4) Countries with Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms 
Tied to Solvency 
Some countries have adopted automatic adjustment mechanisms 
tied to measures of the solvency of their social security program. 
Sweden. Sweden is a leader in the movement toward automatic 
adjustments of social security. For that reason its system is explained 
in greater detail than for other countries that have followed its lead. In 
1994, the Swedish parliament passed legislation establishing the prin-
ciples of the reform. This was followed by a series of implementing 
laws passed starting in 1998 that established a Notional Deﬁ ned Contri-
bution (NDC) system, alongside a mandatory, fully funded individual 
account plan. The legislation for the automatic balancing mechanism in 
the NDC plan was passed in 2001. That system is ﬁnanced by a com-
bined employer-employee tax rate of 16 percent of wages (Table 3.2). 
Each worker has a notional account to which contributions are credited. 
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Table 3.2  Sweden: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts 
System parameter Value (%) 
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate 
Rate in 2010 16 
Future rate 16 
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker) 
Rate in 2008 53 
Future rate (2050) 40 
NOTE: The replacement rate includes both the NDC pension and the mandatory indi-
vidual account pension. 
SOURCE: Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2005). 
The accumulated account balance is credited each year with a rate of re-
turn equal to the growth rate of average wages.3 In addition, 2.5 percent 
of wages up to a ceiling are paid to the individual account plan, called 
the premium pension. 
Each year, because of life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, the ini-
tial beneﬁts received by new beneﬁciaries are adjusted downward as 
a new birth cohort reaches the eligibility age of 61 (Table 3.3). The 
life-expectancy indexing of the system started in 1995, before the NDC 
system actually began. It is expected that by approximately 2032, after 
nearly 40 years of indexing, workers would need to postpone retirement 
by two years and seven months to avoid receiving lower beneﬁts in 
Table 3.3  Sweden: Life-Expectancy Indexing of Beneﬁts 
(4) 
Retirement 
age required to (5) 
neutralize the Implying an 
(1) (2) (3) effect on beneﬁts expected length 
Birth Reaches age Life expectancy of increased life of retirement 
cohort 65 in at age 65 expectancy (col. 3 minus col. 4) 
1930 1995 82 yrs. 5 mos. 65 yrs. 0 mos. 17 yrs. 5 mos. 
1940 2005 83 yrs. 7 mos. 65 yrs. 9 mos. 17 yrs. 10 mos. 
1950 2015 84 yrs. 10 mos. 66 yrs. 7 mos. 18 yrs. 3 mos. 
1960 2025 85 yrs. 7 mos. 67 yrs. 2 mos. 18 yrs. 5 mos. 
1970 2035 86 yrs. 3 mos. 67 yrs. 7 mos. 18 yrs. 8 mos. 
SOURCE: Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2005). 
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comparison to the beneﬁts they would have received had there been no 
indexing. Thus, people formerly retiring at age 63 would need to retire 
at 65 years and 7 months to receive the same level of beneﬁts as without 
the beneﬁ t reduction. 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts is done by an adjustment that 
reﬂects improvements in life expectancy at age 65. No further adjust-
ments to retirees’ beneﬁts are made for improvements in mortality after 
age 65. 
The Swedish system uses period mortality tables, which are based 
on the experience of a cross section of older persons, not projecting 
future mortality improvements. For example, period tables would be 
based on the mortality experience of the population alive in the year 
2000, rather than the expected experience of people aged 61 in that 
year, projecting into the future. For each cohort, the annuity divisor 
adjustment—the amount by which the worker’s accumulated balance is 
divided to determine the worker’s initial beneﬁt—is established at age 
65, with a provisional adjustment made for retirements starting at age 
61, which is the eligibility age. 
In establishing adjustment mechanisms, a fundamental question is 
whether any of the adjustment will be borne by current retirees. Gener-
ally, U.S. Social Security reform proposals exempt current retirees and 
workers nearing retirement age on the grounds that people in those age 
groups have limited ability to change their work and savings plans to 
adjust to reforms. Sweden has not adopted that principle. 
In Sweden, if the growth rate of real per capita wages is constant 
at 1.6 percent per year, the social security annuity is adjusted solely by 
changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, if the annual 
growth rate of real per capita wage income in Sweden falls below 1.6 
percent, the cost-of-living adjustment is less than the increase in the 
CPI, and if the growth rate of real per capita wage income exceeds 1.6 
percent, the adjustment is greater than the CPI. For example, if the an-
nual growth rate in real per capita wages was 1.5 percent, the increase 
in beneﬁts in payment would be the rate of growth of the CPI minus 0.1 
percent, which would cause a slight decline in the real level of beneﬁts 
paid. 
Real per capita wage growth in Sweden has averaged about 2 per-
cent a year over long periods (Palmer 2000). Because this average rate 
exceeds the rate of 1.6 percent in the adjustment formula, over time this 
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indexing is expected to be more generous than price indexing. Thus, 
Swedish pensioners share with workers in the ﬂuctuations in the Swed-
ish economy and in the long-term growth of the economy. However, 
in an economic recession, as occurred in 2009–2010, indexed beneﬁts 
of Swedish pensioners are increased by less than the level provided by 
price indexing. 
Life-expectancy indexing and the adjustment of beneﬁts in pay-
ment for changes in productivity may at times be inadequate to assure 
solvency. To handle this, Sweden has built into its system a mechanism 
called the automatic balancing mechanism. This adjustment mechanism 
has two goals: 1) to set the contribution rate so that there will be no need 
to raise it in the future and 2) to automatically restore ﬁ nancial balance 
to the social security system without the intervention of politicians. The 
automatic balancing mechanism is used when the system is not fully 
solvent in the long run. 
To determine whether it needs to implement the automatic balanc-
ing mechanism, each year the Swedish government measures the assets 
and liabilities of its social security system. The assets in the system are 
measured as the assets in the associated trust fund, called a buffer fund, 
plus the estimated present value of future contributions. If the present 
value of liabilities for future beneﬁts exceeds the value of assets, adjust-
ments are made to reduce future beneﬁ ts. Speciﬁcally, the adjustment 
mechanism reduces the rate of return used to calculate accruals in the 
notional balances below the rate of growth of average real wages.4 It 
also reduces by the same amount the indexing rate for beneﬁts in pay-
ment. For example, if a shortfall of assets to liabilities of 5 percent 
develops, the current beneﬁt accruals of workers and the beneﬁts in 
payment would be reduced by 5 percent. Thus, both workers and re-
tirees are affected by the adjustment. The level of contributions is not 
affected. 
When the system is in good ﬁnancial condition, workers can be as-
sured that these cuts will not occur in the near future. However, if the 
system is near the point where adjustments may be made, workers and 
retirees face uncertainty as to whether cuts will occur within the next 
few years. This mechanism shares the burden of the adjustment across 
generations. However, if cuts are made and the trigger later is switched 
off because conditions have again become more favorable, those who 
were working during the adjustment phase will not be affected at all: 
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the value of their accumulated pension rights will be restored. The pen-
sioners affected by the balancing mechanism, on the contrary, will not 
receive any compensation for what they lost during the period when the 
balancing mechanism was active. 
The logic of the system dictates that the adjustment occurs through 
accrual and beneﬁt reductions, but not through tax rate changes. If the 
payroll tax rate were increased, that would increase the contributions 
credited to the individual accounts, which would increase future beneﬁt 
liabilities, and thus would not help restore solvency.5 
Because of the fall in world stock markets in 2008, the reserve funds 
for the Swedish Notional Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) system fell con-
siderably in value. The buffer funds received a negative return of −21 
percent (Sundén 2009). Balance is restored by reducing per capita wage 
indexation of earned pension rights for current workers and reducing 
the indexation of beneﬁts for current retirees. The adjustment occurs 
with a lag, so the 4.5 percent scheduled increase in pension beneﬁts 
in 2009 was not affected by the ﬁnancial crisis. Because of slow wage 
growth, beneﬁts were scheduled to decrease by 1.3 percent. But, as a 
result of the automatic adjustment mechanism, beneﬁts were scheduled 
to decrease by a further 3.3 percent in 2010, or a total of 4.6 percent. 
The cuts would continue until the system regained ﬁ nancial balance.6 
With current projections, the outlook improves only after 2012. Any 
surpluses that occur after balancing are used to increase indexation until 
the value of pension credits and beneﬁts are restored. 
The proposed cuts generated an immediate response from the ﬁve 
Swedish political parties that support the pension reform. They pro-
posed a change in the procedure for valuing buffer fund assets from 
market value to a three-year average in order to smooth the pattern. 
The government decided to go forward with the change. As a result, 
the response of the NDC plan ﬁnancing to the economic recession will 
be muted, and it should take longer for the system to return to balance. 
Instead of a reduction in beneﬁts of 4.5 percent in 2010, the reduction 
was 3.0 percent. That means that if inﬂation is 3 percent, there will be 
a real reduction in beneﬁts of 6 percent. In 2011, instead of a nominal 
reduction in beneﬁts of 1.7 percent, the reduction will be 2.8 percent. 
And in 2012, instead of a projected increase in nominal beneﬁts of 0.8 
percent, nominal beneﬁts will be reduced by 0.5 percent (Sundén 2009). 
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While these changes modify the original adjustment mechanism, 
substantial cuts in real beneﬁts still occur over a short period, as real 
beneﬁts decline by approximately 12 percent over two years and 16 
percent over three years, assuming a 3 percent inﬂ ation rate. 
A criticism of the Swedish system is that, because of its automatic 
adjustments, its replacement rate is falling over time. That criticism is 
addressed for low-wage workers in Sweden by the provision of a mini-
mum beneﬁ t. Beneﬁciaries with relatively low beneﬁts also receive the 
guarantee beneﬁt. About 43 percent of beneﬁciaries receive that beneﬁt 
(Sundén 2009). When the NDC beneﬁts are cut by the automatic adjust-
ments, the beneﬁt from the guarantee beneﬁt is increased, somewhat 
offsetting the cut for the retirees receiving the guarantee beneﬁt. 
At some point, however, Sweden may decide it needs to raise its 
early retirement age, which is relatively low at 61. Raising the early re-
tirement age would allow Sweden to raise the replacement rate because 
higher beneﬁts would be received, but for fewer years. 
The Swedish public, after its limited experience with the NDC sys-
tem, appears to have readily accepted the Swedish system. The lack of 
widespread criticism may be because the replacement rate is declin-
ing slowly, so the public may have limited awareness of the long-run 
decline in the replacement rate. Also, acceptance of the system could 
diminish when the automatic adjustment mechanism is used to reduce 
accruals and the price indexing of beneﬁts. 
Germany. Unlike Sweden, Germany does not index social security 
beneﬁts for life expectancy. It, however, has changed the calculation of 
beneﬁts to incorporate life expectancy as one aspect of a more complex 
adjustment mechanism. The adjustment mechanism is called the sustain-
ability factor. The sustainability factor, which was introduced in 2004 
and took effect in 2005, attempts to achieve sustainability by limiting 
the growth rate of average beneﬁts (Table 3.4). The sustainability factor 
incorporates not only life-expectancy changes but all demographic fac-
tors that affect the dependency ratio (Toft 2007). It includes the effects 
of changes in migration, birth rates, labor force participation rates, and 
retirement rates. It is used to index beneﬁts, but part of the adjustment 
to solvency also raises the social security payroll tax rate. 
Initial beneﬁts for a retiree are determined by multiplying the ben-
eﬁts received under the beneﬁt formula of the previous year by the 
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Table 3.4  Germany: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts 
System parameter Value (%) 
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate 
Rate in 2008 19.5 
Future rate (2030) 22.0 
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker) 
Rate in 2008 70.0 
Future rate 64.0 
SOURCE: Toft (2007). 
sustainability factor. The sustainability factor is based on the percentage 
change in the dependency ratio.7 
A safety clause, however, sets a limit on the adjustment so that nom-
inal beneﬁts cannot be reduced. Without this clause, nominal beneﬁts 
could be reduced during a period of low earnings growth or declining 
earnings, as occurred in Sweden. The safety clause took effect immedi-
ately in Germany, limiting the effect of the sustainability factor in 2005 
and 2006 (Toft 2007). 
The sustainability factor has reduced the projected payroll tax rate 
necessary to ﬁnance the system in 2040 from 28 percent to 24 percent 
(Capretta 2006). Germany’s goal is to limit the payroll tax rate to no 
higher than 20 percent by 2020 and 22 percent by 2030 (Penner and 
Steuerle 2007). The sustainability factor is weighted so that it offsets 
just one-quarter of the percentage increase in the system’s dependency 
ratio, rather than the full increase. The difference is made up by the 
projected increase in payroll taxes. 
Germany uses a points system for calculating social security ben-
eﬁts. In that system, contributing for one year at the average wage earns 
a worker one point. A retiree’s beneﬁts are based on the total number of 
points earned by the retiree multiplied by a factor measuring the value 
of a point. The sustainability factor affects the value of a point, so it af-
fects both current and future retirees. Thus, the beneﬁts of retirees are 
affected by the adjustment, as in Sweden. 
Japan. Japan has studied the reforms in Sweden and Germany 
and developed its own system of automatic adjustments that incorpo-
rates features from both countries. Japan calls its approach modiﬁed 
indexation. 
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Japan’s social security program has had to deal with increasing life 
expectancy at older ages that is among the highest in the world. In addi-
tion, it has faced a continuing decline in the birth rate to below the rate 
that would be sufﬁcient to maintain the population at its current level. 
Because of the low birth rate and limited immigration, Japan’s popula-
tion and workforce are both declining. 
Even though Japan passed major social security reform legislation 
in 2000, greater-than-expected improvement in life expectancy, plus 
greater-than-expected decline in the birth rate, caused the need for fur-
ther reform in 2004. Because of the political cost to politicians of the 
repeated process of making unpopular social security reforms, Japanese 
politicians wanted an automatic mechanism that would return the sys-
tem to solvency without their continued intervention (Sakamoto 2005). 
As in the United States, so in Japan, Sweden, and Germany there 
is a desire to not raise the payroll tax rate above a set level. In Japan, 
Sweden, and Germany that desire motivated the introduction of the au-
tomatic adjustment. Japan decided to introduce the adjustment in part 
because younger workers were concerned about the possibility of high 
contribution rates, which they viewed as unfair to their generation. 
In reform legislation passed in 2004, Japan incorporated a demo-
graphic factor into the calculation of social security beneﬁ ts (Sakamoto 
2008; Takayama 2006). The social security adjustment reduces the in-
dexing of initial beneﬁts and beneﬁts in subsequent years. 
The Japanese government is gradually increasing the payroll tax 
rate for its social security program, called the Employees’ Pension In-
surance Scheme, to 18.3 percent in 2017. At that point, the payroll tax 
rate is considered to be ﬁxed, with no further increases necessary (Table 
3.5). In the absence of the 2004 reforms, the payroll tax rate was pro-
jected to increase to 25.9 percent. It was 13.58 percent in 2004. 
With these increases in the payroll tax rate, it is estimated under 
the best-case scenario that the modiﬁed indexation will continue until 
2023, when indexation will return to that used in 2004.8 In the Japa-
nese social security system, initial beneﬁts grow at the rate of growth 
of disposable income. Under the automatic adjustment mechanism, the 
indexing of initial beneﬁts at retirement is reduced until ﬁ nancial sol-
vency is restored. 
The reduction factor takes into account the decline in the number 
of people in the Japanese workforce and the increase in life expectancy. 
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Table 3.5  Japan: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts 
System parameter Value (%) 
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate 
Rate in 2008 15.35 
Future rate (2017) 18.30 
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker) 
Rate in 2008 59.00 
Future rate (2023) 50.00 
SOURCE: Sakamoto (2008); Takayama (2006). 
The factor equals the rate of decline in the Japanese workforce par-
ticipating in social security programs plus the rate of increase in life 
expectancy at age 65. 
Japanese policy experts have noted that the growth rate of the bene-
ﬁciary population also affects solvency. However, they took a long-term 
perspective and did not incorporate that into the calculation, since the 
growth rate of the beneﬁciary population would eventually reﬂ ect the 
growth rate of the workforce (Sakamoto 2005). 
For the beneﬁt calculation, the projected rate of increase in life 
expectancy at age 65 is ﬁxed in the law at 0.3 percent annually, or ap-
proximately three weeks a year. That adjustment is based on the 2002 
projection over the period from 2000 to 2025. Thus, this indexation can 
be categorized as quasi indexing because it is not tied to actual changes 
in life expectancy. It was ﬁxed in advance to avoid year-to-year ﬂuctua-
tions in the beneﬁt adjustment and to set the beneﬁt adjustment so that 
Japanese workers would be able to know in advance the change that 
would affect their beneﬁts. 
It is expected that the demographic factor will reduce the index-
ation rate for beneﬁts at retirement by 0.9 percentage points per year 
on average, compared to the previous method. By reducing the growth 
rate of beneﬁts to less than the growth rate in real wages, this change 
is projected to reduce the average replacement rate from 59 percent in 
2008 to 50 percent by 2023. 
The adjustment factor, however, is not applied if it would cause 
nominal beneﬁts to decline, as in Germany. If the Consumer Price In-
dex declines in a year (which has happened in Japan and in the United 
States) or if per capita disposable income declines, beneﬁts are main-
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tained at their nominal value, rather than being cut to reﬂect the effects 
of indexing. 
Also, if the replacement rate fell much more rapidly than expected, 
and fell to 50 percent or lower, the adjustment mechanism would be 
stopped, and the policy would be reviewed. Thus, the law contains a 
provision to override the automatic stabilizer. This provision is known 
as the minimum beneﬁ t provision. 
Canada. Canada uses an approach to automatic adjustments that 
differs from Sweden, Germany, and Japan. Canada introduced its auto-
matic adjustment mechanism in 1997. 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is the main social security pro-
gram for Canada, except for the province of Quebec, which maintains 
a similar but separate plan—the Quebec Pension Plan. These two plans 
operate on top of a ﬂat beneﬁ t. The CPP is a hybrid between a pay-as-
you-go system and a fully funded system. It is partially funded, but, 
unlike the U.S. Social Security system, it is not projected to run out 
of money. Beneﬁts are designed to replace 25 percent of the worker’s
average wages into the future, and thus grow over time for successive 
cohorts at the growth rate of average wages (Table 3.6). 
The payroll tax rate is projected to be sufﬁciently higher than the 
rate necessary to maintain pay-as-you-go funding for a number of years, 
so the trust fund will continue to grow over time. The CPP is ﬁnanced 
with a combined employee-employer tax rate of 9.9 percent. Its fund 
is invested partially in world stock markets. The system is designed so 
that the fund will be adequate to pay for the retirement beneﬁts of the 
Canadian baby boomers and to cover the aging of the population. There 
Table 3.6  Canada: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts 
System parameter Value (%) 
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate 
Rate in 2008  9.9 
Future rate  9.9 
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker) 
Rate in 2008 25.0 
Future rate 25.0 
SOURCE: Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (2007). 
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should be no need for further contribution rate increases or beneﬁ t cuts. 
However, if ﬁnancial markets are weak for a prolonged period or if life 
expectancy increases considerably more rapidly than anticipated, or if 
another economic or demographic variable affecting funding turns out 
to be much more adverse to funding than expected, an adjustment may 
be needed. 
Every three years, the system’s chief actuary evaluates the CPP’s 
ﬁnancial sustainability. If the chief actuary determines that the system is 
not ﬁnancially sustainable in the long run, legislation requires an auto-
matic adjustment (Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
Canada 2007). However, the automatic adjustment takes effect only if 
the Canadian provincial ﬁnance ministers cannot ﬁrst decide on an ad-
justment of their own—an outcome that is considered unlikely. 
If the automatic adjustment takes effect, it freezes beneﬁt index-
ation for three years, eliminating cost-of-living increases for retirees 
during that period. In addition, the automatic adjustment increases the 
contribution rate over that three-year period by an amount equal to half 
of the adjustment needed to reach the new long-term contribution rate 
required to restore solvency. That rate is maintained until the next trien-
nial evaluation. Thus, the changes are borne both through an increase 
in contributions and a reduction in beneﬁts in payment (Brown 2008). 
If changes in long-run assumptions raise the projected steady-state 
contribution rate required to maintain a constant ratio of assets to ex-
penditures, the contribution rate will be increased permanently. 
The Canadian social security system has been designed so that there 
is little need for the adjustment mechanism. By moving toward partial 
funding, the system is designed to maintain both a constant payroll tax 
rate across age cohorts and a constant replacement rate. This is a degree 
of long-run stability that few social security systems have achieved. 
COMPARING THE OPTIONS: THE PROS AND CONS 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts results in a falling replace-
ment rate over time when measured at a ﬁxed retirement age. For this 
reason, social security will provide a decreasingly generous beneﬁt 
over time as traditionally measured by the replacement rate concept. 
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Working longer can offset this effect by raising a person’s beneﬁ ts. Al-
ternatively, workers not wishing to work longer could increase their 
savings for retirement, though the evidence of widespread undersaving 
for retirement suggests that this approach would not be popular. 
Any system with a declining replacement rate, such as the Swedish 
system, eventually will reach the point where the replacement rate is 
politically unacceptable, and further reform will be necessary. Thus, a 
system that achieves solvency with a declining replacement rate does 
not prevent the need for future reforms. The outcome of future reforms 
is subject to the usual political risks as to timing and distributional 
consequences. 
One Swedish commentator (Scherman 2007) is highly critical of the 
decline in replacement rates that will result from the Swedish reform. 
He argues that the early retirement age should be raised to offset the de-
cline, and that the payroll tax rate should not be considered permanently 
ﬁxed. Furthermore, he advocates reinstituting a “normal pension age” 
to clarify to the general public what retirement age is needed to obtain a 
“decent” pension. Moreover, he calls for an in-depth discussion of how 
the labor market reacts to the need for offering employment opportuni-
ties at an advanced age. 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts preserves the option of re-
ceiving social security beneﬁ ts at an early age. That said, some people 
who retire at the early retirement age, particularly those with long life 
expectancy, probably would be ﬁnancially better off if they postponed 
retirement to a higher age, when they would receive higher beneﬁts. 
People generally will receive higher annual social security beneﬁts if 
the early retirement age is indexed than if pension beneﬁts are indexed, 
because pensioners will receive the beneﬁts starting at a later age and 
for fewer years. 
Indexing the eligibility age has the added feature of encouraging 
people to work longer. However, not everyone is able to do so. Peo-
ple with long careers in physically demanding jobs and people in poor 
health may be unable to postpone their retirement. Options could be 
provided to meet the needs of these people. For example, the eligibil-
ity age could be maintained at its current level for people with long 
careers or for people with low lifetime average earnings. The eligibility 
requirements for disability beneﬁts could be eased for people above a 
certain age but below the social security eligibility age. 
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Indexing can also be compared to quasi indexing. With quasi 
indexing, instead of relating policy changes to actual changes in life 
expectancy, such policy changes could be linked to projected changes 
in life expectancy, as in Japan. An argument in favor of indexing is 
that if life expectancy improves more slowly than anticipated, the sys-
tem automatically adjusts to the new reality, and smaller reductions in 
beneﬁts are made. However, indexing creates uncertainty as to when 
changes in social security will occur and how large they will be. With 
quasi indexing, a schedule of changes is announced in advance so that, 
for example, people would know far in advance the early retirement 
age or the beneﬁt reduction that would be relevant for their birth cohort. 
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
The options have different consequences as to the distribution of 
resources across people with different characteristics. Distributional is-
sues can be addressed across the income distribution within a given age 
cohort and across age cohorts. A reform that raises the eligibility age 
will have relatively less effect on workers who already are postpon-
ing retirement past the eligibility age. That group includes high-income 
workers who ﬁnd considerable nonpecuniary, as well as pecuniary, 
rewards from their work. It also includes low-income workers who con-
tinue to work because they need the money. 
While the adjustments in beneﬁts resulting from indexing gener-
ally produce an across-the-board cut in beneﬁts, their effects on retirees 
would differ across the income distribution. For example, a 5 percent 
cut in beneﬁts due to life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts would leave 
the distribution of beneﬁts the same across income classes. However, it 
would affect the distribution of income because lower-income persons 
tend to rely more on social security beneﬁts, so their income would fall 
by a greater percentage than the income of higher-income persons. 
Indexing the early retirement age may be more favorable to lower-
income workers than indexing beneﬁts, provided other changes are 
made to help lower-income people who are unable to extend their work-
ing lives. However, if beneﬁts are indexed, it may be less likely that 
those changes in other programs would be made. 
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The different options for social security reform also have different 
distributional consequences across age cohorts. Automatic adjustment 
mechanisms designed to maintain the solvency of social security tend 
to result in smaller changes made over a longer period of time and affect 
more age cohorts than changes made to restore solvency when insol-
vency is impending. 
Life-expectancy varies across racial groups. Where there is racial 
diversity within the population, such as in the United States, life-
expectancy indexing of the eligibility age raises the question of whether 
this policy would be fair to all racial groups. The effects on different 
racial groups with different life expectancies and different risks of 
disability depend in part on whether disability beneﬁts would also be 
subject to life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts. If disability beneﬁts 
were not also life-expectancy indexed, groups that have a higher take-
up rate for those beneﬁts, such as blacks, would be treated relatively 
favorably since those beneﬁts would not be reduced. 
All countries with life-expectancy indexing use unisex life expec-
tancy rather than having different indexing for men and women or for 
other identiﬁable groups (such as race) with different mortality rates. If 
life expectancy improved at different rates for different demographic 
groups, indexing that was based on the average for all groups might be 
unfair to some groups. Singh and Siahpush (2006), among others, have 
documented a widening of the mortality gap by socioeconomic status. 
In this situation, less than full indexing might be desirable. If life-
expectancy indexing were seen to adversely affect low-income groups, 
that effect could be offset by increasing the progressivity of social secu-
rity beneﬁts through changes in the beneﬁ t formula. 
INDEXING OPTIONS FOR U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY 
Life-expectancy indexing of U.S. Social Security beneﬁts could 
be structured several ways. Beneﬁts received at age 62 could be re-
duced. That approach was proposed by the President’s Commission to 
Strengthen Social Security (2001), which recommended that beneﬁ ts be 
adjusted every 10 years. Another option would be to index the eligibil-
ity age and the normal retirement age so that the eligibility age was a 
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ﬁxed number of years earlier than the normal retirement age. This type 
of indexing would result in a smaller reduction in beneﬁts than under 
life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts because the increase in the eligibil-
ity age would offset the beneﬁt reduction. The legislated increases in 
the normal retirement age account in part for a projected decline in the 
Social Security replacement rate (Table 3.7). 
Savings Estimate 
Life-expectancy indexing of U.S. Social Security beneﬁts would be 
a major step toward resolving the program’s future ﬁ nancial problems. 
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) has estimated the effect of a 
reform that involved life-expectancy indexing of initial Social Security 
beneﬁts. This one change, put into effect in 2012, would eliminate 43 
percent of Social Security’s 75-year deﬁcit and would push back the 
date of insolvency by seven years (CBO 2005). An alternative estimate 
has indicated a smaller effect, with 27 percent of the deﬁ cit eliminated 
(Shelton 2008). 
The two estimates differ in part because of the different ways that 
life-expectancy indexing is applied. The CBO estimate adjusts for the 
percentage change in life expectancy at age 65, while the Shelton esti-
mate adjusts for the percentage change in the present value of lifetime 
beneﬁ ts due to the increase in life expectancy.9 An alternative estimate 
indicates that life-expectancy indexing of initial beneﬁ ts at retirement 
Table 3.7  United States: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts 
System parameter Value (%) 
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate 
Rate in 2008 12.4 
Future rate 12.4 
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker) 
Rate in 2008 41.0 
Future rate (2030) 37.0 
NOTE: The replacement rate is projected to fall for three reasons: 1) the increase in the 
normal retirement age, which acts as a cut in beneﬁts; 2) an increased share of beneﬁts 
being taxable; and 3) increased contributions for Medicare, which are deducted from 
Social Security beneﬁts. 
SOURCE: Munnell (2003). 
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by correcting for the change in the present value of beneﬁts would re-
duce the Social Security beneﬁts of new retirees by about 0.24 percent 
per year (Goss 2003). 
Growth Rate of Beneﬁts 
In the U.S. Social Security system, initial beneﬁts at retirement are 
designed to grow with the growth rate of average real wages in the 
economy. The system achieves that result by indexing Social Security– 
covered wages to age 60 by the growth rate of average wages.10 
A number of countries have reformed their systems to slow the 
growth rate in average beneﬁts to below the growth rate of average 
wages, which is the growth measure used in the U.S. Social Security 
system. In Sweden, initial beneﬁts at retirement grow at the growth rate 
of average wages minus an adjustment for the increase in life expec-
tancy. In Japan, the average beneﬁt level grows at the growth rate of 
average wages less the growth rate in life expectancy. 
The policies of one country may work differently when applied in 
another country. For example, countries differ in their degree of income 
inequality and degree of population heterogeneity with respect to life 
expectancy. For example, Sweden may have greater toleration than the 
United States for cutting the real value of social security beneﬁts in 
payment because it has a low poverty rate for older persons. Using in-
ternationally comparative data, in Sweden 2.1 percent of the population 
aged 65 and older has income below 40 percent of the median income, 
compared with 15.0 percent in the United States (Luxembourg Income 
Study 2007). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Increasingly, countries are adopting automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms for social security ﬁnancing. These mechanisms attempt to deal 
with problems of sustainability and of political risk. While political risk 
has been reduced by these changes, it remains in most systems because 
of oversight of the process by the government and the potential need for 
further reforms due to declining replacement rates. 
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Countries have relatively little experience with life-expectancy in-
dexing of beneﬁts, so it is not possible yet to assess the long-term effects 
of such policies. Countries may eventually decide that life-expectancy 
indexing of beneﬁ ts results in too large a drop in the replacement rate. 
That said, the drop can be offset by workers who choose to work longer 
or by a policy encouraging longer work years, for example by raising 
the social security eligibility age. 
As of 2010, only one country—Denmark—has indexed the social 
security eligibility age. The United Kingdom considered such a pro-
posal but adopted quasi indexing instead, a method in which the age 
rises according to a ﬁ xed schedule. 
Automatic indexing done annually involves regular, incremental 
changes. This type of indexing becomes part of the regular functioning 
of the social security system. However, for indexing to function as it is 
designed, it must be supported by a broad-based political commitment 
not to seek vote-winning modiﬁcations that undermine its effective-
ness. In this regard, it might appear likely that the automatic adjustment 
mechanisms would work in Sweden and Japan because of the consen-
sus nature of their politics. Sweden, however, revised its automatic 
adjustment mechanism to modify its effects. Italy and Germany have 
also overridden automatic adjustments. Thus, the international experi-
ence does not provide a clear lesson as to how this type of adjustment 
would work in the United States. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter recommends that an automatic adjustment mechanism 
be adopted to help restore and maintain Social Security’s solvency. It 
recommends that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life expectancy, 
so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an increase in the 
lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of indexation has been 
adopted by Sweden for its social security program. With this type of 
indexation, every year for each new retirement cohort, there would be a 
slight downward adjustment in beneﬁts to take into account the effect of 
increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of beneﬁ ts. The adjust-
ment would occur for each cohort only once, with beneﬁts received at 
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retirement facing no further adjustments. This type of indexation results 
in a reduced replacement rate over time. The following two chapters 
consider policies that address that issue. 
Notes 
1. This chapter is largely based on Turner (2009). 
2. The projection for life expectancy at age 60 in 2012 is 21.8 years, which is 54.5 
percent of the 40-year working period starting at age 20 (Whitehouse 2007a). 
3. This aspect of the Swedish system is similar to the U.S. Social Security system, 
where beneﬁts are indexed to the growth rate in average wages. However, a differ-
ence is that the U.S. system can increase tax rates without having that change raise 
beneﬁt entitlements, which the Swedish system cannot do. 
4. The actual procedure for calculating the present value of future contributions is 
somewhat different. The expected turnover distribution is calculated as the dif-
ference between the expected average pension–weighted age of beneﬁt receipt, 
which is 76, and the expected average income–weighted age of payroll tax pay-
ments, which is 43. The difference between those two ages is 33. Total assets are 
measured as the buffer fund plus 33 times annual contributions. 
5. The NDC system has few actual assets because it is funded on a pay-as-you-
go basis with a reserve fund that is small relative to liabilities. To calculate 
assets for the purposes of the automatic balancing mechanism, the annual con-
tributions received by the system are multiplied by what is called the expected 
turnover duration. The expected turnover duration is the average length of 
time, measured in years, until the system must pay out beneﬁts to liquidate 
the liability created in the current year. It can be shown that if the population 
structure of the system is stationary, the present value of beneﬁts accrued dur-
ing a year equals the contributions during the year times the turnover duration. 
(Japan has evaluated this method of determining the future liabilities of its 
system and decided that it would not work for the country because it has a de-
clining workforce rather than a stable population structure [Sakamoto 2005].) 
This value of assets is compared to the present value at the end of the ﬁscal 
year of the liabilities for future beneﬁt payments. If assets exceed or equal liabili-
ties in value, no adjustment is made. If assets are less than liabilities, the rate of 
return credited to the notional account balances is reduced, and the indexing of 
current beneﬁts is reduced. To smooth out temporary variations, the calculation is 
done on the basis of a three-year moving average of the ratio of assets to liabilities 
(Könberg, Palmer, and Sundén 2006). Similar to the U.S. Social Security system, 
Sweden’s system calculates three projections: 1) a base case, 2) an optimistic case, 
and 3) a pessimistic case. It uses the base case for determining whether an adjust-
ment is needed and the other two cases for determining the range of possible future 
outcomes. 
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6. Balancing affects the NDC beneﬁ t. Beneﬁciaries without income-related beneﬁts 
or with low NDC beneﬁts can qualify for the minimum guarantee government 
beneﬁt. Among Sweden’s 1.8 million retirees, approximately 800,000 have some 
guarantee beneﬁt. When the NDC beneﬁt is reduced, guarantee beneﬁts will in-
crease for beneﬁciaries with both beneﬁts. Thus, the net effect on total beneﬁ ts will 
be less for this group. 
7. With the sustainability factor A, the beneﬁt formula is multiplied by the following 
factor: 
A = 1 + α(1 – R) , 
where R is the ratio of the dependency rate in year t − 2 (i.e., two years earlier) to 
the dependency rate in year t − 3, and is thus a number greater than 1 because of the 
increasing dependency ratio over time. The parameter α has been set in the German 
reform at 0.25. If it had been set at zero, there would be no sustainability factor 
adjustment. If it had been set at one, the impact of changes in the dependency rate 
would fall entirely on beneﬁts, with no increase in the payroll tax rate. It was set at 
0.25 because that adjustment factor would result in future payroll taxes rising to no 
more than 20 percent in 2020 and 22 percent in 2030, based on current projections 
(Toft 2007). The term α(1 – R) (where α is greater than zero) is negative (but greater 
than –1), making the sustainability factor A have a positive value that is less than 1. 
An example clariﬁes how this operates. If the dependency rate is growing at 
2 percent a year, which is more rapidly than the U.S. dependency rate is projected 
to grow between 2000 and 2030 (Table 3.1), R would equal 1.02, α(1 – R) would 
equal –0.005, and A would equal 0.995. This means that beneﬁts would grow at 
0.5 percent less than the growth rate of average wages. 
8. Japan decided not to follow the Swedish approach, which involves calculating the 
turnover ratio, because in the context of the Japanese social security system it is 
difﬁcult to calculate that measure. This difﬁculty arises because of the variety of 
types of linked beneﬁts, including disability beneﬁts, provided by the Japanese 
system. 
9. The difference may also be explained in part by the differences in the underlying 
models for calculating Social Security’s ﬁnancing: the CBO model calculates a 
smaller long-term deﬁ cit than the approach used by the Social Security Adminis-
tration actuaries. 
10. Once in payment, beneﬁts are indexed to prices. 
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Raising the Early Retirement Age 
Even if Social Security were not projected to have insufﬁ cient funds 
based on current life expectancy, continued increases in life expectancy 
would cause an insufﬁciency to occur in the future. Therefore, a prac-
tical reform proposal to maintain Social Security’s solvency should 
include an adjustment of Social Security for rising longevity. 
Many policy options could deal with the effects of increasing life 
expectancy on Social Security ﬁnancing.1 First, the normal retirement 
age could be raised to a higher predetermined age. In the 1983 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act, the normal retirement age was raised 
from 65 to 67, and that change is being phased in with a long delay, only 
taking full effect for people born in 1960 or later. The normal retire-
ment age is also referred to as the full retirement age, but neither term 
is descriptively accurate. It is the age at which a worker can receive 
Social Security beneﬁts that are not reduced for early retirement. It var-
ies from age 65 to 67, based on year of birth. For example, for workers 
born between 1943 and 1954, the normal retirement age is 66. Liebman, 
MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005) suggest that the normal retirement 
age be raised to 68. 
Second, the normal retirement age could be indexed to rise as the 
life expectancy of retirees increases. The 1994–1996 Advisory Council 
on Social Security included such a measure in its recommendations.2 
Third, the normal retirement age could remain ﬁxed, with beneﬁ ts in-
dexed to life expectancy, so that beneﬁts gradually decline as longevity 
rises for successive cohorts, as recommended in Chapter 3. Fourth, the 
early retirement age could be raised, with the beneﬁts currently receiv-
able at age 62 being received at age 63. Other options include raising 
the payroll tax rate, raising the payroll tax ceiling, adding general rev-
enue funding, changing the beneﬁt formula, and changing the number 
of years used in calculating Social Security beneﬁts. 
While raising the early retirement age is not a popular idea, none 
of the options for restoring solvency pass that test. For more than 40 
years, Social Security’s early retirement age of 62 has been an impor-
71 
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tant benchmark for workers considering retiring. Raising it to keep it in 
line with increases in life expectancy could have a powerful effect on 
the retirement decisions of workers and on all retirement program costs, 
in both the public and private sectors. To allow workers ample time to 
adjust their plans, if the eligibility age for Social Security were raised to 
63, such a change would presumably occur with a long delay, possibly 
20 years, and with a phase-in period.3 
An early retirement age of 63 has international precedents. In Ger-
many, for example, the early retirement age is 63, while in the United 
Kingdom it is currently 65 for men, and is being raised over time to 65 
for women. In Switzerland it is 65 for men and 63 for women. In New 
Zealand and Ireland, it is 65 (Turner 2007). 
In addition, historical precedent supports a higher early retirement 
age. In 1940, when Social Security ﬁrst paid beneﬁts, the earliest age 
at which workers could receive beneﬁts was even higher—age 65. For 
more than 20 years, the earliest age at which men could receive Social 
Security beneﬁts remained at 65. In 1961, the early retirement age for 
men was reduced to 62. The reduction for women had occurred ﬁve 
years earlier, in 1956. 
Chapter 2 considered issues relating to whether older workers 
would generally be able to extend their work lives if the early retire-
ment age for Social Security were raised. Evidence presented in that 
chapter indicates that life expectancy has increased for both men and 
women, and for all major demographic groups in the United States. In 
addition, the physical demands of work have decreased, though not for 
everyone. 
This chapter considers a possible policy change of raising the early 
retirement age in Social Security from age 62 to 63 as one step to-
ward dealing with increased longevity. Arguably, this change would be 
superior to the alternative of workers receiving less in Social Security 
beneﬁts in the future. Either this change could be done in an ad hoc way, 
or it could be done through life-expectancy indexing, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. This chapter surveys early eligibility ages and eli-
gibility requirements for social security old-age beneﬁts in other OECD 
countries, plus selected other countries with informative experience. A
focus of the chapter is on the attempts of various countries to provide 
ﬂexible early eligibility requirements that are targeted to meet the needs 
of groups with particular characteristics as to their work histories. At 
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the end of the chapter, an alternative to raising the early retirement age 
is considered, which is a ﬂexible full retirement age that varies by in-
come level (Monk, Turner, and Zhivan 2010). 
VIEWS ON RAISING THE EARLY RETIREMENT AGE 
It is important to distinguish between changes in lifetime Social 
Security beneﬁts and changes in annual beneﬁts. Changes in lifetime 
beneﬁts affect the wealth value of Social Security and measures of its 
money’s worth. Changes in annual beneﬁts more directly relate to mea-
sures of the adequacy of Social Security, such as the replacement rate. 
These changes can be viewed from different perspectives. 
No changes in the Social Security program, including no changes in 
annual beneﬁts, would mean that lifetime beneﬁts would increase over 
time because of the increase in life expectancy. This change occurs both 
for high-income workers and low-income workers, because life expec-
tancy has increased over time for both groups. Both annual beneﬁ ts and 
lifetime beneﬁts could be maintained if the Social Security early retire-
ment age were increased over time to offset the effect of increases in 
life expectancy on lifetime beneﬁts. Such a change would not adversely 
affect either high-income or low-income workers if it were done by 
adjusting for the lesser improvement in life expectancy experienced by 
low-income workers. 
It is often argued that raising the early retirement age is adverse 
to low-income workers. They have a shorter life expectancy than 
high-income workers, and thus an increase in the early retirement age 
constitutes a greater percentage decline in their years of retirement than 
it does for high-income workers. This argument views the change at a 
point in time, rather than in the broader framework that includes consid-
ering changes in life expectancy over time. Economists have generally 
moved from point-in-time analyses of issues affecting workers to life-
cycle analyses. 
Under a life-cycle analysis, a worker is promised a pension beneﬁt 
when the worker begins work—say, at age 22. When the worker retires 
more than 40 years later, the value of the promised beneﬁt has increased 
considerably for deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans because of the increase in life 
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expectancy that has occurred over that period. Raising the early retire-
ment age to take that increase in life expectancy into account would 
not constitute a reduction in lifetime beneﬁts, but would merely offset 
the increase in payment that was due to rising life expectancy over the 
period. 
Raising the early retirement age could be motivated by a desire to 
reduce Social Security’s beneﬁt costs. Lifetime beneﬁts would effec-
tively be cut if the reform resulted in age 62 beneﬁts being receivable at 
age 63. For workers born in 1960 and later, those who retire at age 62 
would receive an amount equal to 70 percent of their Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA), which is the unreduced value of Social Security beneﬁts 
if they are received at the normal retirement age, which is 67 for these 
workers. Those retiring at age 63 would receive 75 percent of their PIA. 
Thus, workers retiring at age 62 would receive the same level of annual 
beneﬁts but one fewer year of beneﬁts. Workers retiring at age 63 and 
later would receive lower beneﬁts. For those retiring at 63, the beneﬁts 
would be 9.3 percent lower (70/75). 
However, another motivation for raising the early retirement age 
might be to raise annual beneﬁt levels to offset other beneﬁ t cuts. The 
annual beneﬁts of persons taking retirement at age 62 could be raised 
by raising the early retirement age to 63, with no reduction in annual 
beneﬁts receivable at that age. In this case, workers formerly retiring 
at age 62 would receive one fewer year of beneﬁts, but they would 
gain from the postponement in beneﬁt receipt and consequently would 
receive beneﬁts that were 7.1 percent higher (75/70). Those retiring at 
age 63 or later would have no change in their beneﬁts. 
Workers could voluntarily postpone the age at which they take 
Social Security beneﬁts past age 62, and many do. Social Security is 
roughly actuarially fair at age 62, so that for a person with life expec-
tancy equal to the actuarially assumed life expectancy, expected lifetime 
beneﬁts at age 62 are the same as at age 63 for a person delaying receipt 
of beneﬁts. For a person who not only delayed receiving beneﬁts but 
also continued working, generally their beneﬁts would be higher be-
cause of the continued work. 
Since the option of postponing receipt of beneﬁts to age 63 is al-
ready available, the question arises as to why that option should be made 
mandatory. First, because they have ﬁnancial myopia, some workers 
opt to receive beneﬁts at age 62, not taking into account that they might 
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be better off over the remainder of their lifetime by receiving higher 
beneﬁts but at a later age. Second, the incentive to postpone retirement 
built into the Social Security beneﬁt structure only operates for people 
with relatively long life expectancy. For persons with life expectancy 
shorter than average, their incentive in terms of maximizing lifetime 
beneﬁts is to retire at age 62. Third, while some people are poor plan-
ners because of myopia, persons wishing to leave the labor force at age 
62 still are free to do so, especially if they plan so that they ﬁ nance their 
retirement at that age through additional savings from other sources. 
COMPARABLE EARLY RETIREMENT AGES WITH 
INCREASES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY 
With increases in life expectancy and improvements in health at 
older ages, a case can be made that the early retirement age should also 
increase. From a life-cycle perspective, rather than assuming a one-for-
one increase in retirement age with an increase in life expectancy, a rule 
of thumb would be to maintain a constant proportion of life spent in 
retirement. The life-cycle perspective would consider the balance be-
tween the years working (and saving for retirement) compared to the 
years retired because of the focus on ﬁnancing retirement years with 
working years. 
Assuming that the number of years in retirement is roughly 20, 
and that someone who has worked a full career has worked roughly 40 
years, then the number of years in retirement is half the number of years 
spent working. In that case, the early retirement age would be raised by 
two-thirds of the increase in life expectancy to maintain a constant ratio 
of retirement years to working years. 
Table 4.1 shows the increases in life expectancy by race and gen-
der since 1950 and 1960. It makes various calculations of what might 
be considered a comparable early retirement age. At the high end, if 
workers had the same number of years of life remaining in 2006 as they 
did in 1950, when the early retirement age was 65, the early retirement 
age could be raised to 67 and each race-gender group would still be 
better off than the earlier generation by one year. Taking the life-cycle 
perspective of maintaining the same ratio of retirement years to work-
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Table 4.1  Comparable Early Retirement Ages with an Increase in Life 
Expectancy at Age 65, by Race and Sex, 1950–2006 (years) 
White White Black Black 
Year men women men  women 
1950 12.8 15.1 12.9 14.9 
1960 12.9 15.9 12.7 15.1 
2006 17.1 19.8 15.1 18.6 
Change in life expectancy 4.3 4.7 2.2 3.7 
from 1950 (from 1960) (4.2) (3.9) (2.4) (3.5) 
Comparable early retirement 69.3 69.7 67.2 68.7 
age to 1950 (age 65) in 
2003 in terms of number of 
years in retirement 
Comparable early retirement 66.2 65.9 64.4 65.5 
age to 1961 (age 62) in 
2003 in terms of number of 
years in retirement 
Comparable early retirement 64.8 64.6 63.6 64.3 
age to 1961 (age 62) in 2003 
assuming retirement years 
are one-half of work years 
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2009b) and author’s calculations. 
ing years and comparing to 1961 (using data for 1960), when the early 
retirement age was 62, the early retirement age could be raised to 63, 
with each race-gender group being better off than the earlier generation. 
FAIRNESS 
Fairness is an important aspect of the issue of raising Social Secu-
rity’s early retirement age. Would such a change be fair to demographic 
groups with relatively short life expectancy, to people with physically 
demanding jobs, or to people at older ages unable to work or to ﬁnd 
work? The issue of fairness can be addressed in terms of either cross-
sectional equity or intergenerational equity. To examine cross-sectional 
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equity, we compare workers at different income levels at a point in time. 
However, because workers worked to older ages early in the history of 
Social Security, the past becomes a natural point of comparison, which 
is a comparison of intergenerational equity. 
Munnell et al. (2004) note that raising the early retirement age with-
out any associated cut in beneﬁts would result in greater lifetime Social 
Security wealth (the expected present value of Social Security beneﬁts) 
for long-lived demographic groups and less Social Security wealth 
for short-lived groups. By this measure, such a policy is relatively ad-
vantageous to women and disadvantageous to blacks because of their 
relatively longer and shorter life expectancies. This measure considers 
equity across a generation. 
Addressing the issue of cross-sectional equity, a simulation study 
has examined the distributional effects on people of raising the So-
cial Security early retirement age from 62 to 65 (Mermin and Steuerle 
2006). That study ﬁnds that workers in all income quintiles would re-
ceive lower lifetime Social Security beneﬁts. However, workers in the 
lowest income quintile are least affected as a group, in part because a 
higher percentage of them receive Social Security disability beneﬁ ts. In 
that simulation, it was assumed that the level of beneﬁts and age at ﬁrst 
receipt for Social Security disability beneﬁts would not be affected by 
raising the Social Security early retirement age. 
Using intergenerational equity as a measure of fairness, different 
demographic groups are compared to their counterparts in earlier gen-
erations. By the intergenerational method, all groups, including blacks 
and women, are relatively better able to work at older ages, and would 
still be able to spend a higher percentage of their adult life in retire-
ment, if the early retirement age were raised. Thus, it can be argued 
that raising the early retirement age would violate neither standards of 
cross-sectional equity nor intergenerational equity. 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO BENEFIT CUTS 
If the projected future insolvency of Social Security is dealt with 
through beneﬁt cuts, eventually the replacement rate provided at the 
early retirement age would fall to where it would be viewed as un-
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acceptably low. The replacement rate provided by Social Security is 
already not generous by international standards. With changes in law 
that already have been legislated, average earners retiring at age 62 will 
see their replacement rate fall from 30 percent today to 23 percent in 
2030. These replacement rates are net of Medicare part B premiums, 
but they do not include possible future beneﬁt cuts made to restore So-
cial Security’s solvency (Munnell et al. 2004). 
If beneﬁts were cut to restore solvency, a cut in beneﬁts for people 
retiring at 62 could be offset by raising the early retirement age. More 
than half of workers eligible to claim Social Security beneﬁts do so at 
62, the early retirement age in Social Security (Panis et al. 2002).4 If 
beneﬁts were cut by 7 percent but the early retirement age was raised 
by one year, from 62 to 63, people retiring at age 63 instead of 62 would 
receive roughly the same level of annual beneﬁts as before the cut, 
thus helping to maintain Social Security’s ability to keep people out 
of poverty and to provide a base level of retirement income. If people 
worked the extra year, their annual beneﬁts would generally be higher 
than before the beneﬁt cut because of their extra work and postponed 
retirement. 
Raising the early retirement age from 62 to 63 would raise the an-
nual beneﬁts of those claiming before age 63 because of the actuarial 
adjustment for postponed beneﬁt receipt. It could further raise their 
beneﬁts if these claimants worked the additional year. People already 
claiming Social Security beneﬁts at age 63 or later would be unaffected 
by this change, since the beneﬁts receivable at age 63 and higher would 
be unaffected. The effect on Social Security solvency of raising the 
early retirement age would be negligible because on average, across the 
population, raising this age does not affect the expected lifetime level of 
beneﬁ ts. However, without changes in other programs targeted to help 
vulnerable older workers, such a change might signiﬁcantly reduce the 
level of lifetime beneﬁts for individuals who are forced to claim early 
because of poor health or poor labor market opportunities (Zhivan et 
al. 2008). 
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INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The international experience across the OECD countries varies 
considerably concerning age and eligibility requirements for early re-
tirement under Social Security. Most U.S. workers are able to qualify 
for beneﬁts at the early retirement age of 62, but for some countries, 
eligibility requirements are designed to permit long-career workers— 
who started work at relatively young ages and who also tend to be less 
educated—to receive old-age beneﬁts at earlier ages than others. The 
eligibility requirements are based on an attempt to permit people who 
may be less able to continue work at older ages, but who do not qualify 
for disability beneﬁts, to retire relatively early. 
In the international context, pensionable age may be a preferable 
term to early retirement age because for some countries the earliest age 
is 65 or even higher. A pensionable age of 65 is becoming increasingly 
common in OECD countries. In 1993, nearly half of the 23 OECD 
countries (11) had a pensionable age of 65 or higher for men (Turner 
2007). By 2035, three-ﬁfths of the countries (14) are scheduled to 
have a pensionable age of 65 or higher, based on current legislation. 
However, looking backwards, four-ﬁfths of the countries (19) had a 
pensionable age of at least 65 in 1949. Thus, both historical precedent 
and current legislation support the feasibility of a pensionable age of 
65—three years higher than the U.S. age of 62. 
In 2002, in about a third of the traditional OECD countries (7), the 
pensionable age was lower for workers with 40 years of work than for 
those with 30 years of work (Turner 2007). In a few countries (3), the 
pensionable age was higher for workers with 10 years of work than for 
those with 30 years of work; in addition, in a few countries (3), workers 
were ineligible for old-age beneﬁts with only 10 years of work. 
Related policies designed to encourage postponed work include 
• raising the qualifying conditions for eligibility for beneﬁts at 
the pensionable age, 
• reducing the level of beneﬁts available at the pensionable age, 
• raising the incentive for postponing retirement by increasing 
the amount by which beneﬁts are raised with delayed retire-
ment, and 
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• reducing the availability of alternative pathways to early 
retirement. 
Countries That Have Raised the Early Retirement Age 
While many U.S. policy analysts consider it to be politically difﬁ-
cult to raise the early retirement age for Social Security, since the early 
1990s a number of countries have done so, motivated by the desire to 
reduce budgetary outlays and encourage postponed retirement. 
In describing the legislated changes, we give attention to aspects of 
the timing of the increase—the length of the initial delay after the legis-
lation was enacted until the ﬁrst increase, and the length of the phase-in 
or transition period. The following examples identify selected countries 
that have raised the pensionable age for both men and women. 
• In 2002, Finland legislated changes that took effect in 2005. 
The pensionable age in the social security earnings-related pen-
sion system was raised from 60 to 62, and the individual early 
retirement pension, which had been available at age 58 to long-
service workers, was abolished (OECD 2008). 
• Greece raised the pensionable age to 65 for both men and 
women who began working after 1993 and who have had 
short- or medium-length working careers. The current pen-
sionable age, however, is 58 for men and women with long 
careers (10,500 days, or approximately 40 years) and age 60 
for men and women with 4,500 days (approximately 18 years) 
of contributions. 
• Japan is raising the pensionable age for both its ﬂat rate social 
security pension (National Pension) and its earnings-related 
pension (Employees’ Pension Insurance Scheme). Legislation 
Japan passed in 1995 raised the pensionable age for its ﬂ at rate 
pension by one year every three years; it will reach 65 in 2014. 
For sailors and miners, because of the physical difﬁculty of 
their work, the pensionable age for the ﬂat rate pension will not 
reach 65 until 2030. Based on legislation passed in 2000, Japan 
is raising the pensionable age for its earnings-related pension 
(Employees’ Pension Insurance) by one year every three years 
starting in 2013. With these changes, men born after 1960 and 
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women born after 1965 have a pensionable age for both pro-
grams of 65. 
• New Zealand raised its pensionable age from 60 in 1991 to 65 
in 2001. Those workers who turned 60 before March 31, 1992, 
were eligible for a social security beneﬁt at age 60. The legisla-
tion passed August 1, 1991, and took effect the following April 
1, when eligibility increased from age 60 to 61. Beginning July 
1, 1993, eligibility rose by three months for each six-month pe-
riod until April 1, 2001, when the pensionable age reached 65. 
Thus, a ﬁve-year increase in the pensionable age was phased 
in over nine years. A Transitional Retirement Beneﬁt was paid 
over this period to those affected by the changes, and the age of 
eligibility for this beneﬁt also rose, until it was phased out on 
April 1, 2001. 
Some OECD countries have had a long-standing pensionable age 
of 65. In Australia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, the pensionable age for men has been 65 since at least 1949. 
In Ireland, the social security retirement pension is available at age 65 
for both men and women. 
Countries That Have Restricted Qualifying Conditions 
Some countries have increased the incentive for postponed retire-
ment by raising the amount by which beneﬁts increase when a worker 
delays retirement. The United States has done that for retirement post-
poned beyond the normal retirement age up to age 70. The United 
States has also eliminated the earnings test for working Social Security 
beneﬁciaries older than the normal retirement age (currently age 66). 
Some countries, including the United States, have attempted to reduce 
the effect of their social security pensionable age on retirement ages by 
moving toward actuarial neutrality concerning the effect of postponed 
retirement on the present value of social security beneﬁ ts. That change, 
however, only makes Social Security neutral for people with roughly 
the average life expectancy, but still leaves incentive effects for people 
with signiﬁcantly longer or shorter life expectancies. 
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Countries That Have Restricted the Availability of Pathways That 
Facilitate a Relatively High Pensionable Age 
Countries with a relatively high pensionable age usually establish 
policies for people unable to work at older ages that provide alternative 
pathways to retirement. The effective retirement age in countries with a 
relatively high pensionable age is generally at least several years lower 
than the pensionable age in social security, due in part to alternative exit 
routes from the labor force. The easy availability of disability insurance 
and unemployment insurance beneﬁts for older workers facilitates early 
retirement in some countries, since these programs serve as de facto 
early retirement programs. Because of alternative pathways to early re-
tirement, in many countries the pensionable age has a limited effect on 
retirement ages. However, that situation is changing as some countries 
restrict the availability of alternative pathways to early retirement. 
In Australia, a pensionable age of 65 is facilitated by having a 
two-tiered mandatory old-age beneﬁt, with one tier having a lower pen-
sionable age. The pensionable age for the means-tested old-age beneﬁt 
(the age pension) is 65 for men and will rise to 65 for women by 2013. 
Workers can receive the mandatory employer-provided beneﬁt at age 
55; this is being raised to age 60. 
A pensionable age of 65 or higher is facilitated as a social policy 
in some countries, such as Germany, by having a lower pensionable 
age for long-service workers. This policy allows workers who have had 
long careers to retire early. This type of policy may help workers with 
long years of work in physically demanding jobs. It often, however, 
does not help women because they traditionally have interrupted their 
work in the labor market to care for children, though some countries 
give limited credit for child rearing. 
Some countries offer government-provided early retirement ben-
eﬁts through a separate program. In Denmark, workers can receive the 
state-sponsored early retirement beneﬁt at age 60. In Iceland, work-
ers can receive their mandatory occupational pension beneﬁts in their 
two-tier system at age 62 (OECD 2008). Also, many older workers re-
ceive disability beneﬁts. In Norway, nearly all workers are covered by a 
generous early retirement pension that provides beneﬁts at age 62. The 
early retirement pension is considered to be a private sector pension, 
but the government pays 40 percent of the cost. 
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In the United Kingdom, workers who contract out of (withdraw 
from) the social security beneﬁt can receive their contracted-out private 
sector beneﬁt at a younger age, as speciﬁed by the rules for their plan, 
than they could receive their state beneﬁt, or at age 60 if they contract 
out using an individual account (personal pension). 
In the Netherlands, the basic social security old-age pension is 
available at age 65; however, the country’s early retirement program 
(VUT), developed in the early 1980s, provides an alternative exit from 
the workforce. With at least 10 years of uninterrupted employment, a 
worker aged 60 can retire with a replacement rate of at least 80 per-
cent. The government in 2003 announced plans to phase out this system 
(Brooksbank 2003), and in 2004 legislation was passed ending the tax 
subsidy for the VUT except for people aged 55 or older on January 1, 
2005 (Rossingh 2004). It has also ended the tax deductibility of long-
term sickness and early retirement pensions. 
In addition, some countries have a lower pensionable age for work-
ers in certain arduous occupations, such as mining and ﬁ shing. Greece, 
Japan, Portugal, and Spain are examples. 
FLEXIBLE NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE 
Increasing the normal retirement age in the United States while 
holding the early retirement age ﬁxed could be effective in reducing 
Social Security program costs, but eventually it will result in replace-
ment rates that are viewed by many as too low. A possible policy to 
maintain replacement rates is to raise the early retirement age. How-
ever, an increase in the early retirement age introduces possible un-
fairness because the variation in life expectancy across socioeconomic 
groups is positively correlated with lifetime income. A ﬂexible normal 
retirement age is an alternative policy that could preserve or even en-
hance the progressivity of Social Security beneﬁts. If life expectancy 
were correlated with lifetime income, Social Security policy could use 
the AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) to target policies that 
are more equitable for people with both lower lifetime income and 
lower life expectancy. However, while life expectancy is strongly cor-
related with AIME for men, it is only weakly correlated for women, and 
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when pooling the genders the correlation disappears (Monk, Turner, 
and Zhivan 2010). Alternatively, targeting could be done by the “max 
AIME,” which is the AIME for single persons and the maximum of 
the husband’s or wife’s AIME for married couples. Monk, Turner, and 
Zhivan ﬁnd that the max AIME, which is a household measure of 
lifetime income, could be used for constructing a ﬂexible normal retire-
ment age because it is negatively correlated with mortality risk and also 
negatively correlated with other measures of economic vulnerability or 
inability to work at older ages. With a ﬂexible normal retirement age, 
individuals in households with a low max AIME would have a lower 
normal retirement age than other individuals. 
RAISING THE MAXIMUM AGE FOR ACTUARIAL 
ADJUSTMENT OF BENEFITS 
If the early retirement age is raised, the same arguments justifying 
that change should also lead to an increase in the maximum age for 
actuarial increases in beneﬁts. This change would beneﬁt people who 
continue working into older ages, but also would encourage people to 
do so. Currently, the Social Security Administration adjusts beneﬁ ts for 
postponement of receipt up to age 70 in the United States. If the early 
retirement age is increased to age 63, the maximum age for actuarial 
adjustment should be raised in tandem to 71. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This book recommends that the early retirement age in Social Secu-
rity be raised to age 63, with that change being phased in starting in 15 
years, and that thereafter it be periodically adjusted to take into account 
continuing improvements in life expectancy. The initial change would 
occur at the rate of 2 months every other year, so that for persons aged 
47 the new early retirement age would be 62 years and 2 months; for 
persons aged 45, it would be 62 years and 4 months; and so on. 
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If this change were done to help restore solvency, the beneﬁts 
receivable at the new early retirement age would be the same as those 
currently receivable at age 62. This change would both encourage 
postponed retirement and address Social Security’s ﬁnancing. Alterna-
tively, if this change were done in conjunction with the recommended 
life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, proposed in Chapter Three, the 
beneﬁts receivable at age 63 would be the same as those receivable at 
63 before the increase in the early retirement age. 
If Congress raises the early retirement age, then the same argu-
ments justifying that change should also lead it to raise the maximum 
age for actuarial increases in beneﬁts. Currently, beneﬁts are adjusted 
for postponement of receipt up to age 70. If Congress should raise the 
early retirement age to 63, then it should also increase the maximum 
age for actuarial adjustment to 71. 
Notes 
1. See Social Security Advisory Board (2005) for a discussion of various additional 
options. In addition, see Turner (2009) for an international comparison of 
longevity-related reforms to social security systems. 
2. The Advisory Council’s report is available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ 
adcouncil/report/toc.htm (accessed January 5, 2011). The American Academy of 
Actuaries also advocates indexing the normal retirement age to longevity. 
3. See Turner (2007) for international experience with such a policy. 
4. This is also referred to by different authors as the early entitlement age, the early 
eligibility age, and the pensionable age. 
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Longevity Insurance Beneﬁts 
With increased longevity, retirees face an increased risk of hav-
ing insufﬁcient resources to maintain their standard of living at older 
ages. While Social Security provides a guaranteed lifetime beneﬁ t, that 
beneﬁt is insufﬁcient for most retirees to maintain their preretirement 
standard of living. Thus, most people need to supplement their Social 
Security beneﬁts with other sources of income. While the causes of 
old-age poverty are complex, one factor is that as people grow older, 
especially if they live longer than they expected to, they risk exhaust-
ing their sources of income other than Social Security. People in their 
eighties with low Social Security beneﬁts are particularly economically 
vulnerable. Few are able to compensate for a loss of non–Social Se-
curity income by working. People in this age group, often called the 
old-old, may not have sufﬁcient resources to enjoy the last years of their 
lives without ﬁ nancial worries. 
This chapter proposes a new type of Social Security beneﬁ t, called 
longevity insurance, which may be particularly useful for this vulnera-
ble group. This proposed beneﬁt strengthens social insurance for people 
in their eighties and older by adding longevity insurance to the social 
insurance protection Social Security provides. Longevity insurance is 
a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced age. Much of the utility 
value to workers of annuitization is provided by this beneﬁt because 
the annuity value comes from insuring against the possibility of run-
ning resources down to a very low level if one lives to be older than 
expected (Brown 2001). The beneﬁt would be supplied through Social 
Security and would be universally available, but with eligibility based 
on a beneﬁts test, so that only people with low Social Security beneﬁts 
would receive it. 
The longevity insurance beneﬁt proposed here is an enhanced 
Social Security beneﬁt starting at age 82, which is roughly the life ex-
pectancy of someone retiring at age 62. Qualifying persons receiving a 
Social Security beneﬁt below a minimum level would have their beneﬁt 
raised at that age. 
87 
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Longevity insurance can be an important component of a policy 
package to restore Social Security solvency. Public policy changes to 
restore solvency likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security 
old-age beneﬁts as part of a package of changes. Most reform pack-
ages that cut beneﬁ ts would raise elderly poverty. To offset that effect, 
policymakers may want to increase the generosity of some beneﬁ ts to 
better target beneﬁts to vulnerable groups. That goal could be achieved 
by providing longevity insurance beneﬁ ts. This insurance shifts Social 
Security resources toward persons who both are old and have low in-
comes, and thus provides better targeting of limited resources in terms 
of the protection provided to vulnerable persons. 
AN INCREASING RISK OF POVERTY WITH ADVANCING AGE 
Poverty rates among older persons increase with age. Elderly pov-
erty is especially high among people aged 80 and older—a third higher 
than for people aged 65–69 (Whitman and Purcell 2006). Poverty is 
particularly a problem for older women (Smith 2003). Women aged 80 
and older had a poverty rate of 14 percent in 2004, and 25 percent had 
income below 125 percent of the poverty line, compared to 10 percent 
and 13 percent for women aged 55 to 61 (Social Security Administra-
tion 2006). A reason for the increase in poverty at older ages is a decline 
in the importance of non–Social Security sources of retirement income 
at older ages. 
Ofﬁcial poverty statistics understate the problem of poverty in this 
age group because they no longer represent the minimum needs of older 
persons. They are based on a methodology established in 1964. For 
that reason, 125 percent of poverty is often used as a better measure 
of persons with insufﬁcient resources (Butrica and Zedlewski 2008). 
However, even that ﬁgure understates the percentage of older women 
who have fallen into poverty. If no one fell into poverty as they aged, 
poverty rates would decline at older ages because of the greater mortal-
ity risk of low-income persons as compared to high-income persons. 
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Risks Leading to Poverty in Old Age 
People over the age of 80 are at risk of falling into poverty even if 
they have not been poor earlier in life. Also, they have greater difﬁculty 
leaving poverty than people at younger ages (Lee and Shaw 2008). The 
problem of poverty at advanced ages may be growing over time be-
cause while the bankruptcy rate for persons under age 55 fell during the 
period from 1991 to 2007, it more than quadrupled for people aged 75 
to 84 (Sedensky 2008). 
Except for Social Security, most people do not receive retirement 
income in the form of a price-indexed annuity. Partially for that reason, 
people who were not already in poverty can fall into poverty at older 
ages. This may particularly be a problem during periods of increasing 
longevity, if people underestimate how long they will live and they fail 
to plan adequately for a longer retirement. 
The MetLife Retirement Income IQ Study (MetLife Mature Market 
Institute 2008) provides evidence as to errors in retirement planning 
that make a longevity insurance beneﬁt desirable. It ﬁnds that nearly 
70 percent of preretirees overestimate how much they can withdraw 
from their savings and assure that their savings will last. More than 40 
percent indicate that they think they can withdraw 10 percent of their 
savings each year while preserving their principal, while 14 percent 
believe they can draw down 15 percent per year while maintaining their 
principal. Almost half estimate that they will need 50 percent or less of 
their preretirement income to maintain their consumption in retirement, 
while ﬁnancial planners tend to put the ﬁgure in the range of 70 to 80 
percent, depending on family circumstances, such as number of chil-
dren. Six in ten underestimate their chances of living beyond average 
life expectancy. 
While the causes of old-age poverty are complex, in part because 
of these problems in planning for retirement income at older ages, a 
leading cause is that a higher percentage of people at advanced older 
ages depend on Social Security for most or all of their income than do 
people in their sixties and early seventies. For households aged 75 and 
older, 40 percent depend on Social Security for 90 percent or more of 
their income, compared to 27 percent of people aged 65 to 74 (Social 
Security Administration 2006). 
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LONGEVITY INSURANCE 
Longevity insurance is a special type of annuity. Annuities are 
ﬁnancial instruments that pay a stream of beneﬁts over time. A life an-
nuity pays ﬁxed nominal beneﬁts periodically until death. Annuities can 
be purchased privately or through pension plans. Social Security ben-
eﬁts are also an annuity. Workers can purchase an immediate annuity 
at retirement, or they can purchase a deferred annuity for receipt at a 
later age. 
Longevity insurance is a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced 
age, such as 82. It is less commonly called an advanced life deferred 
annuity. While all annuities provide a degree of longevity insurance, in 
recent years that term has been used to refer to a deferred annuity start-
ing payment at an advanced age. Adding longevity insurance to Social 
Security would address the problem of people falling into poverty at 
advanced ages, and it would provide cost-effective social insurance. 
This insurance protection is similar to buying car or home insur-
ance with a large deductible, which optimally deals with catastrophic 
risk. Longevity insurance provides insurance against outliving one’s 
assets, but only when that risk becomes substantial at advanced ages 
(Milevsky 2005). Making assumptions about risk aversion (a coefﬁcient 
of risk aversion of ﬁve), one study calculates that a longevity insurance 
annuity beginning at age 85 provides 62 percent of the longevity insur-
ance of an annuity beginning at age 60 (Webb, Gong, and Sun 2007). In 
actual practice, a longevity insurance annuity would probably be sold at 
more of an actuarially unfair price than a regular annuity because of the 
greater presumption of longer-than-average life expectancy. 
The life cycle theory suggests that rational planners may not save 
for a level of consumption at advanced ages that is equivalent to the 
consumption at earlier ages because of the low probability of being 
alive at advanced ages. A longevity insurance annuity allows a person, 
at low cost relative to the beneﬁt received, to obtain an annuity that 
only pays beneﬁts at advanced ages (Webb, Gong, and Sun 2007). An 
advantage of this type of annuity for life cycle planning is that workers 
may be able to consume more of their nonannuitized resources in their 
sixties and seventies, knowing that they have longevity insurance that 
protects them if they live longer than their life expectancy. 
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Annuity beneﬁts can conceptually be divided into two components: 
old-age beneﬁts and longevity insurance beneﬁts. Longevity insurance 
beneﬁts are a hedge against life expectancy risk. Increases in life ex-
pectancy at retirement age raise the need for longevity insurance. The 
longer the retirement period, the greater the risk that retirees will out-
live their resources and fall into poverty. 
The Social Security beneﬁts paid at age 62 are primarily old-age 
beneﬁts. This type of beneﬁt provides little longevity insurance at that 
age. As life expectancy at age 62 has increased, the proportion of So-
cial Security beneﬁts that serve the function of longevity insurance has 
decreased. By comparison, beneﬁts paid starting at age 82 have a high 
component of longevity insurance. 
This Proposal 
The longevity insurance beneﬁt that I am proposing here is a de-
layed annuity in the form of a minimum Social Security beneﬁ t, which 
would be paid starting at age 82. That age would increase in the future 
as longevity increases. Age 82 is chosen because it is approximately 
the average life expectancy at age 65 (CDC 2007). Longevity insur-
ance is primarily a beneﬁt for women, since women outnumber men by 
roughly two to one in this age group (Smith 2003). 
The longevity insurance would be a price-indexed annuity, just like 
current Social Security beneﬁts. Thus, the deferred aspect of the annu-
ity would not disadvantage recipients because there would be no loss of 
buying power from the annuity. 
Recognizing this enhanced insurance protection, Social Security 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) would be renamed Social 
Security Old-Age, Survivors, and Longevity Insurance (OASLI). The 
renaming would help inform people about the beneﬁt: it would posi-
tively frame the beneﬁt as a form of insurance, rather than the beneﬁt 
being thought of as an antipoverty beneﬁt. 
In addition to serving as insurance against outliving one’s resources 
in advanced old age, longevity insurance can simplify the problem retir-
ees face of planning asset decumulation. Many retirees have difﬁculty 
managing the spend-down of their assets over a retirement period of un-
certain length, in part because of the inherent difﬁculty in planning for a 
long and uncertain period. The prevalence of this problem will increase 
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in the future as people live longer and as an increasing percentage of 
retirees have 401(k) plans, which generally do not provide annuities. 
With a longevity insurance beneﬁt, that planning problem is simpliﬁed. 
Instead of planning for an uncertain period, retirees can plan for the 
ﬁxed period from the date of their retirement to the date at which they 
start receiving the longevity insurance beneﬁt. 
As well as assisting in planning, longevity insurance may help 
people who at advanced ages have difﬁculty managing their ﬁnances. 
At advanced ages, people are increasingly likely to need assistance in 
managing their ﬁnances because of declining mental ability and declin-
ing health. With longevity insurance, retirees have nothing to manage 
concerning the receipt of the beneﬁts because the beneﬁts are handled 
automatically by Social Security, generally with automatic deposit to 
their checking account. They have no checks to cash or investments to 
manage. 
Webb, Gong, and Sun (2007) estimate that with longevity insur-
ance provided at an advanced age, a substantial share of the longevity 
insurance provided by an immediate annuity can be obtained. A de-
ferred annuity starting at age 85 provides more than half the longevity 
insurance of an annuity starting at age 65 (between 56 and 62 percent, 
depending on the degree of risk aversion in their examples), and at a 
fraction of the cost—roughly 15 percent. The authors calculate that 
a household planning to smooth consumption through its retirement 
would need to allocate only 15 percent of its age-60 wealth to a deferred 
annuity with payments starting at age 85. The remainder of its wealth it 
would hold in nonannuitized form to ﬁnance consumption from age 60 
to 85. Much of the utility value to workers of annuitization comes from 
insuring against the possibility of running resources down to a very low 
level if one lives to be older than expected (Brown 2001). 
Part of a Larger Reform 
Longevity insurance can be an important component of a reform to 
restore Social Security solvency. Reform likely will reduce the generos-
ity of Social Security old-age beneﬁts. Most reform packages that cut 
beneﬁts across the board would raise elderly poverty (see, for example, 
Sarney [2008]). Thus, there would be a need to increase the generosity 
of some beneﬁts to provide better targeting to vulnerable populations. 
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That goal could be achieved by providing longevity insurance beneﬁts. 
For low-income persons, the effects of beneﬁt cuts later in life when 
they are least able to work would be moderated. 
This policy shifts Social Security resources toward persons who 
both are old and have low incomes. When this policy is enacted within a 
ﬁxed budget constraint, without enhanced ﬁnancing for Social Security, 
it would involve a transfer of resources from people who are young and 
relatively well-off to people who are old and relatively poor. 
Beneﬁt Payment Structures 
Longevity insurance beneﬁts can be structured in different ways, 
at different costs, and with different goals being served. Beneﬁts can 
be universal or they can be targeted. Universal beneﬁts provide lon-
gevity insurance without regard for need. Targeted beneﬁts take into 
account need. Because they are targeted, they can be provided at lower 
total cost. Within those two categories for beneﬁt eligibility, beneﬁts 
can be based on Social Security beneﬁt levels, years of contributions 
to Social Security, or age, or they can be ﬂ at beneﬁts, being the same 
amount for everyone who qualiﬁes. For example, if the beneﬁt is uni-
versal, everyone aged 82 and older could receive the same ﬂ at amount. 
Alternatively, everyone aged 82 could receive the same amount, but 
the amount would increase slightly more than the rate of inﬂ ation for 
subsequent years, so that it increases in real value at older ages. If the 
beneﬁt is targeted, it could be based on the recipient having worked a 
minimum number of years, with the amount increasing based on the 
number of years worked. While these options would provide longevity 
insurance in different ways, the next section proposes a targeted option. 
A Speciﬁ c, Targeted Option 
The level of beneﬁts provided by longevity insurance proposed 
here would be based on quarters of contributions to Social Security. A
minimum of 20 years (80 quarters) of contributions would be required. 
At that level, a beneﬁt of 70 percent of the poverty level for a single 
or married person, depending on the Social Security beneﬁ t received, 
would be provided. For each additional four quarters, the beneﬁ t would 
increase by 1.5 percent, so that someone who had worked 40 years (160 
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quarters) would receive a beneﬁt equal to 100 percent of the poverty 
level. There would be no maximum number of quarters, so that some-
one who had worked 45 years would receive a beneﬁt at 107.5 percent 
of the poverty level (Table 5.1). 
This beneﬁt formula, by taking into account quarters of coverage, 
supports the principle that Social Security rewards work. Persons with 
more years of work who qualiﬁed for a longevity insurance beneﬁt 
would receive a higher beneﬁt. It also establishes the principle that a 
poor person who has worked at least 40 years is guaranteed at least 
a poverty-level beneﬁt in advanced old age. Thus, a poor person who 
has worked for many years and has contributed to Social Security is 
guaranteed a minimum level of income, and the dignity associated with 
that, in advanced old age. However, a factor that may possibly reduce 
the effectiveness of this beneﬁt is that people with low lifetime earnings 
tend to have more years of zero earnings than people with higher life-
time earnings. People in the lowest quintile of family lifetime earnings 
have on average 9.1 years of zero earnings, compared to 2.4 years in the 
second-lowest quintile (Sarney 2008). 
Social Security currently treats divorced spouses as though they 
had the cost saving advantages of economies of scale inherent in living 
with another person. They receive the same beneﬁ t as do spouses. The 
longevity insurance beneﬁt would help divorced spouses whose former 
spouses were still living.
The beneﬁt eligibility conditions set out here exclude people who 
receive low beneﬁts for reasons other than a full career with low earn-
ings. First, recipients receiving a low beneﬁt who have fewer than 80 
quarters of covered earnings would be excluded. Second, recipients 
Table 5.1  Relationship between Number of Years of Covered Work and 
Beneﬁt Level for the Longevity Insurance Beneﬁt 
Beneﬁt as a percentage of 
Number of years (quarters) of covered work the poverty level 
20 (80)  70.0 
30 (120)  85.0 
40 (160) 100.0 
45 (180) 107.5 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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receiving beneﬁts from pension plans in noncovered employment in 
federal, state, or local government would generally be excluded be-
cause they would have insufﬁcient quarters of coverage. Thus, people 
would be excluded who were affected either by the Government Pen-
sion Offset, which reduces the spouse’s beneﬁt for spouses who have 
a government pension and were not covered by Social Security, or by 
the Windfall Elimination Provision, which reduces the Social Security 
beneﬁt for persons who have a government pension and were in a job 
that was not covered by Social Security (and thus they did not pay So-
cial Security taxes). 
Social Security has provided a minimum beneﬁt in the past, but not 
a longevity insurance beneﬁt. The minimum beneﬁt was available to 
workers taking Social Security beneﬁts at the early retirement age or 
any later age. Because it was not well-targeted to low-income workers 
with long careers of covered employment, it was eliminated for beneﬁ-
ciaries who became entitled in 1982 or later. A more targeted minimum 
beneﬁt was created in 1972 and still exists, but is being phased out. 
Diamond and Orszag (2004) have proposed a new minimum beneﬁt, 
available at the early retirement age, that has some features similar to 
the longevity insurance beneﬁt proposed here. Their minimum beneﬁt 
would require at least 20 years of covered work and would increase in 
value for each additional year of covered work, reaching 100 percent of 
the poverty threshold for workers with 35 years of covered work. 
The longevity insurance beneﬁt would improve the progressivity 
of Social Security by shifting resources toward a subset of low-income 
persons. It also provides insurance against negative shocks, which 
cause some people to have low Social Security beneﬁts. 
Longevity insurance provided automatically to a broad group of 
people years in the future avoids the problem of adverse selection in 
insurance markets. When longevity insurance is purchased privately, 
presumably only people with long life expectancy would purchase it, 
which would drive up its price because of adverse selection. 
While a pure longevity insurance beneﬁt would provide beneﬁts 
to everyone reaching the target age, the targeted longevity insurance 
beneﬁt proposed here also insures against low beneﬁts in old age be-
cause it is a beneﬁ ts-tested beneﬁt. However, it does not consider all 
the resources available to older persons, but only their Social Security 
beneﬁts. The advantage of this approach is that payment would be auto-
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matic, without requiring the recipient to apply for it. Thus, there would 
not be the problem of having a low take-up rate among the targeted 
population. 
Low take-up is a problem with some beneﬁts for older persons. 
An estimated 40 percent of the elderly who are eligible for Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) beneﬁts do not apply for them (Hoskins 
2008). Declining cognitive ability may contribute to a low take-up rate 
at advanced older ages. For this reason SSI is not a good substitute for 
longevity insurance beneﬁts. Longevity insurance would help make up 
for the shortcomings of SSI, and could replace it for the target group. 
Furthermore, it would not be stigmatized, given that the beneﬁt would 
be described as a form of insurance, rather than as an antipoverty ben-
eﬁt. It would not be as targeted a beneﬁt as it would if all resources were 
considered as a qualifying condition, but that type of administrative 
process is both expensive and intrusive. 
Cost Estimate 
This section presents a rough cost estimate for the proposed beneﬁt. 
In 2004, there were 7.3 million persons aged 80 and older receiving 
Social Security beneﬁts (Social Security Administration 2006). The 
poverty threshold for a single person aged 65 or older in 2004 was 
$9,060 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Roughly 24 percent of Social Se-
curity beneﬁciaries aged 80 or older had annual beneﬁts of less than the 
poverty threshold, while roughly 11 percent had annual beneﬁts at less 
than 70 percent of the poverty threshold (based on interpolation, Table 
5.2). Thus, roughly 1.75 million were below the poverty line. 
Somewhat dated data (for 1993) indicate that of the retired Social 
Security beneﬁciaries living in poverty, 42 percent had worked between 
21 and 40 years and 10 percent had worked for 41 or more years 
(Diamond and Orszag 2004; Olsen and Hoffmeyer 2002). More recent 
data for beneﬁt recipients in 2004 indicate that fewer than 20 percent 
of recipients have less than 20 years of covered earnings (Pfau 2008). 
Thus, if 80 percent of the target population aged 82 and older had at 
least 20 years of service, that population in 2004 would be less than 1.4 
million. For the cost calculations, we assume there would be approxi-
mately 1.4 million eligible persons. 
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Table 5.2  Social Security Beneﬁt Recipients with Low Annual Beneﬁts, 
2004 
Annual Social Cumulative Cumulative percentage 
Security beneﬁt Percentage of percentage of of recipients below
level ($) recipients recipients the poverty line 
1–999 0.6  0.6  2.5 
1,000–1,999 0.6  1.2  5.0 
2,000–2,999 0.8  2.0  8.3 
3,000–3,999 1.2  3.2  13.3 
4,000–4,999 2.3  5.5  22.9 
5,000–5,999 3.5  9.0  37.5 
6,000–6,999 4.5 13.5  56.3 
7,000–7,999 5.6 19.1  80.0 
8,000–8,999 4.8 23.9 100.0 
9,000–9,999 7.4 31.3 
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. 
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (2006). 
The level of the longevity insurance beneﬁt received depends on 
the level of the person’s Social Security OASI beneﬁt and the num-
ber of years the person or the person’s spouse (in the case of survivor 
beneﬁts) had worked. The data in Table 5.2 suggest that the average 
beneﬁts would be less than $3,000 a year. If these people each received 
a supplemental beneﬁt that averaged $3,000 a year, the cost would be 
approximately $4.2 billion a year. This ﬁgure is rough, but it indicates 
approximate cost. For perspective, consider that the annual cost of this 
beneﬁt would be less than half of the monthly cost of the Iraq war in 
2009. 
The choice of a level of beneﬁts involves tradeoffs between bud-
getary considerations if there are more generous beneﬁts and social 
welfare considerations if there are less generous beneﬁts. Setting a ben-
eﬁt at less than the poverty line for workers with less than a full career 
of work represents the thinking that Social Security is not intended to 
be the sole source of income for older persons, even though statistics 
indicate that it is for many older persons. Basing the level of beneﬁts 
on the current poverty line recognizes the reality that that amount is the 
poverty measure used in the United States, ﬂawed though it may be. If 
in future years the United States adopts a new poverty standard, at that 
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time policymakers might want to consider using that standard for set-
ting the level of the longevity insurance beneﬁt. 
Who Else Would Be Affected? 
The children of people in their eighties would be affected because 
they would have less ﬁnancial responsibility for low-income parents. 
Provision of longevity insurance may affect family relationships. It 
may empower the poor elderly and raise their social standing within the 
household and within their families. 
Because this beneﬁt provides a form of insurance, it affects po-
tential beneﬁciaries as well as actual beneﬁciaries. Thus, it provides 
insurance to a person with low Social Security beneﬁts even if that per-
son or the person’s spouse does not survive to receive the beneﬁ t. While 
the probability that a single person would survive to receive the beneﬁt 
is roughly 50 percent, the probability is higher that at least one person 
in a couple would survive to receive it. 
In a broader philosophical sense, the insurance would beneﬁt all 
Americans. While a person aged 50 with a career of high earnings 
would probably never directly beneﬁt from the insurance, that person 
could have been born into a family with less advantaged circumstances, 
or they could have suffered from serious health problems, and their 
situation at age 50 could have been much different. 
A possible unintended consequence is that guaranteed minimum 
beneﬁts reduce the incentive to save for people who anticipate that they 
may qualify for those beneﬁts. Since the qualifying condition is the 
level of Social Security beneﬁts at age 82, the unintended consequence 
of people taking steps to qualify would be expected to be minimal. For 
example, a person could retire at age 62 rather than age 65, possibly 
qualifying himself for the higher beneﬁt at age 82, but at the cost of 
lower beneﬁts for 20 years. It is thus unlikely that longevity insurance 
would reduce labor supply at older ages. 
Raising the level of Social Security beneﬁts could have the conse-
quence that some people no longer would be eligible for food stamps, 
Medicaid, housing allowances, and other programs for low-income 
older persons. 
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A possible unintended consequence is that picking the age of 82 
would be unfair to African Americans because of their shorter life ex-
pectancy. However, at older ages the difference in life expectancy is less 
than at younger ages, and at age 65 the difference for white and African 
American women is less than two years. Furthermore, at age 65, the dif-
ference in life expectancy between males and females is greater than the 
difference between African Americans and whites (CDC 2007). 
Another possible unintended consequence is that government-
provided longevity insurance would displace privately provided 
longevity insurance offered by insurance companies. This outcome ap-
pears unlikely given that few companies offer the annuity and that not 
many people purchase annuities—in particular not many of the target 
population. 
Provision of longevity insurance by the government for Social Se-
curity beneﬁciaries with low beneﬁts could stimulate demand among 
higher-income retirees for private longevity insurance. The example set 
by the government could serve as an endorsement that would encourage 
higher-income persons to consider obtaining such insurance through 
their 401(k) plans or purchased privately. 
Political support tends to be greater for social insurance than for 
public assistance, perhaps because of the broader base of people it 
helps. For that reason, political support for adequate beneﬁts through 
longevity insurance may be greater than for Supplemental Security In-
come or for a minimum beneﬁt framed as an antipoverty beneﬁt. 
LONGEVITY INSURANCE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
AND INTERNATIONALLY 
Most U.S. life insurance companies do not provide longevity insur-
ance annuities. These annuities are only available from a small number 
of insurance companies (Iwry and Turner 2008). Longevity insurance 
has been available since about 2005. It is offered by MetLife, Hartford, 
and New York Life Insurance Company. If a 65-year-old man invested 
$100,000 with MetLife’s Longevity Income Guarantee annuity (the 
maximum beneﬁt without death beneﬁt), he would receive $83,000 a 
year starting at age 85. Inﬂation protection and a return-of-premium 
Turner 2011.indb 100   5/17/2011 9:53:55 AM   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
100 Turner 
guarantee can increase the premium by as much as 50 percent (Greene 
2008). 
U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁcult for 401(k) 
participants to purchase longevity insurance. The problem arises with 
the requirement that minimum distributions from a 401(k) plan start by 
April 1 of the year following the year the person turns age 70½. This 
requirement prevents a person from using the entire account balance, or 
a substantial part of it, to purchase an annuity starting at age 80 or 85. 
Changes in these minimum required distribution rules should be con-
sidered to encourage the purchase of longevity insurance. 
A further problem with private sector provision of these beneﬁ ts is 
the long delay between the purchase and the ﬁrst receipt, which raises 
the risk that the insurance company might go bankrupt. While insur-
ance companies are backed by state guarantee funds, these funds are 
inadequate to deal with the bankruptcy of a major insurance company, 
such as AIG. 
Old-age beneﬁts starting at advanced old ages are provided in a few 
countries. The United Kingdom provides a small old age allowance to 
persons aged 80 and older. Ireland pays a beneﬁt of about $800 a year 
at age 80, called the Age 80 Allowance. That beneﬁt is automatically 
received by persons receiving Irish social security pensions once they 
turn 80. Italy has a special supplement for low-income persons aged 
75 and older (European Commission 2001). The Riester pensions in 
Germany are voluntary deﬁned contribution plans that were enabled by 
a reform that took effect in 2002. They require that at retirement the par-
ticipant purchase a longevity insurance annuity that begins payment at 
age 85 (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2005). Singapore is considering add-
ing such a requirement to its mandatory deﬁned contribution system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
With increased longevity, older retirees face an increased risk of 
ending life with insufﬁcient resources to maintain their standard of liv-
ing. In the United States, people with low Social Security beneﬁ ts who 
are in their eighties are a particularly vulnerable group. At that age, few 
are able to compensate for their low beneﬁts by working. As a matter of 
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national policy, it is desirable that people in this age group, often called 
the old-old, be able to live with sufﬁcient resources that they are able to 
enjoy the last years of their lives with dignity. 
The target population for the proposal discussed here is people aged 
82 or older with low Social Security beneﬁts and long work histories. 
Age 82 is chosen because it is approximately the average life expec-
tancy at age 65. Elderly poverty is particularly high among this age 
group—a third higher than for people aged 65–69. People in this age 
group are particularly at risk of falling into poverty even if they have 
not been in poverty earlier in life. They also have greater difﬁ culty leav-
ing poverty than people at younger ages. 
Longevity insurance can be an important component of a policy 
package to restore Social Security solvency. Public policy changes 
likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security old-age beneﬁ ts to 
restore solvency. If general beneﬁt reductions, such as through longev-
ity indexing of beneﬁts as of retirement age, are combined with a new 
longevity insurance beneﬁt, it may be possible to retain much of the 
longevity insurance that Social Security provides for low-income per-
sons. For these persons, the effects of beneﬁt cuts later in life, when 
such persons are least able to work, would be moderated. This policy 
shifts Social Security resources toward persons who both are old and 
have low incomes. It involves a transfer of resources from people who 
are relatively young and well-off to people who are old and have low 
incomes. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter recommends that a new type of Social Security beneﬁt 
be provided, called longevity insurance. Longevity insurance would be 
a type of social insurance providing beneﬁts to qualifying persons at an 
advanced age—initially set at age 82, but periodically increased to take 
into account future increases in life expectancy As retirees age, they 
face an increased risk of poverty as they spend down their non–Social 
Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt would be paid by Social 
Security starting at age 82 for people with at least 20 years of covered 
earnings and receiving Social Security beneﬁts below a ﬁxed level. 
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Payment would not require an application or a means test; it would 
occur automatically. This would be a targeted, cost-effective way of ad-
dressing poverty at advanced old age. It could be included in a reform 
package to restore Social Security solvency that contained beneﬁ t cuts, 
so that it would prevent beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at 
advanced older ages. 
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Deﬁned Contribution Plans 
Encouraging Annuitization 
Retirees risk outliving their assets. While Social Security provides 
a guaranteed lifetime beneﬁt, it does not provide enough income for 
most retirees to maintain their preretirement standard of living. Accord-
ingly, individuals who reach retirement with a 401(k) plan and without 
a traditional deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan generally need to convert at least part 
of their account balance to a ﬂow of income to pay for their retire-
ment consumption. Relatively few, however, actually do that. Only 10 
percent of individuals with deﬁned contribution plans annuitized their 
account balances when terminating employment at ages 60 to 64 and 
ages 65 to 69 (Gale and Dworsky 2006). 
Deﬁned contribution plans can pay old-age beneﬁts in any, or a 
combination, of ﬁve basic ways: 1) a lump sum, 2) a life annuity, 3) a 
phased withdrawal (based on annual recalculation of life expectancy), 
4) installment (term-certain) payments, or 5) ad hoc withdrawals. An 
annuity is a ﬁnancial instrument that converts an account balance into a 
stream of periodic payments. With life annuities, workers receive peri-
odic payments that continue until death. Life annuities, referred to here 
simply as annuities, insure workers against running out of money if 
they live longer than expected. 
The U.S. pension system has shifted dramatically over the past 20 
years from deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned contribution plans, primar-
ily 401(k) plans. While deﬁned beneﬁt plans traditionally provided 
beneﬁts as annuities, most 401(k) plans do not provide that option. His-
torical data indicates that traditionally deﬁned contribution plans have 
generally not provided annuities. For example, in 1985, only 29 percent 
of full-time participants in retirement savings and thrift plans had an-
nuities as a payout option (Mitchell 1992). Deﬁned contribution plans 
accrue beneﬁts in the form of an account balance and typically pay 
beneﬁts as a lump sum. Money purchase plans are required to provide 
the option of a joint and survivors annuity, but few participants choose 
105 
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that option (Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Ben-
eﬁt Plans 2005b). While 401(k) plans are permitted to make a joint 
and survivor beneﬁt the normal form of beneﬁt payment, relatively few 
do. In 2000, 33 percent of deﬁned contribution plans offered annuities 
(Blostin 2003). 
This chapter considers changes in policy and changes in features of 
annuities to expand the extent to which 401(k) plans offer annuities and 
participants choose them. It makes a distinction between two types of 
401(k) plans. For 401(k) plans that are sole or primary plans, it recom-
mends further requirements so that they will function as pension plans 
rather than as savings plans. For 401(k) plans that are secondary plans, 
it does not recommend any changes. 
To summarize the chapter in broad generalities, four approaches 
can be used to increase the annuitization of 401(k) plans: 1) changes in 
public policy (laws and regulations), 2) changes in annuity products, 3) 
changes in marketing of annuities, and 4) changes in the advice people 
receive when planning for retirement. 
POLICIES ENCOURAGING WORKERS TO ANNUITIZE 
Because of the insurance against outliving one’s assets that an-
nuities provide, many public policy analysts support public policy to 
encourage annuitization. This section considers policy options for en-
couraging workers to annuitize their 401(k) account balances. 
Mandatory versus Voluntary Annuitization 
Mandatory annuitization is the only policy that assures that ev-
eryone obtains an annuity from their 401(k) account balance. Because 
trivial beneﬁt payments would result, mandatory annuitization gener-
ally excludes small account balances. Mandatory annuitization need not 
require that full annuitization of the account balance occur at retirement. 
Some degree of mandatory annuitization, such as partial annuitization 
or annuitization at an older age, would help assure that workers would 
not outlive their retirement savings. Mandatory annuity purchases 
would reduce annuity prices by expanding the market to cover individ-
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uals regardless of health and life expectancy. Also, mandatory annuities 
would be less expensive to administer than voluntary annuities, as they 
would offer greater economies of scale and reduced enrollment costs. 
The requirement of mandatory annuitization could be limited to de-
ﬁned contribution plans that are the primary plan provided to workers. 
Thus, if an employer also provided a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan, annuitization 
would not be mandated for the secondary deﬁned contribution plan. 
A mandate, however, may not be in the best interest of all partici-
pants. Workers who have a high replacement rate from Social Security 
and workers with short life expectancy may be better off without a man-
date. Since low-income and low-education workers tend to have shorter 
life expectancy and higher Social Security replacement rates than other 
workers because of the progressivity of the Social Security beneﬁ t for-
mula, they as a group may be disadvantaged by an annuity mandate. 
Furthermore, mandatory annuitization could be problematic when an-
nuities are calculated on a unisex basis, because men possibly could 
purchase larger annuities in the individual market. Another argument 
against mandates is an ideological one: some people oppose mandates 
as an unwanted government intrusion into the lives of Americans. 
Mandates can take various forms. For instance, a weaker mandate 
would require that employers offer annuities as an option. Alternatively, 
a partial mandate could require that the portion of the account bal-
ance attributable to employer contributions be annuitized. A mandate 
could take effect after a period of phased withdrawal. Partial annui-
tization could be required so that at least a minimum level of beneﬁts 
was provided. For example, annuitization could be required of the 
employer contribution and the investment earnings attributable to that 
contribution. The requirement could be extended to the portion of the 
accumulated balance due to government tax relief. Partial annuitization 
has the advantage that it provides a guaranteed ﬂoor of retirement in-
come while allowing the worker to maintain liquidity and control over 
some assets. 
An argument against mandating an annuity, or even mandating the 
provision by 401(k) plans of one, is that workers can easily obtain an 
annuity by purchasing one with their account balance. This option, how-
ever, has at least three drawbacks. First, a drawback for women is that 
the annuity would be available on gender-based pricing, which would 
increase its cost for women. Second, the annuity would be priced on an 
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individual rather than a group basis, which would increase its cost for 
both men and women. Third, this option is less convenient than obtain-
ing an annuity through the pension plan, which reduces the likelihood 
that workers would take it. Full mandatory annuitization could reduce 
participation in a voluntary deﬁned contribution system, as long-lived 
people are relatively more likely to participate than those with shorter 
life expectations, given the requirement of mandatory annuitization 
(Davis 2004). 
Perhaps in part because of the interest rate risk associated with 
converting an account balance to an annuity, many countries with man-
datory individual accounts do not require that workers annuitize their 
account balances. Seven countries in Latin America with mandatory 
individual accounts allow their workers to choose between an annu-
ity or phased withdrawals throughout retirement, while two countries 
mandate annuity purchases (Kritzer 2000). Countries that do not man-
date annuitization generally mandate that beneﬁts be withdrawn in an 
orderly fashion through phased withdrawals. 
Switzerland mandates provision of pensions that are similar to cash 
balance plans. Each worker has an individual account to which interest 
is credited. Pension law sets the minimum contribution rate, the mini-
mum interest crediting rate, and the manner in which account balances 
are converted to annuities at retirement. Beneﬁts must be paid as an 
annuity except for small account balances. 
A compromise would be to impose a limited mandate that preserves 
the options of employees and employers. Such a mandate, favored here, 
would require that all employers that offer a 401(k) plan as the sole 
plan (i.e., without also offering a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum 
standards of generosity) offer an annuity as an option for workers. 
Default Options 
Behavioral ﬁnance has shown that defaults can have an important 
effect on pension outcomes for workers. Some workers, when they 
are eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan, do not decide whether to 
participate. They end up not participating out of inaction, since nonpar-
ticipation is the default in their plan. This group is affected by inertia 
and procrastination, which is also called “status quo bias.” Making par-
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ticipation the default appears to markedly increase the percentage of 
workers participating in 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2001). 
Inertia or procrastination by workers may be the result of a number 
of different mental processes (Turner and Verma 2007). For instance, 
workers in this group may take a passive approach to decision making 
(Choi et al. 2001). Or, they may have ambivalent feelings about the 
decision and for that reason not decide whether to enroll. Ambivalence 
and procrastination may also arise because of the complexity of the 
decision-making process—in particular, the complexity of the decision 
as to how to invest the pension funds, but also complexity in issues 
relating to how to take withdrawals. 
The positive experience concerning worker participation rates with 
autoenrollment may appear to provide lessons for encouraging annui-
tization. Thus, it might be thought that making an annuity the default 
option could have an important effect on the percentage of pension 
participants taking annuities. For example, annuitization could be the 
default, with other forms of beneﬁt receipt being allowed only if the 
participant’s spouse agrees in writing. That approach is mandated for 
beneﬁts provided by employer-sponsored deﬁ ned beneﬁt pension plans 
and money-purchase deﬁned contribution pension plans, but not for 
401(k) plans. 
However, while defaults have a powerful effect on raising the par-
ticipation rate among groups with low participation in 401(k) plans, 
defaults do not always have such a strong effect in other contexts. Be-
cause of the ﬁ nancial importance of the decision and its irreversibility, 
if annuities were the default, considerably more people might opt out of 
the default than has been the case with automatic enrollment. Anecdotal 
evidence strongly suggests that many workers opt out of the default of 
an annuity and take a lump sum distribution when that option is offered 
in traditional deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
It also appears that workers are much more likely to take lump 
sum distributions from cash balance plans than from traditional deﬁned 
beneﬁt plans. This observation may provide further evidence of the im-
portance of framing, suggesting that workers are less likely to choose 
an annuity when the beneﬁt is presented to them as an account balance 
than when it is presented to them as an annuitized beneﬁt. 
Defaults appear to have a larger impact on outcomes when the de-
cision is of less consequence to the worker. If the amount of money 
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committed at any point in time is small, and the implicit commitment 
to the default status for future purchases is reversible, defaults are more 
likely to affect workers. 
This lesson from the experience with defaults concerning small pur-
chases suggests a possible policy to encourage annuitization. A possible 
default for annuitization would be that workers would begin purchasing 
annuity units with their contributions starting at a particular age, say at 
age 40. Each pay period, part of their contributions would go toward 
purchasing annuity units. This default is likely to be more effective than 
a default at retirement because workers can opt out of later annuity 
purchases, and the amount they are purchasing at any one time is small. 
Workers would beneﬁt from dollar cost averaging by purchasing an-
nuities over time at different interest rates. This approach mitigates the 
conversion risk that occurs when the entire annuity is purchased at one 
point in time at retirement (Iwry and Turner 2009). 
Spousal Consent 
Spousal consent is required in other pension decisions, so the 
principle is established that spousal consent can be used as a way of 
encouraging certain behavior, particularly when that behavior affects 
the spouse. For example, spousal consent is required in deﬁ ned beneﬁt 
plans if the participant takes an option other than a joint and survivor 
beneﬁt. The choice of annuities in 401(k) plans could be encouraged 
by requiring spousal consent for an option other than an annuity with 
a joint and survivor beneﬁt. Currently, if an annuity option is not pro-
vided, spousal consent is not required for withdrawing part or all of a 
worker’s account balance. Alternatively, the plan could be required to 
notify the spouse if a different option were chosen. The pensions for 
federal government employees provide examples of these approaches. 
Federal government workers in the Thrift Savings Plan who participate 
in the Federal Employees Retirement System (the “new” system) have 
the ﬁrst of these two alternatives for requirement of spousal consent. 
Federal government workers in the Thrift Savings Plan who participate 
in the Civil Service Retirement System (the “old” system) have the sec-
ond requirement of spousal notiﬁcation. The role of spousal consent 
may, however, be limited in its ability to inﬂuence couples to opt for an-
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nuities, as evidenced by the experience with cash balance plans, where 
consent is required but lump sums are commonly taken. 
Incentives 
Incentives could encourage employers to offer annuities as an 
option in 401(k) plans. These incentives could include regulatory re-
lief. Regulatory relief might take the form, for example, of allowing 
electronic spousal consent, which would enable plans to save costs by 
avoiding paper systems for spousal protections. Some participant-rights 
activists argue, however, that electronic spousal consent can easily be 
abused, because the quality of the signatures in currently available sys-
tems is too poor to allow veriﬁcation as to who has signed. 
Tax incentives are another means to encourage the use of annui-
ties. Incentives can take the form of either more favorable tax treatment 
for annuities or less favorable tax treatment for lump sums and other 
forms of withdrawals. Tax advantages could be provided for plans that 
only provide annuities. They could be offered to workers that choose 
annuities. In Japan, pension annuities receive preferential income tax 
treatment: they are tax-free up to a certain amount per year, with a 
variable deduction that declines in percentage terms in increments for 
beneﬁts exceeding a certain level. 
Adding tax incentives for annuities, however, would raise the tax 
expenditures for the pension system. That would contribute further to 
federal budget deﬁcits. These tax incentives would probably most ben-
eﬁt middle- and upper-income workers because those workers are most 
likely to have pensions. A bill proposed a few years ago, called the 
Lifetime Pension Annuity for You Act of 2005, would have provided 
deﬁned contribution plan participants with a tax exemption on 25 per-
cent of income from annuities purchased through qualiﬁed plans, up 
to $5,000. This ceiling would have limited to some extent the possible 
adverse distributional consequences of providing favorable tax treat-
ment of annuities. 
If tax incentives were provided for annuities, presumably they 
would apply to both deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans. 
However, if they did include both types of plans, that would increase 
further the lost tax revenue, with much if not most of the forgone reve-
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nue going to beneﬁt participants in deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans, where workers 
generally already take annuities. 
Penalties 
The opposite approach to providing tax incentives to take annuities 
is to provide penalties for not taking them. In 2006, Spain reduced the 
generosity of the tax treatment of lump sum beneﬁts in order to en-
courage workers to purchase annuities (Social Security Administration 
2007). However, to the extent that lower-income workers, who have 
lower life expectancy, do not take annuities, this approach would penal-
ize them. 
Immediate Annuity with Programmed Withdrawals 
Chile has an annuity package that combines an immediate annuity 
with programmed withdrawals (Social Security Administration 2004). 
The advantage of this annuity package is that it pays beneﬁts for life 
but the balance of the account used for programmed withdrawals is in-
heritable if the person dies early. This combination allows participants 
to have both the advantages of guaranteed lifetime income through an 
annuity and the possibility of leaving an inheritance to their offspring. 
Insurance for Annuities 
Annuity providers are insurance companies that are regulated in 
the United States at the state level. Each state provides a guarantee fund 
for annuities in case the insurance company should become insolvent, 
but the amount guaranteed varies by state, ranging from $100,000 to 
$500,000. Of greater concern is that the state insurance funds have in-
sufﬁcient assets to guarantee the failure of a large insurance provider, 
such as AIG. The United Kingdom, rather than having a patchwork of 
insurers of insurance companies, has a single insurer at the national 
level, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Annuities are in-
sured at 90 percent of their value, with no ceiling. 
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THE USE OF INFORMATION TO AFFECT BEHAVIOR: 
EDUCATION, FRAMING, AND ADVICE 
Education, framing, and advice are options for encouraging work-
ers to choose annuitization. Education involves providing information 
to participants. Framing relates to the way information is provided; it 
highlights more important information. Advice goes beyond education 
and framing and explicitly makes recommendations. These options all 
relate to the way information is presented to workers. 
Participant Education 
Workers may need to be educated as to the advantages of guar-
anteed lifetime income provided by annuities. The Advisory Council 
on Employee Welfare and Pension Beneﬁt Plans (2005a), an advisory 
group appointed by the Secretary of Labor, commented that plan com-
munications tend to focus on the accumulation phase rather than on the 
payout phase. The council’s report recommended that the Department 
of Labor provide guidance as to what constitutes education, as opposed 
to advice, when employers provide information concerning beneﬁ t op-
tions. Such guidance would alleviate concerns employers have over 
their ﬁduciary liability in providing such information to their workers. 
Education for workers may need to include information about mor-
tality risk and life expectancy in old age. Information concerning life 
expectancy is the most common way that information about mortality 
risk is provided. However, roughly half the population at retirement 
will outlive its life expectancy, so information about life expectancy 
sets a low standard in terms of the number of years that a person should 
be prepared to ﬁnance. It may be more useful, as far as helping par-
ticipants understand the risks they face, to provide information on the 
probability that they will live to age 90, and the probability that at least 
one member of a couple will survive to age 90. 
Participant education is often provided by the institution manag-
ing the investments of the participants’ accounts, which is usually a 
mutual fund. Those institutions have an incentive to not provide infor-
mation about the advantages of annuitization. Because they typically 
do not provide annuities, their income will be greater if participants 
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continue to maintain an account balance that the mutual fund manages. 
Thus, policymakers may need to consider changing the incentives fac-
ing mutual fund companies as pension fund providers and as providers 
of education to 401(k) participants. For example, mutual fund compa-
nies could be paid a fee when an account holder annuitizes an account. 
However, unless the government provided a subsidy, this fee would 
ultimately be paid by the account holder, thus reducing the retirement 
income the account holder received. 
The Pensions Advisory Service (2008), a part of the British govern-
ment, provides a Web-based tool to help people understand the different 
options available from annuities and how those options would affect 
their level of beneﬁts. This tool is designed to facilitate the choice of an 
annuity for people who do not have access to a ﬁ nancial adviser. 
Framing 
The framing of the form of beneﬁt receipt may be important. The 
concept of framing is that the way something is described is important 
to how it is perceived. Participants are accustomed to thinking of 401(k) 
plans in terms of their account balance. More participants might an-
nuitize if they thought of their 401(k) plans in terms of the amount of 
annuitized income the account could provide. Thus, it might be desir-
able for quarterly statements to provide information as to the amount 
of annuitized income the account would provide if it were annuitized 
at a different age, such as at 62, 65, or 67. Expressing the value of an 
annuity this way would also have the advantage of clarifying to workers 
the value of postponing retirement. The Social Security Administra-
tion presents Social Security beneﬁts this way on the annual individual 
statements it provides. 
Several issues arise in attempting to accurately and clearly present 
the future annuitized value of a pension. The value presumably would 
be expressed based on the amount accumulated in the worker’s account 
to date. To make it easier to interpret, it should be expressed in current 
dollars, rather than in future dollars, which would provide a mislead-
ingly large ﬁgure because of inﬂation illusion. Since there is always 
uncertainty surrounding interest rates in the future, the value would best 
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be presented as a range, or with some indication of the likely range of 
variability. Italy and the United Kingdom currently have this type of 
beneﬁt reporting, where deﬁned contribution plan participants receive 
an annual statement indicating the annuitized value of beneﬁ ts accrued 
to date. 
Advice 
Increasingly, pension participants have access to computer soft-
ware that provides advice concerning planning for retirement. It is rare 
that any of this software advises users as to the beneﬁts of annuitizing 
part of their accumulated assets (Turner and Witte 2009; Turner 2010b). 
Even when confronted with a hypothetical case contrived to make an-
nuitization a desirable option, most free retirement planning software 
available over the internet does not advise annuitization (Turner 2010b). 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter considers a number of options for encouraging annui-
tization so that more participants in 401(k) plans would receive beneﬁts 
as a life annuity. Based on these options, we have ﬁ ve recommendations 
to make. 
1) The ﬁrst recommendation is to require that 401(k) plans offer 
annuities when those plans are provided by an employer that 
does not also provide a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum 
standards of generosity. This requirement would treat 401(k) 
plans in that situation as pension plans rather than as savings 
plans, as they are currently treated. 
2) The second recommendation is that 401(k) plans that are pri-
mary or sole plans be required to offer as an option the phased 
purchase of annuities while working. This option would be a 
considerably less risky way of purchasing annuities, compared 
to the current method of making a single purchase at retirement. 
3) The third recommendation is that spousal consent be required 
for workers not choosing a joint and survivor annuity as the 
distribution form of their 401(k) account for 401(k) plans that 
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are primary or sole plans. This option presumably would be of 
particular beneﬁt to women. 
4) The fourth recommendation would be to require that pension 
annuities be covered by federal annuity insurance rather than 
by the inadequate, underfunded patchwork of insurance pro-
vided by the states. 
5) Fifth, U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁcult 
for 401(k) participants to purchase longevity insurance. The 
problem arises with the requirement that, to avoid tax penal-
ties, minimum distributions from a 401(k) plan start by April 
1 of the year following the year the person turns age 70½. 
This requirement prevents a person from using the entire ac-
count balance, or a substantial part of it, to purchase an annuity 
starting at age 80 or 85. Changes in these minimum required 
distribution rules should be considered to encourage the private 
purchase of longevity insurance. 
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Deﬁ ned Beneﬁ t Plans 
Flexibility to Deal with Increasing Life Expectancy 
Improving longevity among workers causes the increasing social 
security costs that so many nations are facing, but it also causes in-
creasing costs for employers sponsoring deﬁned beneﬁt plans. This 
increasing longevity raises the costs of providing beneﬁts in deﬁned 
beneﬁt pension plans because workers receive beneﬁts for more years. 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans are traditional pension plans where the worker’s
beneﬁt at retirement is typically based on a beneﬁt formula that incor-
porates years of work and some measure of the worker’s salary. Over 
a year, the effect on deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan costs of changes in life expec-
tancy is small. Over a period of decades, however, the slow but con-
tinuous effect on pension costs of the cumulatively large increases in 
longevity can be considerable. This chapter considers policies to deal 
with the effects of increased longevity on deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
EFFECT OF LIFE-EXPECTANCY INCREASES ON DEFINED 
BENEFIT PLAN COSTS 
Life expectancy increased considerably during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. A 40-year-old man was expected to live to 73 in the 
1980 population life table, but was expected to live to 78 in 2002 (Oster 
2003). This change increases the length of retirement from 11 years 
to 16 years, assuming retirement at age 62—an increase in retirement 
years of 45 percent. Thus, it is plausible that life expectancy increases 
have had a substantial effect on the cost of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans over 
the past 20 years. 
Assuming an average retirement age of 62 in both 1980 and 2002, 
a 4 percent interest rate, and no inﬂation indexing of beneﬁts past re-
tirement, the growth in life expectancy since 1980 has increased the 
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nominal cost of providing a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan per male participant 
by more than 30 percent. This number is less than the 45 percent in-
crease in retirement years because of the effect of interest discounting, 
which reduces the present value of distant future beneﬁ ts. Thus, over 
this period, deﬁ ned beneﬁt costs have grown by an average of more 
than 1 percent per year per male participant because of the increase in 
life expectancy. This number is a rough approximation, but it gives an 
estimate of the magnitude of the effect for a typical deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan. 
The “feminization” of some pension plans due to the increased labor 
force participation of women would further increase costs, since that 
would raise the average life expectancy of the participants in the plan. 
Related evidence as to the effect of life expectancy on plan costs is 
provided by the price changes made by life insurers. Life insurers in the 
United States have revised downward their prices by amounts ranging 
from 10 to 30 percent because new mortality tables are being used that 
replace tables established in 1980 (Oster 2003). 
In the United Kingdom, the effect of increasing longevity on 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan costs is thought to be one of the reasons why em-
ployers are ending those plans in favor of deﬁned contribution plans 
(Pensions Policy Institute 2007). According to a British survey, the 
primary reasons for large numbers of employers terminating deﬁned 
beneﬁt pension plans are increased costs due to lower real investment 
returns and greater longevity (White 2003). 
The Effects of Uncertainty on Improvements in Life Expectancy 
The uncertainty of the cost imposed by unknown future changes 
in longevity may also affect employers’ pension decisions. Future 
improvements in life expectancy are inherently uncertain, causing em-
ployers sponsoring deﬁned beneﬁt plans to bear longevity risk. The 
dramatic rise in obesity in recent years may cause life expectancy to 
increase less than currently projected, or a revolution in medical sci-
ence may cause the improvements to be greater than projected. As an 
example of the differences of opinion among experts, the Social Secu-
rity actuaries projected that between 2000 and 2080 there would be an 
increase of six years for life expectancy at birth, but the 2003 Technical 
Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003), which examined the basis 
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for that projection, recommended projecting an even greater increase in 
life expectancy, about 7.5 years. 
Pension plan sponsors during the late 1940s and 1950s, when many 
deﬁned beneﬁt plans were established, may have poorly anticipated 
improvements in life expectancy at older ages. The increases in life 
expectancy at older ages during the preceding decades were relatively 
small. Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 11.7 years in 1900 to 21.2 
years in 2000, an 81 percent increase. However, 75 percent of this 
change occurred after 1950. The improvements in life expectancy at 
older ages generally accelerated over the century, thanks especially to 
an unprecedented reduction in mortality from cardiovascular disease 
beginning in the late 1960s (Technical Panel on Assumptions and Meth-
ods 2003). 
EMPLOYER PENSION RESPONSES TO INCREASED 
WORKER LONGEVITY 
Increasing life expectancy raises pension liabilities based on both 
future and past work. Employers have a number of options for dealing 
with this problem, though some good ones are prevented by U.S. pen-
sion law (Muir and Turner 2007). Some employers aggressively deal 
with the problem by maintaining updated mortality tables; others use 
conservative funding assumptions to offset the misrepresentation of 
costs that an outdated mortality table yields; other employers cut future 
beneﬁt accruals; and still others encourage their employees to take a 
lump sum option, which frees them of liability for future longevity im-
provements during the worker’s retirement period. But in what is more 
often the case, ﬁrms are switching to deﬁned contribution plans or cash 
balance plans, where employer costs are unaffected by the apparent gla-
cial inevitability of improved longevity. 
In adjusting deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to offset the beneﬁt cost increase 
caused by increasing life expectancy, employers can cut beneﬁts re-
ceived at normal retirement, cut early retirement beneﬁts, reduce 
cost-of-living adjustments for beneﬁts being paid, or raise the early 
or normal retirement ages, all of which are indirect ways of cutting 
beneﬁts. Employers can end plan features that provide incentives for 
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early retirement. In most countries, and in government-sector plans in 
the United States, employees as a general rule directly share in the ﬁ-
nancing of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans by making mandatory tax-deductible 
contributions. Raising these contributions is another way of dealing 
with increased costs due to increased longevity. Besides making adjust-
ments in deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to offset the increased beneﬁt cost due to 
increased longevity, employers may make other adjustments. Employ-
ers may reduce the amount of wage compensation they pay, so that 
the workers themselves absorb the increased cost of providing pension 
beneﬁts through reduced wages. 
Employers can reduce future pension accruals for new employees 
by establishing a higher early-retirement age or requiring more years of 
service to qualify for early retirement, but making these changes is ad-
ministratively complex. The approach of basing changes on the date of 
employment has the further disadvantage that different employees who 
may be holding similar jobs are treated differently. Nonetheless, such 
an approach would be legal under pension law, and may be viewed by 
employees as fair, since it becomes part of the labor agreement at time 
of hire. 
Employers can also reduce future pension accruals for current em-
ployees. When they do so, they must distribute an Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) Section 204(h) notice to employees, ad-
vising them of the change and explaining its effect on them. When the 
reduction is for an early retirement beneﬁt, the notice must provide an 
explanation of the beneﬁt before and after the change. More informa-
tion is required if the simple description does not give a reasonable 
picture of the full impact of the change (Segal Company 2003). Al-
though these notice provisions do not prohibit plan amendments that 
reduce accruals, they do ensure that participants are informed about 
pending changes. These disclosure requirements may discourage plan 
sponsors from taking actions that they would prefer not to highlight 
to their employees or may enable employees to exert pressure against 
potential plan amendments. 
Relatively few sponsors of ERISA deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans have raised 
their early retirement age, in spite of large increases in cost due to sig-
niﬁcant increases in life expectancy (Muir and Turner 2007). However, 
some private-sector employers have established separate plans with 
higher early-retirement ages for new employees. In the government 
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sector, the early retirement age has been increased in the federal gov-
ernment’s plan for civil servants, as well as in some state and local 
government plans, especially for teachers. The evidence from the gov-
ernment sector provides some indication that the anticutback rule in 
ERISA may be making it difﬁcult for private employers to adjust their 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans for the increased costs stemming from increasing 
longevity. 
 ERISA appears to have limited increases in the normal retirement 
age (NRA) by legislative language that has been interpreted by some 
pension attorneys to indicate that the NRA cannot be raised higher than 
age 65. Even if ERISA would permit such a change, its substantive and 
notice provisions may act as an implicit barrier. 
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 
International evidence may provide further insights into reasons 
why ERISA plans in the United States have not raised the early retire-
ment age. The following survey of policies in different nations points 
to international experience that may be useful for the United States in 
considering policy options with respect to the early retirement age and 
the normal retirement age in occupational pension plans. By providing 
information about reforms in other countries, it may indicate the range 
of feasible reforms. 
Australia. The minimum retirement age is 55 for receiving a pen-
sion beneﬁt for both men and women born before July 1, 1960. It will 
gradually increase so that for those born after June 30, 1964, the mini-
mum retirement age will be 60. 
Belgium. In 2003, Belgium passed a pension law stipulating that 
pension beneﬁts cannot be paid before the age of 60. Previously ben-
eﬁts could be received at age 58 or earlier. For all existing plans, the old 
rules applied until January 1, 2010 (Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2003). 
New Zealand. New Zealand has passed human rights legisla-
tion that bans compulsory retirement ages. Before that legislation, the 
country’s police departments had set a mandatory retirement age of 55 
(Global Action on Aging 2003). 
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Switzerland. To make the early retirement age for social security 
pensions the same as that for occupational pensions, in 2001 Switzer-
land increased the early retirement age for occupational pension plans 
from age 62 to 64. The increase from 62 to 63 took place in 2001, and 
the increase from 63 to 64 took place in 2005. 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has raised the minimum 
age at which occupational pensions can be received from 50 to 55. Civil 
servants became subject to a new early retirement age of 65 for all new 
employees starting in 2006; prior to that the pensionable age was 60. 
European Union. Legislation proposed in 1999 and taking effect 
in May 2004 increased the retirement age for European Union civil ser-
vants from 60 to 63. However, up to 10 percent of the civil servants will 
be able to retire earlier under certain conditions (Spiteri 2003). 
A LIFE EXPECTANCY–INDEXED DB PLAN 
A factor that appears to have led to the decline in deﬁ ned beneﬁt 
plans in the United States and elsewhere has been the increase in life 
expectancy. Deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans do not have the ﬂexibility to deal 
readily with this continued increase in cost. 
A policy innovation would permit life-expectancy indexing of ben-
eﬁts at retirement: a life expectancy–indexed DB plan. This innovation 
follows the Notional Deﬁned Contribution plan in Sweden. A traditional 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan can easily be converted into a life expectancy– 
indexed DB by adding a single feature to the calculation of initial 
beneﬁts at retirement. Each year as another cohort reaches retirement 
age, the generosity of beneﬁts would be reduced slightly to take into 
account the continued improvement in life expectancy. The adjustment 
would not reduce expected lifetime beneﬁts, but rather would offset 
the increase in lifetime beneﬁts caused by increased life expectancy. 
No further adjustments would occur for life expectancy improvements 
during retirement. Thus, some of the cohort life expectancy risk would 
remain with employers. 
Life expectancy risk can be divided into the idiosyncratic risk that 
a particular individual will live longer than expected and the cohort risk 
that an entire cohort on average will live longer than expected. Annuity 
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providers are able to deal with idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across 
large numbers of people, effectively diversifying it away. However, 
cohort risk cannot be pooled because it is correlated across workers. 
Longevity bonds would provide a hedge, but a market for them has not 
developed. The higher the percentage of a cohort that remains alive, 
the higher the payout from longevity bonds. Life-expectancy indexing 
of beneﬁts is one way of dealing with this risk. The idiosyncratic risk 
is borne by the annuity provider, who can diversify it away. The cohort 
risk is borne by workers, who are the beneﬁciaries of the improved life 
expectancy.1 
A life expectancy–indexed DB plan would arguably provide more 
efﬁcient bearing of longevity risk than a traditional deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan. 
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts would shift to workers the cohort 
life-expectancy risk, which is the risk that an entire birth cohort will live 
longer than expected, on average. The plan sponsor bears the idiosyn-
cratic life-expectancy risk, which is the risk that a particular individual 
will live longer than expected. 
Different pension types vary in the life expectancy risk that workers 
and employers bear (Table 7.1). In a traditional deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan, the 
employer bears both the idiosyncratic and the cohort risk. In a 401(k) 
plan without an annuity, the employee bears both of those risks. In a life 
expectancy–indexed DB plan and in a 401(k) plan with an annuity, the 
risks are shared, as employers bear the idiosyncratic risk and employees 
bear the cohort risk. 
Under current U.S. pension law (ERISA), this innovation would 
not be allowed because it would violate the anticutback rule. The 
Table 7.1  Bearing of Longevity Risk by Employers, Employees, and 
Insurance Companies 
Plan type Idiosyncratic risk Cohort risk 
LE DB Employer Employee 
Traditional DB Employer Employer 
BMW’s DB plan (UK) Insurance company Insurance company 
401(k) without annuity Employee Employee 
401(k) with annuity Insurance company Employee 
NOTE: “LE” stands for “life expectancy–indexed.” 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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anticutback rule is deﬁned in terms of annual beneﬁts. If that rule were
redeﬁned to take an economist’s perspective and use lifetime beneﬁts 
as the measure, life-expectancy indexing would not constitute a cutback 
in lifetime beneﬁts. 
With this proposal, the risk that on average workers will live longer 
is largely shifted from employers to workers. Workers are better able 
to bear this risk than employers because they are also the beneﬁciaries 
of the increased life expectancy. They can adjust to the beneﬁt cuts by 
working longer, which is facilitated by their increased life expectancy. 
An issue arises for plan sponsors as to who would generate the life ex-
pectancy index to be used. Department of Labor regulations may need 
to resolve that issue, setting a required index or a minimum standard. 
A similar approach for dealing with cohort life expectancy risk, 
which may have the questionable advantage of being less transparent 
to workers, would be to index the plan’s normal retirement age to in-
creases in life expectancy. Doing so could also result in a reduction in 
annual beneﬁts while maintaining the lifetime expected value of ben-
eﬁ ts. This change is less transparent because it is presented to workers 
as an increase in the normal retirement age rather than a cut in beneﬁts. 
A variant of this proposal has been adopted by BMW in the United 
Kingdom (Plumridge 2010). Under this arrangement, BMW has shifted 
the cohort and idiosyncratic longevity risk to a life insurance company, 
rather than shifting that risk to workers. It retains ﬁnancial market 
risk. 
LIFE-EXPECTANCY INDEXING OF FIXED AGES 
IN PENSION LAW 
U.S. pension law contains a number of ﬁxed minimum or maximum 
ages for receipt of beneﬁts. For example, retirees generally must start 
receiving beneﬁts shortly after they turn age 70½. Another example is 
that they cannot receive beneﬁts from a 401(k) plan before age 55 with-
out a tax penalty and without having terminated employment with that 
employer, or age 59½ while continuing in employment with the same 
employer. Pension law is generally interpreted as not permitting a nor-
mal retirement age in deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans higher than age 65. Given 
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the increase in longevity, it may make sense to periodically review and 
raise these ages or automatically index them. 
LUMP SUM BENEFITS IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
While deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans are not required to provide a lump sum 
option, many of them do, presumably because participants like the op-
tion. Once a plan sponsor offers a lump sum distribution as an option 
in a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan, ERISA makes it difﬁcult for that option to be 
ended. Thus, a possible change in pension law would be to clearly al-
low employers to terminate the lump sum distribution option in deﬁned 
beneﬁt plans in order to encourage annuitization. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter recommends that pension law be amended to permit 
a new type of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy–indexed 
DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient bearing of life expec-
tancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans. With a 
life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the generosity of the 
plan would be adjusted to take into account improvements in life ex-
pectancy, analogous to annuitizing a deﬁned contribution plan account 
using current life expectancy. Thus, cohort life expectancy risk would 
be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan sponsors 
because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase in life 
expectancy. 
In addition, this chapter recommends life-expectancy indexing: 
legally set minimum or maximum ages in pension law to take into 
account improvements in life expectancy. For example, the require-
ment that pension payments begin shortly after a person turns age 70½ 
would be periodically updated to take into account improvements in 
life expectancy. Similarly, pension law should be clariﬁed so that a nor-
mal retirement age greater than 65 in deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans would be 
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allowed. This chapter recommends that ERISA be clariﬁed to permit 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to terminate lump sum beneﬁts as an option, in 
order to encourage annuitization. 
Note 
1. A study has attempted to quantify the aggregate mortality risk, which is the risk 
that an entire cohort will live longer than predicted (Friedberg and Webb 2005). 
The study estimates that a markup of the annuity premium by 4.3 percent would 
reduce the probability of insolvency due to cohort mortality risk to 5 percent, and 
that a markup of 6.1 percent would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1 per-
cent. 
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Policy Recommendations 
While increasing longevity at older ages is well known, U.S. 
policymakers have not developed a uniﬁed national policy that deals 
with its effects. In this book, I recommend a number of policies for 
dealing with increased longevity, arguing that a uniﬁed longevity policy 
would be more effective than dealing separately with the issues facing 
older workers, pensions, and Social Security. Together, these policies 
would encourage work at older ages, move Social Security toward 
solvency, provide better targeting of Social Security beneﬁ ts, increase 
annuitization of 401(k) accounts, and encourage employers to provide 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter 2 presents evidence concerning improvements in the 
ability of older persons to work and in reductions in the physical de-
mands of many jobs. Based on that evidence, it appears clear that if 
older workers were economically motivated to do so and the demand 
for older workers were sufﬁcient, it would be feasible for many to ex-
tend their work lives. This change could be facilitated by encouraging 
older workers to maintain and improve their job skills through training 
programs or informal training on the job. To facilitate such a policy, it 
also would be desirable to address barriers to employment at older ages. 
Many older workers report age discrimination if they are in the situation 
of looking for a job—for example, if they have been laid off. While this 
book does not address this issue, it recommends that further research be 
done on the issue of age discrimination and policies to deal with it. A
further topic worth exploring is the issue of educating workers as to the 
beneﬁts of postponing retirement. Deciding at what age to retire is one 
of the most important ﬁnancial decisions a worker makes, yet it appears 
that many workers retire too early, perhaps because of myopia as to the 
consequences of the decision. 
129 
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Recognizing the political difﬁculty in enacting reforms that involve 
cutting beneﬁts, raising taxes, or raising the early retirement age, Chap-
ter 3 recommends an automatic adjustment mechanism be adopted to 
help restore and maintain Social Security’s solvency. The chapter rec-
ommends that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life expectancy, 
so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an increase in the 
lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of indexation has been 
adopted by Sweden for its social security program. 
With this type of indexation, every year for each new retirement 
cohort, beneﬁts would be slightly adjusted downward to take into ac-
count the effect of increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of 
beneﬁts. The adjustment would occur for each cohort only once, with 
beneﬁts received at retirement facing no further adjustments for contin-
ued increases in life expectancy during the retirement period. This type 
of indexation results in a reduced replacement rate over time. Chapters
4 and 5 address that issue. 
Based on the evidence presented in Chapter 2 indicating that the 
early retirement age could be raised with relatively little hardship for 
most workers, Chapter 4 recommends that the early retirement age 
for Social Security be raised to 63, with that change being phased in 
starting in 15 years, and that thereafter the early retirement age be au-
tomatically adjusted to take into account continuing improvements in 
life expectancy. This change could offset to some extent the beneﬁ t cuts 
recommended above, so as to diminish the reduction in annual beneﬁts 
workers would receive. The initial change would occur at the rate of 
two months every other year, so that for persons aged 47 the new early 
retirement age would be 62 years and two months; for persons aged 45 
it would be 62 years and four months; and so on. This policy would be 
enacted with a long lead time and phase-in period so as to allow people 
time to plan for the change. It thus would not affect workers nearing 
retirement and would only affect workers in the future, when it can be 
expected that life expectancy will be even longer than it is now. 
As a matter of social policy concern for vulnerable groups, it would 
be desirable to consider other changes to help a small group of vul-
nerable workers who are unable to extend their work lives. While this 
group of workers is often cited as a reason not to raise the early retire-
ment age, the group is small, and policies can be enacted that address 
their particular needs. These policies could include early beneﬁts for 
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workers with many years of covered Social Security work or lowering 
the requirements for receipt of disability beneﬁts at older ages. 
If the early retirement age was raised to help restore solvency, the 
beneﬁts received at the new early retirement age would be the same 
as those currently receivable at age 62. This change would encourage 
workers to postpone retirement, thus reducing Social Security’s deﬁcit. 
Alternatively, if this change were done in conjunction with the recom-
mended life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, the beneﬁts receivable at 
age 63 would be unchanged, being the same as those receivable at 63 
before the increase in the early retirement age. 
While some people are adamantly opposed to any cuts in Social 
Security beneﬁts because those beneﬁts already are not generous by 
international standards, others are equally adamant that there should 
be no increases in taxes to support Social Security. Once both groups 
realize that some change is needed and it is a matter of making a choice 
of which one, perhaps raising the early retirement age with a long lead 
time might be less unpopular than the two alternatives. While some 
people object to such a policy as placing a hard burden on workers, 
those making that criticism seem to be unaware that when President 
Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act in 1935, and for more 
than 20 years afterward, during an era when life expectancy was lower 
and more people had physically demanding jobs, the early retirement 
age was 65. 
If the early retirement age is raised, the same arguments justifying 
that change should also lead to an increase in the maximum age for 
actuarial increases in beneﬁts with postponed receipt of beneﬁ ts. Cur-
rently, beneﬁts are adjusted for postponement of receipt up to age 70. 
If the early retirement age is increased to age 63, the maximum age for 
actuarial adjustment should be raised to 71. 
Taking steps to address low income at older ages, Chapter 5 recom-
mends that a new type of Social Security beneﬁt be provided called 
longevity insurance. Longevity insurance would be a type of social in-
surance providing beneﬁts to qualifying persons at an advanced age 
—initially set at age 82, but automatically increased to take into ac-
count future increases in life expectancy. 
As retirees age, they face an increased risk of poverty as they spend 
down their non–Social Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt 
would be paid by Social Security starting at age 82 for people with at 
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least 20 years of covered earnings and receiving Social Security ben-
eﬁts below a ﬁxed level. Payment would not require an application or 
a means test; it would occur automatically. This would be a targeted, 
cost-effective way of addressing poverty at advanced old age. 
Longevity insurance could be included in a reform package to re-
store Social Security solvency that contained beneﬁt cuts, so that it 
would prevent beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at advanced 
older ages. It would be ﬁnanced out of payroll tax revenue. Thus either 
payroll taxes would need to be higher than otherwise in order to ﬁnance 
it, or other beneﬁt cuts could provide the needed ﬁnancing. 
Chapters 6 and 7 consider longevity policy options for employer-
provided pension plans. Chapter 6 considers a number of options for 
encouraging annuitization of 401(k) plan accounts so that participants 
would receive beneﬁts as a life annuity. The ﬁrst recommendation is to 
require that 401(k) plans offer annuities when those plans are provided 
by an employer that does not also provide a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan meet-
ing minimum standards of generosity. This requirement would treat 
401(k) plans that are the primary plan as pension plans rather than as 
savings plans, as they are currently treated. 
The second recommendation is that 401(k) plans that are sole or 
primary plans be required to offer as an option the phased purchase 
of annuities by the employee during that employee’s working years. 
This option would be a considerably less risky way of purchasing an-
nuities, compared to the current method of making a single purchase at 
retirement. 
The third recommendation is that spousal consent be required for 
workers not choosing a joint and survivor annuity as the distribution 
form of their 401(k) account when the 401(k) plan is the sole or primary 
plan. 
The fourth recommendation would require that pension annuities 
be covered by federal annuity insurance rather than by the inadequate, 
underfunded patchwork of insurance provided by the states. 
Fifth, U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁ cult for 
401(k) participants to purchase longevity insurance with their pension 
assets. The problem arises with the requirement that minimum distribu-
tions from a 401(k) plan start by April 1 of the year following the year 
the person turns age 70½. This requirement prevents a person from us-
ing the entire account balance, or a substantial part of it, to purchase an 
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annuity starting at age 80 or 85. Changes in these minimum required 
distribution rules would facilitate the purchase of longevity insurance. 
Because of the different types of risks that deﬁ ned beneﬁt and de-
ﬁned contribution plans impose on participants, a pension system would 
be better diversiﬁed if it provided both deﬁ ned beneﬁt and deﬁ ned con-
tribution plans to most workers. Deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans have declined, 
and currently most workers with a pension plan only have a deﬁned 
contribution plan. In order to encourage employer provision of deﬁned 
beneﬁt plans, Chapter 7 recommends that pension law be amended to 
permit a new type of deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy– 
indexed DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient bearing of life 
expectancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans. 
With a life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the generos-
ity of the plan would be adjusted to take into account improvements in 
life expectancy, analogous to annuitizing a deﬁned contribution plan 
account using current life expectancy or to the changes proposed for in-
dexing Social Security beneﬁts. Thus, cohort life expectancy risk would 
be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan sponsors 
because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase in life 
expectancy. 
In addition, this chapter recommends life expectancy indexing– 
ﬁxed ages in pension law, so as to take into account improvements in 
life expectancy. U.S. pension law contains a number of ﬁ xed minimum 
or maximum ages for receipt of beneﬁts. For example, the requirement 
that pension payments begin shortly after a person turns age 70½ would 
be periodically updated to take into account improvements in life ex-
pectancy. Similarly, pension law should be clariﬁed so that a normal 
retirement age greater than 65 would be allowed for deﬁ ned beneﬁt 
plans. Furthermore, this chapter recommends that ERISA be clariﬁed 
to permit deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans to terminate lump sum beneﬁts as an op-
tion, in order to encourage annuitization. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While the book argues for a number of distinct policies, its main 
argument is for a package of longevity policies. These policies would 
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reinforce each other and would facilitate the adjustment of workers and 
pension systems to the costs and beneﬁts of a longer life. A uniﬁed 
package of reforms dealing with longevity would not only be more ef-
fective, it would presumably be more feasible to enact from a political 
perspective, because it would provide a more balanced approach. 
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